It has been widely reported that in Kuwait’s election, “radicals” gained significantly and one “westernized” candidate narrowly missed becoming the first woman elected to the assembly. Less reported is what the electoral system is.
If it is the same as it was in 2003, the 50 seats are allocated in 25 districts by MNTV. [UPDATE: In a comment, Bancki notes a major change in magnitude; formula apparently remains MNTV, but in its "limited vote" variant.] That is, voters have [or, rather, had, in 2003] two votes, and the top two candidates win. There are no real parties,1 so it is a near-perfect example of personalistic voting and seat-allocation. A quick glance at the 2003 elections (Psephos) shows why this electoral system’s common name–block vote–is misleading.
When voters have M votes, where M is the district magnitude, and the winners will be the candidates with the M highest votes, it is an open question whether there exist “blocks” and whether, if they do exist, voters will vote as if they recognize those blocks as electorally relevant.
If there are blocks–parties, or just teams of local notables who campaign for votes in block–then the top M winners should have identical vote shares. So should the first M losers, the next M losers, etc., if there are multiple blocks contesting the seats.
For Kuwait, or any similar electoral system, we can get a window into the block vs. personal-voting tendencies of voters by simply calculating the ratios of candidates’ votes. Divide the second candidate’s votes by the first, the third by the second, etc.
When M=2, this will produce three ratios of interest: Second winner to first winner (SW:FW), first loser to second winner (FL:SW), and second loser to first loser (SL:FL).
If there is a block-voting tendency within the electorate, SW:FW and SL:FL should be close to 1.0. There is no expectation about FL:SW, because it depends not on intra-bloc cohesiveness but rather on inter-block competitiveness (i.e. the closer it is to 1.0 the more the district has close competition between two blocks–and, of course, the more any slackening of the leading block’s cohesiveness can contribute to the second block’s winning one of of the seats).
In Kuwait, 2003, the mean ratios across the 25 districts were:
-
SW:FW .858
FL:SW .837
SL:FL .827
Maybe some blockness there, but not much: If there were blocks, we might expect closer to 1.0 for at least SW:FW and maybe also SL:FL (if there are two blocs contesting the election).2 Standard deviations will also tell us something here. If .85 is a typical degree of achievable intrabloc unity, and the winners in each district tend to come close to that, then the standard deviation should be fairly small on SF:FW. On the other hand, if there is variation in inter-block competitiveness across districts, there would be a relatively high standard deviation on FL:SW, as some districts have two candidates well in the lead, while others have three or four bunched closely. The standard deviations are, in fact, .101, .126, and .191. So the top two in a district do indeed tend to be less variable in their ratios, which implies there might be some block tendency, after all, but just that it is hard to get much better than the .85 to .9 range.3
The first two losers’ ratio is more variable than even the FL:SW ratio, implying that it may be harder for the opposition to coordinate its votes–which is a pretty standard finding for this type of electoral system. That is, for electoral systems that are based solely on nominal and nontransferable votes.
Obviously, a leading block with two candidates relatively unchallenged does not have to worry about non-equalization between its two candidates, which might be caused by differential personal votes (or simple voter laziness). There seems little evidence for a notion that the leading block might put more (successful) effort into equalization when a third candidate in the district is more challenging,4 but the absence of party labels makes it impossible to know for sure!
Special note has to be made of the Al-Rumaithiah district, where the top two candidates had vote totals only seven votes apart! Then again, it is impossible to know if that is two candidates from one “block” that had voters generally willing to vote for both, or if it was two candidates from opposing blocks who had just enough personal support to squeak to victory over the third candidate, who missed one of the seats by 98 votes (out of over 11,000 cast). (The fourth candidate missed the second seat by a whopping 518 votes!)
At the opposite end of the spectrum was Al-Salmiah, where the first winner was far above any other candidate (SW:FW ratio of .68), but three other candidates were closely competitive for the second seat (their ratios to the candidate ahead were .86, .88, and .98).
In the absence of cohesive parties and strong party identification in the electorate, these MNTV systems can be rather unpredictable. They function as if they were pure personal-vote systems because, from the mechanical standpoint of how seats are allocated, they are. Blocks are irrelevant to actual seat allocation, and only through careful nomination and campaign strategy–and voter willingness to go along–can they function as block plurality.
