Don’t miss Prof. Robert Pekkanen’s very informative on-the-scene report in the comments!
In Sunday’s election for Japan’s upper house, the House of Councilors (HoC), the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is winning most of the single-seat districts and will be the largest party in that body.
The HoC is elected by a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, as is the more powerful lower house. However, the HoC electoral system differs in several important respects. First, terms are staggered, so only half the seats were up today. Second, the nominal tier consists of some single-seat districts (at any given election) and some multi-seat districts, with the SNTV rule in the latter saving the LDP from a total disaster (for instance, it has won 1 seat and its New Komeito ally another in Tokyo, where the DPJ won the other three). Third, the list is nationwide (whereas for the lower house each prefecture is a there are eleven regional list constituencies). Fourth, the list is open (rather than closed, as in the lower house).
The DPJ is really cleaning up in the single-seat districts (SSDs) where voters were given a clear choice of LDP vs. DPJ candidate. The Okayama prefecture, which forms a SSD for the upper house, offers a glimpse of clever one-on-one campaign tactics:
Toranosuke Katayama, secretary general of the LDP’s upper house caucus, lost his seat to Democratic Party of Japan rookie Yumiko Himei, a former member of the Okayama Prefectural Assembly backed by the People’s New Party.
Himei won with her slogan “Hime no Tora Taiji,” a play on both candidates’ names that means “The princess [hime] will wipe out the tiger [tora].”
That a leader of the governing LDP’s caucus lost is, of course, a big deal, and it was not the only such case. In another district, Shimane, a candidate of the People’s New Party (PNP) defeated a deputy secretary general of the LDP caucus. There were several districts in which the DPJ jointly endorsed candidates with the PNP, which is one of the parties founded by the “traitors” who were expelled from the LDP in 2005 for opposing then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s postal privatization program. (The PNP also is the party that placed former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori on its national list for this election; apparently he will not be elected.)
According to The Daily Yomiuri (first link above), many of the races won by the DPJ were won with policy-based and anti-government campaigning.
During the campaign [in Tokyo, DPJ candidate and director of an environmental NGO] Masako] Okawara, 54, stressed her achievements in dealing with food safety and environmental problems. She garnered support among housewives and swing voters. [...]
[ Also in Tokyo, DPJ candidate Kan] Suzuki, 43, emphasized his six years of activities as an expert on educational and medical issues throughout the campaign. He called for a change of government, saying, “The current administration cannot carry out real reforms.” [...]
[In Tochigi constituency, DPJ candidate Hiroyuki] Tani apparently gained wider support by capitalizing on public criticism of the ruling coalition over the pension record-keeping blunder and a series of scandals involving Cabinet members.
The success of such campaign tactics is significant for Japan, given that breaking with the old pork-barrel and special-interest-focused campaigns that long sustained the LDP was one of the goals of the lower-house electoral reform back in 1993. The LDP still has not lost an election for the lower house (partly due to its alliance with New Komeito), although the 2005 “snap” election that the LDP won big under Koizumi was fought almost entirely on a single national policy issue: postal privatization. Koizumi craftily used that issue to advertise the repositioning of his party as a policy-reform vehicle and to catch the DPJ off guard.
This election suggests that the voters are no longer buying the reform image of the LDP and have finally decided that the DPJ is the more reformist party. The LDP apparently will be reduced to being the second largest party in the HoC for (if I am not mistaken) the first time in about 50 years. (There was a period in the 1990s when it was not the majority, but remained the largest party.)
Nonetheless, this election is not necessarily fatal for the LDP government headed by Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe. Unlike in Italy, for example, the elected upper house in Japan has no authority to withdraw “confidence” from the cabinet.* Only the lower house can do that, and no election is due for the lower house until 2010 2009. Nonetheless, almost all legislation must clear the upper house, and so Abe’s agenda will be greatly weakened. Will the LDP dump him? Will he decide he has to call an early election and challenge the voters to either oust his party entirely or reinforce his party’s authority vis-a-vis the upper house? I hope some readers more familiar with Japanese politics will weigh in.
____
* In most bicameral parliamentary systems, the upper house is constitutionally much weaker than the lower house. Other notably powerful parliamentary upper chambers would be those of Australia and Germany, though those also have no formal no-confidence authority. Even so, lack of an upper-house majority was one of the major reasons behind the early lower-house election in Germany in 2005. It is also worth remembering that the defeat Koizumi suffered on his postal privatization in 2005, which led him to call the snap lower-house election, was in the upper house.
Quick thoughts on the morning after Japan’s HOC 2007 election
Coming on the heels of the LDP’s greatest ever electoral victory (HOR, 2005), this 2007 HOC election is their greatest ever defeat. In 1989, the LDP lost its majority, but remained the largest party and was able to still manage the HOC. Speculation in the run-up the election, when the LDP and CGP were clearly not going to win the combined 64 seats needed to maintain their majority (51 for LDP and 13 for CGP), centered on whether the LDP might do well enough (mid-40s if CGP held 13) to retain their majority by enticing in a few independents. Likely candidates included People’s New Party members who disagreed with party leader Tanaka’s dovish politics and were themselves ex-LDP MPs booted out by Koizumi over postal privatization. In the end, such plans were pipe dreams.
