Fruits and Votes » The Iraqle

‘A flawed policy wrapped in illusion’ and ratified by scurrilous polarization

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Peace and war; The Iraqle

The quoted words in the title were, of course, some of the opening words of the statement on the Iraq war by Representative John P. Murtha (D-Penn.) on November 17.

It will surprise no one who has spent any time with this blog that I agree with Rep. Murtha. Some of us saw this coming back at the time that Murtha was among those facilitating the bipartisan support for the looming debacle, but as the old saying goes, better late than never. Thank you, Rep. Murtha, for having the courage to speak up. At last.

I want to spend most of this post on the strategy of the House GOP majority in its vote on November 18, which I consider an absolutely scurrilous case of forced polarization and dodging of the real issues. But first, I want to address the substance of the policy, and how Murtha said it should change. (more…)

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Cold Spring Shops grafted THINKING ABOUT EXIT STRATEGIES.

18 October 2005

Iraq: The IIP and the insurgency

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Iraq; Peace and war; The Iraqle

One commenter to an earlier post has a provocative suggestion: That the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which is one party among the Sunni Arab leadership and broke with the rest to endorse the constitution, may have ties to the guerrillas. The commenter notes that there were very few attacks during the voting. The LA Times on Sunday also referred, in passing, to a “de facto cease fire.”

I think it is unlikely that there are any formal ties between the IIP and the guerrillas (not that I would know if there were…). I also think it is unlikely that there are no informal ties. In fact, months ago it was reported that the US government was having talks with insurgent leaders. Parties to conflict usually talk to one another, even if they have no formal ties or are not conducting any formal negotiations.

What I think is more likely is that the guerrillas who are home grown do care about the institutional process. They think (correctly, in my view) that what is being constructed in (non-Kurdish) Iraq is a majoritarian quasi-theocratic state in which Sunni Arabs will have only a limited role and limited access to oil revenues. But they must know they can’t overthrow this government, in part because US troops won’t leave till the Iraqi government can defend itself. (Here is where the Vietnam analogies completely break down: “South Iraq” as well as the nothern Kurdistan, are far more rooted in their populations than South Vietnam ever was.)

In other words, I would expect that those elements of the guerrillas who are actually rooted in their own population do care about the process that is ongoing, wanted to see the constitution defeated, and want to see Sunni Arabs represented in parliament. They just do not see that as the end game. They need to maintain armed pressure to force the Shiite and Kurdish parties to make concessions that would limit the majoritarian nature of the constitution and make all ethnic and religious groups stakeholders in the system. Again, assuming my characterization of their views is correct, the Sunni Arab leaders are right about this: They will gain these concessions only to the extent that there is armed pressure on the majority’s government.

Note that I am referring only to the armed groups that are rooted in the population somehow. I suspect this includes those with ties to the (banned) Ba’athists. The foreign fighters and Al Qaeda types are, for the most part, in a different category, and clearly would reject the entire process.

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15 October 2005

Iraq: Worse than the status quo ante?

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Peace and war; The Iraqle

Steven Taylor of Poliblog had a thoughtful reaction to my concerns about the current state of the Iraqi constitutional process. In a couple of earlier posts, I have said that the way Sunnis have been divided by the US-brokered deal out of which one Sunni party endorsed the constitution, was a bad sign for institutionalization in Iraq.

Steven responds, after first noting that he shares some of my basic concerns:

Still, it seems to me that any process (within reason), at this stage, which increases the percentage of the population engaged in the building of the institutions is a positive. It is hardly ideal, I will grant.

The reason I think that the current state of the processâ€”acceptance by some Sunnis and rejection by others among the non-violentâ€”may actually be a detriment is the following. I think it is very unlikely that active and passive cooperation with the guerrillas will diminish appreciably as long as there is not a consensus within the Sunni community that the country and its institutional process are moving in the right direction. I also think there is little hope that the overall political stability of the country will improve until there is a concerted effort by the current (and likely long-term) majority forces to come to terms with the deep resentment within the Sunni community. They will not do that as long as they have (a) a belief that they can divide and rule the Sunnis, and (b) the backing of the US government for their rule and their approch to the Sunni political leadership.

Yes, I am aware that part of the problem is that the Sunni leadershipâ€”both the violent and the non-violentâ€”is in fact divided. But whether it is smart US policy to encourage the majority to exploit those divisions is rather questionable.

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28 August 2005

Talking Points on the Baath ban and exit strategies

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Peace and war; The Iraqle

I highly recomended reading Steve Clemons’s August 27 post. Clemons, guest-blogging for Joshua Micah Marshall, suggests that the US and Iraqi interim government policy towards Baathists has been less pragmatic than the Allied approach to the less seriously criminal among the defeated Japanese imperial government after WWII.

I have been skeptical all along about the extent of the ban on the Baath Party and the dissolution of the Iraqi army, both of which are institutions that predate Saddam Hussein’s rein of terror. I think it is now clear that it was a poor policy decision and, as we have seen in recent days, the Baathist issue has been one of the sticking points in developing a consensus on the constitution.

Clemons:

The differences between America’s engagement in Iraq and Japan are enormous — but what is clear is that there is a cost to keeping the competent civil and military administrators who worked for thugs, but who were not thugs themselves, from taking positions in a reformed government.

Right, and in fact, those differences between the occupations (or “engagements”) in Iraq and Japan only make the case stronger for avoiding too deep and sweeping a purge. In the case of Japan we had an unconditional surrender and a vast occupation presence and administration. In Iraq we have had neither, making it all the more important to be pragmatic and work with those who stood and probably still stand the best chance of providing capable administration and luring political support away from the guerrillas.

