In the thread on Canadian upper-house reform, Bancki notes a leaked proposal for reform of an even older unelected upper house, the House of Lords.
The remainder of this planting is not mine. It is Bancki’s.
An official paper on the reform of the House of Lords has leaked. It’s written by Jack Straw (Leader of the House of Commons), to be used for cross-party negotiations on the issue.
The proposed new House of Lords would have 450 members, half of it elected, the others appointed.
The elections would be using open list-PR in the EP-constituencies at the same time as the elections to the House of Commons.
Besides some Anglican bishops and PM-appointed members, most of the appointments would be made by an independent nine-member Appointments Commission.
All members would sit for three Parliament terms. Most of the existing members (the co-opted hereditary peers and the life peers) would lose their seats.
In the paper, the advantages and disadvantages of various methods and timings of elections are discussed (thos that were not chosen in an appendix).
It puzzles me to read that regional lists “produce proportionate result” (catalogued as an advantage) and STV “allows proportional result” (advantage) but “can produce visibly disproportional outcomes” (disadvantage). This is only true if under STV one considers only the first preferences aggregated by party to calculate “the” proportional result, while voters can cross party-lines with their lower preferences. But if everyone votes completely loyal to only one party, STV gives the same result (on the party-level) as list-PR.
/Thanks, Bancki, for the information!
Bancki writes: “if everyone votes completely loyal to only one party, STV gives the same result (on the party-level) as list-PR.”
Only if the district magnitudes are comparable. Most proposals for STV suggest smaller district magnitudes that most proposals for list PR. Based on a very quick glance at it, the Straw report appears to address this issue only in one oblique comment, “STV not used for elections on this scale” (under disadvantages).
On the other hand, at least in Ireland, STV often results in better overall proportionality than district magnitude alone would imply, because support for at least some small parties is geographically concentrated.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 31 October 2006 @ 11:27
MSS, thanks should go to Elect the Lords (always reveal your sources) They drew my attention and provided a link to the article with the leaked paper: “Life peers face axe in Lords overhaul” in The Sunday Times of October 22, 2006 .
Bob, it’s probable they suppose STV should have fewer seats per district (normally 3 to 7 ?) than list-PR. But the proposed districts aren’t that big. At the moment there are 78 MEPs elected in 12 districts ranging from 3 to 10 seats per district. The same districts would be used for the House of Lords elections with approximatly the same number of seats up for election each time: there would be 450 members serving 3 terms, half of them elected, so there would be 75 seats to be renewed every general election.
Seed planted by Bancki — 01 November 2006 @ 04:00
Jack Straw, leader of the House of Commons, presented his proposals on a reformed House of Lords.
If the proposals make it, the upper house will have 540 members. Part of them will be directly elected, part of them appointed. MPs will choose in a ‘free vote’ the type of upper chamber they like best: they will be able to rank (a preferential ballot!) seven possible ratios of elected – appointed members (100-0%, 80-20%, 60-40%, 50-50%, 40-60%, 20-80%, 0-100%) Straws favors the 50-50% option, and I’ll use these numbers.
The 270 elected members would be elected by partially open-list PR (voters can vote for the whole list or for a specific candidate) in the existing European Parliament constituencies (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and 9 regions in England) Every five years, coincidental with the EP elections, one third (90) would be renewed.
There would be 2 types of appointed members: 162 partisan and 108 non-partisan appointments. An independent Satutory Appointments Commission would appoint the non-partisan members and oversee the partisan appointments. Partisan appointees will be apportioned to the parties on the basis of the last general elections result (votes, not seats)
The appointed members also sit for 15 year terms, with one third (54 partisan and 36 non-partisan) renewed every five years.
No-one can sit more than one term: no re-election or re-appointment possible but also no switch from elected to appointed or vice-versa. And no-one can be elected MP save after some years in the cold.
And what with the historical oddities?
* The existing 615 life peers will not be forced to leave, and will sit besides the new members, with the first 180 elected/appointed in 2014.
* The existing 92 hereditary peers would go, but the question remains if they are allowed to ‘die out’ or if they will be replaced by new ‘last time’ life peers.
* Some Anglican bishops (now 26) can stay as part of the non-partisan appointed members.
* The upper chamber will no longer be styled ‘House of Lords’, but at present there is no new name proposed.
* Sitting or retired members will no longer by styled ‘peers’.
Seed planted by Bancki — 09 February 2007 @ 15:13
how are the members of house of lords elected? by who?
Seed planted by norman — 09 January 2008 @ 03:08
The White Paper on House of Lords Reform said “the most appropriate system of election for a reformed House of Lords is a partially open regional list system. We will consider further the precise details of the list system to be used.” The debate in the House last March 7th judged this as better than the closed-list system, but not much more. As far as I know they are still consulting; will it be a fully open regional list system?
But first the Lords has to accept that the Lords be 80% elected and only 20% appointed.
Seed planted by Wilfred Day — 13 January 2008 @ 08:11
> “they will be able to rank (a preferential ballot!) seven possible ratios of elected – appointed members”
I am usually a fan of preferential systems (whether IROV or Condorcet) over yes/no seriatim voting (whether the Commons’s or the Riksdag’s method), precisely because preferential methods can handle non-single-peaked preferences in a way that serial yea-or-nay can’t.
(Example: Australian voters seem to split roughly evenly among “current monarchy”, “Republic with directly-elected ceremonial President”, and “Republic with ceremonial President appointed by 2/3 of Parliament”, not only in first preferences but also second. If your criterion is populist democracy, you’d rank these [3] [1] [2]. If your guiding principle is conservative stability and Westminster tradition, you’d vote [1] [3] [2] or [2] [3] [1]. But if your main concern is that “the Head of State must be completely independent of the governing political party”, you might vote [1] [2] [3] or [2] [1] [3]. All three combinations are possible. With a series of yes-or-no referenda, we’ll get either continual deadlocks or else stone-scissors-paper.)
Having said that, I’m at a loss why the Epistle Of Straw would propose a preferential ballot on an issue – the ratio between electees and appointees – that would, AFAICT, be precisely single-peaked. Would there be anyone who might say “I would prefer an all-elected British Senate, but, if we have to keep any appointees at all, I’d rather they be 90% rather than 10%”? Am I missing something?
Seed planted by Tom Round — 13 January 2008 @ 09:42
I see Clegg is pushing for for the UK’s Upper House of Lords-Senators to be 80% elected by PR and 20% appointed by the executive – or, put another way, four parts Jo Vallentine to one part Jo Valentine.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 26 May 2011 @ 08:26