Sorry of these tables don’t transplant nicely–it’s my first planting
Results:
Election results LDP DPJ CGP JCP SDP PNP NPJ Unaffiliated
Elected this time 37 60 9 3 2 2 1 7
Not up for election 46 49 11 4 3 2 0 6
New Totals 83 109 20 7 5 4 1 13
Old Strength 110 81 23 9 6 4 0 7
Change -27 +28 -3 -2 -1 0 1 +6
.
LDP won 23 seats in districts, 14 in list, 37 total–down 27 seats.
DPJ won 40 district seats, 20 list, 60 total—up 28 seats.
CGP won 2 distrct seats, 7 list, 9 total–
JCP won 3 list.
SDP won 2 list.
People’s New Party won 1 district, 1 list, 2 total.
New Party Japan won 1 list.
Unaffiliateds won 7 seats.
List results:
party Votes Party votes Candidate votes % # elected
DJP 23,111,474 18,498,788 4,356,587 39.45 20
LDP 16,462,625 10,359,884 5,896,616 28.10 14
CGP 7,716,985 3,453,775 4,183,001 13.17 7
JCP 4,386,714 3,861,329 468,991 7.48 3
SDP 2,627,183 1,948,539 647,238 4.48 2
New Party Japan 1,760,013 1,121,147 618,682 3.00 1
People’s New Party 1,262,360 662,051 577,752 2.15 1
There are 96 list seats and 146 district seats. Up for grab this time, 48 list seats and 73 district seats. Districts were 29 1 seat, 12 2 seats (24), 5 3 seats (15), and 1 5 seat (5).
The LDP benefited mostly from the 2 seat districts. These are uncompetitive, giving in each case 1 LDP and 1 DPJ victor—except in Gifu in which an unaffiliated supported by the LDP and CGP won, as did a DPJ candidate.
So, the LDP got:
14 list seats
6 SSD seats
11 Seats from the 12 2 seat districts
5 seats – 1 from each of the 5 3 seat districts
1 seat in Tokyo (of 5)
Without the 2 seat districts, it would have been much worse for the LDP. Tokyo’s never been a great district for the LDP, but they showed weakness in the 3 seat districts and the 1 seat districts.
In Tokyo, the LDP had two good candidates. One was Marukawa, who came in 4th. She was an inexperienced candidate who had failed to register to vote in the last couple of elections, after returning from a posting in New York. A young former TV announcer with good looks, she won. The LDP incumbent Hosaka, lost. An experienced pol, he used the traditional LDP group-based politics and narrowly lost—coming in 6th by 32,500 or so votes (earning 651,484). Interesting contrast to Marukawa, inexperienced and criticized as inept, but telegenic. The implications for those interested in candidate quality are fascinating.
A number of factors combined to produce this curious alchemy of disastrous defeat coming 2 years after triumph. Some are ephemeral, some systemic.
1) HOC FEWER SEATS: The HOC is easier for the DPJ to run in than the HOR because it needs to field fewer candidates. Ethan Scheiner argued that the Japanese opposition’s failure stems from their inability to recruit quality candidates, which in turn has its roots in Japan’s fiscal centralization combined with clientelism. Fewer districts alleviates this problem. Also, the districts are bigger than HOR districts, making them harder (or more expensive) to target with pork.
2) HOC LESS IMPORTANT: The HOC is the less important body. Voters know this and worry less about turning the HOC over to the opposition. So, many voters might have chosen in this election to send the LDP a message, even though they remain LDP supporters. Polls suggest the LDP garnered only 60% of the votes from self-identified LDP supporters. Will they come back? Did the DPJ make inroads into the LDP’s base, or did the base just send a message?
3) PENSION ISSUE DOMINATES ELECTION: PM Abe’s pet issues were patriotism and patriotic education. Voters couldn’t have cared less. The issue that dominated this election was the loss of 50 million pension records. Voters were incensed. The records had been lost under a series of administrations, not just Abe’s. However, Abe was in the PM’s residence when it hit the papers. Making matters much worse, Abe initially mishandled the issue, dismissing it and then minimizing it before belatedly realizing this issue was going to be tremendously annoying and important to voters. The 2005 election issue was postal privatization, a not inherently interesting topic that captivated voters due to Koizumi’s mastery of framing issues and playing the (especially non-traditional-e.g. “soft news†shows and weekly magazines) media.
4) HE’S NO KOIZUMI: Koizumi campaigned very little for the LDP. He was on the trail initially, but pulled very early—reportedly after his appearances reminded voters a little too keenly how much they preferred Koizumi to Abe. One can imagine how Koizumi would have handled the pension records issue, turning it into a stick to beat the bureaucrats and increase his own popularity (and win the election). Abe also faced criticism over his judgment, when 3 Cabinet members resigned (including one suicide) after various scandals. The farm minister who replaced the suicide almost immediately became embroiled in exactly the same time of financial scandals as his predecessors. LDP MPs questioned Abe’s repeated failure to vet his Cabinet.
