Victoria’s introduction of PR for its Legislative Council a decade ago was, I estimate, a first in the democratic world since there is no longer any reason to hold the Victorian Legislative Assembly the “lower” or “popular” house, as opposed to the Legislative Council, other than (a) custom and (b) larger size.

In other words, the Victorian Legislative Council is fully elected by popular vote; there is no vote-weighting, unlike the federal Senate and the WA and Tasmanian Councils (eight regions of roughly equal size each elect 5 MLCs by PR-STV and 11 MLAs from SMDs); and unlike the Senate, NSW, SA and Tasmania, there is no rotation – both houses serve four-year terms.

In other words, there is no particular reason other than force of habit to regard the Assembly as “more democratic” than the Council. None of the usual reasons why the upper houses should “sit down and shut up” apply to Victoria.

Even the larger size of the Assembly is not conclusive – compare the UK Lords which was traditionally larger than the Commons, and the USSR’s Soviet of Nationalities which had the same number of deputies (750) as the Soviet of the Union.

As far as I can tell this is unique to Victoria (although there may be US States I have missed where Senate and Assembly both serve either 2- or 4-year terms and it’s only size that matters).

One minor point is that Assembly vacancies are filled though by-election whereas the Council has adopted the post-1977 Senate method of appointment by party machines. Yet even so, former Premier Jeff Kennett in 1993 wanted to abolish Assembly by-elections (substituting party appointment) whenever the Govt had a majority of at least 5 seats. And if countback had been adopted instead of the “Olsen Parachute” method, I would argue vigorously that would have made the Council no less democratic than the larger chamber.

Some idiot wrote a recent article that Australia cannot be taken seriously as a diplomatic middle power unless we abolish the states. He apparently had not noticed that the US, India, Russia, Brazil and Germany are all federations and seem nevertheless to get their diplomats taken seriously.

However, assuming that the lower house is still larger than the upper house, that leaves the problem. I think there is considerable value in having constituency representatives elected by districts. In the Australian case, a non-proportionally elected Senate would be either elected on a statewide basis or appointed by the state governments. If the Senate is to be elected on a statewide basis the current proportional system is obviously much better and anyway you don’t get constituency representation.

MMP would allow for the placing of constituency representatives in a lower house that was proportional overall. I happen to dislike MMP because of the presence of representatives who don’t actually represent anyway (since they are appointed by the parties to bring their representative up to quota), but this can be seen by some as an aesthetic consideration.

However, with a larger, constituency or SMD elected lower house and a proportional upper house, you get the paradox that the upper house is more democratic.

In the Australian case, if Australia reversed the formula in favor of a proportionally elected House of Representatives and a non-proportionally elected Senate, I would prefer to use statewide open party lists for the House, and an unelected Senate made up of recallable state government appointees, or the senior state cabinet members themselves. State delegations in the House would still be proportional to the state populations, and Senate delegations would still be equal. The House delegations would represent the people of the states and the Senate delegations would represent the state governments. Come to think of it, something like this would be appropriate for a federal Europe. Note there is a serious argument in the Australian context for doing away with the states altogether.

There is also an argument that the continuation of the government and national finances should not necessarily be in the hands of the more democratic chamber, its better to entrust it to a stable chamber that is merely sufficiently democratic.

I would not have the Senate able to reject supply, also because it is more democratic that the House of Representatives.

The minimum, as I think Tom says, is that you need a constitutional provision for a continuing budget. That comes close to only a limited capacity to block supply anyway, the sting in blocking supply is not its constitutional or legal status, but the fact that the money runs out and you are likely to be dismissed by the governor-gneral. A situation where supply can expire before a referendum is finalised is an invitation to chaos. I know we have stolen a thread devoted to North America, but let’s not acquire fiscal cliffs as well.

It is true that the Senate has a more democratic character than the House. It does not necessarily follow that a referendum on supply, with a chance the government would have to cease operations before or until the referendum, has a more democratic character than the alternatives.

It is great to see this old planting revived. It’s the sort of re-propagation that makes F&V valuable!

Your reason for voting against the republic model in 1999 is the same as mine. No one would design a system with an inherited monarch at the top of it now, but the absurdity of the system does not justify just any old replacement.

I am opposed to taking away the Senate’s power to block supply because the Senate is more democratic and representative than the House. The principle is separate from the issue of the use of this power on any particular occasion. I did not support the blocking of supply on 1974 or 1975. In fact, I spoke against it at the Victorian DLP Central Executive meeting in 1974 when the DLP senators were considering what to do. Unfortunately, Frank McManus was conned by Billy Snedden into thinking the DLP senators would be on a joint ticket with the Coalition. I said this would not happen, but who was going to listen to a 21-year old in preference to the federal leader of the party? The DLP was wiped out – not the last example of the consequences of my advice not being taken.

I am imposing a referendum on supply bills. If the Senate refused to pass supply, it would do so knowing that a subsequent referendum might do so and force the Senate to an election. That is meant to discourage the Senate form refusing to pass supply in most circumstances. If the senate got it wrong, it would face an election with supply already passed (at the referendum). If the Senate got it right, the House would face an election with supply having been defeated, so there would need to be funding for an interim period. I don’t think it need to be anywhere near 4-8 weeks for each poll. I’d say three weeks for the referendum and two for the subsequent election. (I’ll let the lawyers do the drafting.)

I am totally opposed to any provision for the House to override the Senate for the reasons that the Senate is in fact more democratic and any dispute can be settled by the ultimate authority – the people.

I accept hat the nexus provision is less important if there is to be no double dissolution, but I would keep it any way to allow the Senate to grow in size as population grows.

I would keep rotation as it smooths out temporary enthusiasms.

I should never have posted #44 because you are now sure to hire Tom.