I’d further add that my belief is that the house should not even be dissolved without a vote by the commons itself. In a minority government situation, it should be up to the house and not what’s in the interest of the governing party to determine whether it’s time for another election.

The problem in Canada is the GG really has no moral authority to do anything. Therefore, it effectively gives the PM carte blance to interpret the constitution, irrespective of what British apologists believe.

You see this when Harper painted the Lib-NDP-BQ coalition as having no authority to govern in 2008. This was despite the fact that he did not have a majority let alone 40% of the vote.

And what was worse, the media didn’t call him out as a liar.

Interesting analogy with the French Fifth Republic where de Gaulle got around the problem of deadlock by making it easier for the prime minister to put decisions through the Chamber on an up-or-down vote and requiring an absolute majority to pass a censure motion if they want to block the “project” concerned.

I think -and the lordships were proved correct to do this- that this is ample precedent that prerogation does not apply to upper houses, even in Australia. Their membership anyway does not turn over each election.

I’m an American, and though the American system is in many ways a striking fossil of the eighteenth century and the relationship at the times between Parliament/ Congress and the Crown/ Presidency, there are a few benefits to this, one of which is that the House of Representative and the Senate, and their state counterparts, can quite clearly assemble whenever they wish.

Abolition of the prorogation power would remove the opportunity for abuse without losing anything. The disputes about the meaning and effect of prorogation strengthen the case for abolition. There is no reason why the houses of the parliaments could not meet, and begin their business anew, in accordance with a constitutional and statutory timetable after a general election, and then meet and adjourn solely by their own resolution until that timetable again takes effect. Such a change would require constitutional amendment in each jurisdiction.

Prorogation has been abused in Australia, most recently when the NSW parliament was prorogued in an attempt by the executive to kill an inquiry by a Legislative Council committee. Both the Senate and the NSW Legislative Council insist that their committees can function during a prorogation and the Senate itself has in fact during a prorogation a number of times. The executive in both governments has at times refused to provide ministers or civil servants to appear before parliamentary inquiries claiming that a prorogation suspends any committee proceedings.

I have not found, and do not expect to find, a clear recent case of a contested prorogation here, but that may be incomplete research or just the relative of minority governments here.

I guess we will find out if the Gillard Government ever finds itself in serious parliamentary difficulties.

This obligation arose regardless of whether Mr Bartlett had the support of the Greens party or not, for it was the only way to move the issue into the Parliament to enable the members of the House of Assembly to make the ultimate decision of who should govern.

The problem with these Canadian decisions is that they do the precise opposite, removing the ultimate decision of who should govern from the parliament and into the hands of the governor.

While either formally abolishing prorogation or vesting the power directly in the parliament would obviously be better, I remain convinced that an Australian governor would almost certainly require the premier to demonstrate their control of the proceedings of the house before granting a ‘contested’ prorogation.

For example, at a minimum each House should have power to call itself into session if the Crown and/or PM leave it adjourned for too long. A letter/ petition of 50% of members if that House last sat less than [say] 90 days ago, of 25% of members if it last sat 91 to 364 days ago, and automatic re-convening if it goes 365 days without meeting.

(Australia’s Constitution, like others, already requires that each House must meet at least once a year. But given that prerogative writs like mandamus [that's "mandate" to you, MSS] don’t lie against the Governor-General – who is the only person who can legally summon Parliament – the requirement is effectively non-judiciable).