The results open many issues for discussion in Tokyo. Among these:
1) PM RESIGNATION: PM Abe insists he won’t resign. His line is that HOC elections are not about who should be the governing party. I haven’t heard him explain what they are about if this is the case. PM Hashimoto resigned after the LDP got 44 seats in 1998 and Uno Soskue resigned after the party got 39 seats in 1989. In the 29 SSDs, the LDP won 6 and DPJ 23. HOR SSD incumbents must now consider whether Abe can lead them to victory in the next HOR election. There is no obvious successor.
2) DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: Unlike the 1989 elections, which left the LDP 109 seats to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, then largest opposition) 68, this time the LDP is for the first time ever not the largest party. The DPJ is the largest party with, coincidentally, 109 seats. I also note that several of the unaffiliateds (and the PNP) ran with DPJ support. It’s possible the DPJ can cobble together a majority coalition by enticing in PNP and SDP and a few unaffiliateds. I haven’t heard anything about their intentions about playing it this way or going it alone.
3) DPJ: How will the DPJ handle its new power? Will it be obstructionist? Can it convince the voters it’s responsible and position itself for victory or at least a good showing in an HOR election?
4) CGP: What’s gone almost unnoticed is that this is also CGP’s worst ever (I think) performance in a HOC election. They have already said they plan to continue their coalition with the LDP. CGP is important not only for their limited numbers (which were essential to the LDP in the HOC), but for their electoral support in hotly contested SSD in HOC and HOR. CGP voters tend to be quite disciplined and their votes can swing many SSDs. In the 2003 election, analysts estimated that had the CGP voters in SSDs all marked their ballots for DPJ instead of LDP, there would have been a swing of 50 seats—enough to have won the DPJ control of the HOR. Will the CGP start to distance itself from the LDP.
Robert Pekkanen
University of Washington
Seed planted by Robert Pekkanen — 29 July 2007 @ 20:42
Has there been a redistribution of prefectural seats? Adam Carr gives 4 seats to Tokyo, but now there were five.
Seed planted by Bancki — 30 July 2007 @ 05:31
I am not sure. Perhaps it was when the number of HOC seats was reduced, between 1998 and 2001 elections. Only 3 incumbents running this time, so I’ll have to find another way to check. The 5 Tokyo winners this time were from, in order, DPJ, CGP, DPJ, LDP, Unaffiliated (an AIDS activist).
Seed planted by Robert Pekkanen — 30 July 2007 @ 08:08
Briefly: there has indeed been a redistribution of seats this election, including moving from 4 seats in Tokyo to 5 seats, and dropping a couple 2 seat districts to SSDs. There were several other changes, but I don’t have them handy. There seems to have been minor redistributions of seats in each of the last few UH elections, but I don’t know for certain whether this is something mandated under the revised election law or not (my guess is not, but I don’t know off the top of my head).
Cheers,
Ben
Seed planted by Ben Nyblade — 30 July 2007 @ 13:06
The news item that I linked mentions some of the redistributions.
Has the number of list seats changed? I thought it was 100 (50 at each election), but apparently it is 96 (48). Or did I just remember them as about 100?
The national tier of the upper house has been interesting. At one time all elected by SNTV (the largest such district until Colombia used 100 seats for its de-facto SNTV in its Senate from 1991 to 2002). Then closed-list PR. And, in recent elections, open-list PR.
Seed planted by MSS — 30 July 2007 @ 15:19
Japan, the HoC veto, and the HoR override
The LDP and its coalition partner, the New Komeito, will have only 42.6% of the HoC seats after Sunday’s election, but the governing coalition has exactly 70% of the seats in the HoR since the 2005 election.
Scion grafted by Fruits and Votes — 30 July 2007 @ 21:33
1.There was a minor reshuffle: Tokyo and Chiba each gained a seat (now 5 and 3) and Gunma and Tochigi each lost one (both now 1)
(See this article in a Japanese English-language newspaper, the Daily Yomiuri)
Is there a mathematical rule supporting the actual apportionment?
2. At first, the upper house consisted of exactly 250 seats: 50 seats nationwide and 75 by prefectures each election round. In 1972 one prefecture seat each round was added for Okinawa (total: 252).
In 2001 the numbers were reduced to 48 seats nationwide and 73 by prefectures each round. The totals were 247 in 2001 (126 elected in 1998 and 121 elected in 2001) and 242 since 2004.
Since 1980(?) the nationwide tier is elected by list-PR (D’Hondt), closed-list until 1998, open-list since 2001.
At first the nationwide tier was elected by SNTV, with 50 seats at stake! Can someone give a real-life result of this 50-seat-SNTV-system illustrating the coordination problems of the major parties?
Seed planted by Bancki — 31 July 2007 @ 04:47