What this might actually mean for Kuwaiti politics–or for 2008 (remember, the data I worked with are 2003)–I do not know. Did the “radicals” do relatively well because their ideological cohesiveness allowed them to place in the top two in 12 districts (they are reported to have won 24 seats)? Or did they have one popular candidate in almost every district whose popularity led some pro-government voters to vote for only one of the government candidates and give their second vote to a charismatic radical? Either outcome is plausible in such a system (though the first a good deal more so), and the final results will give us some clue. As for the “westernizers” they probably simply aren’t sufficiently organized to do well under this sort of system.
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- “Political parties are banned in Kuwait, but various groupings operate as de facto parties,” as the AFP item linked in the first paragraph puts it. [↩]
- Medians are .858, .887, .871. [↩]
- Ten of the 25 districts have ratios of the top two candidates that are more than .9. [↩]
- If the top two were assumed to be from the same block and to have ratios closer to 1.0 when the first loser’s ratio was also close to 1.0, it would point in that direction. But that is very definitely not the case, because some of the highest and lowest ratios for the top two candidates occur in districts with FL:SW>.9. [↩]
“The number of constituencies has been reduced from 25 smaller ones, which varied considerably in size and electoral roll, to just five large ones in order to reduce the possibilities of vote-buying and voting along tribal and sectarian lines. This time voters made up to four choices each from inevitably long lists of candidates, making the process at the voting booths more complicated and harder to predict.”
(BBC News 18 May 2008)
Expanding the districts or not was the issue which lead to the snap elections in 2006.
(BBC News 27 July 2006)
“Many Kuwaiti reformers support a decrease in the number of electoral districts from the current 25 to 10, 5 or even one. This would decrease the salience of tribe in elections, and perhaps increase the ability of ideological parties to win seats. Decreasing the size of districts would also make it more difficult to influence the outcome of elections through vote buying. Nonetheless, tribal and sectarian identity is at the core of Kuwaiti politics, and redistricting itself will not change this. This reform has wide support, though by the nature of things there are deputies from all groups and all political persuasions who oppose redistricting because it would threaten their ability to win reelection.”
(Paper of Michael Herb, Georgia State University, 2005)
Seed planted by Bancki — 19 May 2008 @ 04:00
OK… I plead guilty to mixing up “unLimited NTV” (where VOTESNUM equals or exceeds SEATSNUM) with “block vote”. I take MSS to be suggesting that the latter term be reserved for systems where the plurality or majority block is legally guaranteed (or, de facto, highly likely) to sweep all seats – examples being the US Electoral College, in States where voters cannot and can (respectively) vote for individual candidates. A State’s delegation is almost never split among parties as a result of votes cast (only occasionally by maverick individual “defector Electors”, or those who can’t spell “Edwards”).
In Queensland, Australia, many local councils used Unlimited NTV (“disguised” as preferential, eg, “number 12 candidates” if there were 12 council vacancies at large). The number is reduced now the Beattie State Govt has pushed for amalgamations recently – these larger regional super-councils tend to use single-seat wards instead, with optional-preferential IROV.
And not that many Qld “at large” councils produced “clean sweeps” for one faction or another. This is only partly a function of the absence (by law) of party labels on Qld local ballots before 1994, or of the ruling National Party’s policy of not endorsing local-govt candidates. Anecdotally, it seems, in many regional towns, people would know full well that AB was “Labor” or XY was “National” – not least because they may have previously stood as a State or Federal candidate on a party platform. There might be, say, six or seven “Labor” candidates for council but only the best-known one or two would get elected. Voters deliberately declined to vote a party ticket.
On the other hand, the Australian Senate from 1901 to 1918 shows how unlimited non-transferable (or, from 1918 to 1948, unlimited transferable) votes can very easily give clean sweeps and “windscreen-wiper” majorities when voters do vote a party ticket. Even with voting for individual candidates, the results would often approximate “block vote” in the strict sense (ie, electing one party list or ticket by plurality).
Seed planted by Tom Round — 19 May 2008 @ 07:26
Thanks! Finally, I have a way to describe the degree of “blockness” from publicly known election results. In U.S., at least, MNTV results are never published in a form that allows direct measurement. In fact, typical voting machines don’t even capture the necessary data.
Terminology like “multiple non-transferable vote” is utterly useless to activists trying to communicate with citizens (i.e., outside academia). “Plurality at large” doesn’t seem to work that much better, although people do seem to understand “vote for N”.
I will continue using “block vote” even though MNTV only permits that result rather than requiring it (similar to the way cumulative voting permits but does not require proportional results). OK, I admit it, I’m motivated by a polemical purpose: my interest in local government elections is to push for STV, so I need to talk about majority sweep results when they occur. “Block vote” helps do that.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 19 May 2008 @ 11:51
Taagepera and I have used “unlimited vote” to refer to nontransferable votes where votes available to be cast by each voter (w) are equal to district magnitude (m). Of course, w=m is a limitation, and the approval vote is a case where w>m. Hence I do not use that term anymore.