On developing a serious exit strategy, such as the one Juan Cole put forth a few days ago, Clemons says:

…the moment President Bush gets serious about withdrawing from Iraq, European states and other Middle East nations are going to be worried about chaos, potential civil war, and outward migration. The American brand has been harmed in Iraq — but that does not mean that all other nations will have the same problems.

[...]

But how to get them to go? The German Ambassador to the U.S. Wolfgang Ischinger once told me that his biggest fear about John Kerry being elected is that he would have to work hard to keep Kerry from asking Germany to send troops to Iraq, which many assumed Kerry would do if elected.

The entire piece is well worth reading.

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23 August 2005

Cole’s exit strategy

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Peace and war; The Iraqle

Wow, this is worth reading. It is far more specific than Hagel’s vague “We should start figuring out how we get out of there” and far less cover-thy-retreat than the Tom Hayden plan.

It is far too long to quote here, and should not be merely excerpted.

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22 August 2005

Iraq–the “V” and “E ” words; Hagel and Hayden

Planted by MSS
Planted in: Peace and war; Politics (general); The Iraqle

So, Senator Hagel (R-Nebraska), on ABC This Week, August 21, uttered the “V” word, if somewhat obliquely:

We’re past that stage [where more troops, as Hagel advocated back in 2003, would helpâ€“Ed] now because now we are locked into a bogged-down problem not unsimilar, dissimilar to where we were in Vietnam. The longer we stay, the more problems we’re going to have. [Emphasis added.]

He also said, “We should start figuring out how we get out of there.” Now that is not quite uttering the “E” word, or rather phrase (exit strategy), but that is what he is saying, noting further that “we’re not winning.”

This is quite a turn from April, 2004, when Hagel, worried about the military being stretched thin, said:

Where’s that manpower going to come from? What about a draft? What about mandatory national service in some way? [Source: Omaha World-Herlad, April 22, 2004, pg. 6a, via Lexis Nexus]

Well, these statements are consistent in one way: They both recognize that the war cannot be won with the size of force that the administration committed. But the proposed solution certainly has changed, and I think we can chalk it up to Hagel’s having been more realistic than his party’s executive officials all along regarding Iraq. Now that realism has led him to the conclusion that things are getting more Vietnam-like the longer we go without an exit strategy.

Further, Hagel’s change of heart on what to do about the Iraq situation is rather revealing in that he is widely viewed as a presidential contender in 2008. I would suggest that 38 months out is a bit early to be positioning oneself for the general election, so Hagel must have concluded that being on record as the first major Republican contender to be in favor of an exit strategy won’t be harmful in the primaries. Interesting.

But Hagel did not actually articualte what that exit strategy might look like. So, what might it look like. Would Sen. Hagel like to sign on to Tom Hayden’s plan for an exit strategy, elements of which include:

-the US government must declare it has no interest in permanent military bases or controlling Iraqi oil or other resources.

Yes, that would be a good place to start. It is especially timely to debate this, given Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker’s comment, also on August 21, that the US might have to keep 100,000 troops in Iraq for four years.

The issue of bases is hardly new or unimportant. The Manchester Guardian reported January 29 that GlobalSecurity.org’s director, John Pike, said there were already then about 12 US military bases under construction. Such reports only diminish the credibility of any official US claims that the US does not intend to retain a long-term military presence.

This was raised in the first presidential debate last September, when Democratic nominee John Kerry (remember him? rumor has it he still is one of Hagel’s colleagues) said:

I think a critical component of success in Iraq is being able to convince the Iraqis and the Arab world that the United States doesn’t have long-term designs on it. As I understand it, we’re building some 14 military bases there now, and some people say they’ve got a rather permanent concept to them. When you guard the oil ministry, but you don’t guard the nuclear facilities, the message to a lot of people is maybe, “Wow, maybe they’re interested in our oil.” [...] I will make a flat statement: The United States of America has no long-term designs on staying in Iraq. [My emphasisâ€“Ed.]

Bush’s response was to talk about how brave then-PM Allawi was. No further mention of bases in Iraq came up, so we can infer that Bush did not accept Kerry’s “flat statement.” (We can also infer that the “debate” was not actually meant to be an opportunity to debate one of the most crucial questions of the election, but I digress.)

But what about Hagel? He clearly does not favor a strategy of maintaining the large presence General Schoomaker refers to–branding it “complete folly” during his This Week appearanceâ€”but it would be good to know where he stands on the more general question of long-term basing, because as the above-referenced John Pike noted about the Iraqi military:

How many fighter jets does the new Iraqi army have? None. How many tanks? None.

So, are long-term bases now inevitable? And if that is US policy, does it not further fuel the insurgency? Seems like something we ought to be debating.

Senator Hagel and others now raising their voices against the “bogged down” military operation in Iraq would do us all a service if they began to spell out their exit strategy, whether it looks more like Tom Hayden’s model or whether it involves continued bases and assumes continued dependency of the Iraqi military on the US even after a withdrawal of most ground forces.

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Fruits and Votes » Blog Archive » ‘Dangerously wrong-headed’ grafted [...] The escalation-surge-augmentation is “dangerously wrong-headed” and “will drive America deeper into an unwinnable swamp.” Who said that? Obama? Kerry? Biden? No. In fact, it was said by possibly the first semi-serious presidential candidate to speak of the need for an exit strategy, way back in August, 2005. Propagation: [...]

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