MNTV is a term that is not limited (so to speak) to w=m, but would be any case of w>1
when M>1, as long as the votes go only to the candidates for whom they are cast (i.e., are nominal and nontransferable).I am not proposing that activists use the term, MNTV. I am proposing that scholars do so, to avoid the confusion of “block vote” with list plurality systems (such as the US electoral college).
Seed planted by MSS — 19 May 2008 @ 12:17
Thanks, Bancki. So, the districts are of M=10 (on average), with limited vote?
Seed planted by MSS — 19 May 2008 @ 12:20
Why doesn’t Kuwait use STV for its elections? It’s the only system of PR without party lists and can be used without any parties. Is STV too democratic to be used?
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 22 May 2008 @ 03:06
I suppose Kuwait doesn’t use STV for the same reasons no one else uses STV, whatever those may be. OK, make that almost no one.
Much loved by activists and many scholars, but a ‘fringe’ system from the standpoint of actual elections.
(The view just expressed is independent of any sentiment I might have for or against the system.)
Seed planted by MSS — 22 May 2008 @ 12:28
Suaprazzodi: Why doesn’t Kuwait use STV for its elections?
Two thoughts. (1) STV is almost never considered outside the English speaking world. Was Kuwait ever a British colony? (Forgive my ignorance on this!)
(2) Electoral system changes are generally made by political parties, or by bargaining among political parties. STV is not very popular with party professionals because it make independent candidates more viable and might weaken party discipline, so it rarely gets considered. I disagree with MSS slightly here: when you can get around the parties and present STV directly to the voters, it has a fighting chance.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 22 May 2008 @ 15:18
Kuwait was under British “protection” and, of course, NTV systems are nearly as much products of British influence as STV is. NTV systems have slightly more non-British presence (notably in East Asia), whereas STV has only a single election in Estonia).
I don’t disagree with you Bob on the “fighting chance” for STV when it gets before the voters. I was really only thinking of elite bargaining, which remains the way most electoral systems are chosen/changed.
STV has won popular majorities in Ireland (twice, when governments tried to change to FPTP), BC (where it was short of the needed 60%), and in a few American cities. On the other hand, New Zealanders were given a choice between MMP and STV in the first referendum leading up to the change, and clearly went with the Royal Commission (of elites and political scientists!) recommendation of MMP.
Seed planted by MSS — 22 May 2008 @ 17:10
MMP was unknown outside Denmark before the West Germans adopted it in 1949. At that time, STV had been used in Ireland for nearly three decades, and Tasmania for over four decades.
In 1949 STV had also been used, briefly, in the preceding decade, by America’s largest city (New York) and Australia’s largest State (New South Wales) before being abolished at the behest of those two notoriously uncorrupt and public-spirited political machines – Tammany Hall Democrats and Jack Lang Labor. (Interestingly, at the same time STV was retained for elections to bodies other than the main popular chamber – NYC school boards and the NSW uper house – which to my mind shows that Hermens-ish complaints about the weirdness and complexity of STV were not made in utmost good faith by STV’s opponents).
So beware the “fringe” argument… STV may not have a majority, but it does have a respectable quota in its favour. MMP may have fashion in its favour, but over time its defects become apparent (not always enough to overcome inertia and self-interest).
(I have had the experience, nearly half a dozen times, of someone who knows a little politics second-hand – ie, their main expertise is an adjoining area, such as economics or journalism – evangelising passionately for MMP as “the best electoral system ever devised”. Invariably this was based on a comparison between MMP and single-seaters only. These bods had all never heard of “open-ticket” STV, ie Hare-Clark – only the Australian “stage-managed” Senate version – or even of non-closed party lists).
Seed planted by Tom Round — 23 May 2008 @ 17:32
Denmark’s early 20thC system was almost MMP. There was no nominal tier covering Copenhagen, but the rest of the country was under MMP-type rules. Was this precedent known to the designers of the German system?
Denmark is also the home of an inventor of STV, Carl Andrae, apparently independently of its ‘invention’ in Britain.
Interestingly, MMP and STV are the most recognized reforms in current FPTP jurisdictions, yet neither is used in the country where both might have been said to have originated. Maybe list-PR is the ‘best’ after all!
(And I have no idea what this has to do with MNTV. Or Kuwait.)
Seed planted by MSS — 23 May 2008 @ 19:16
Well, dig and re-plant then. Cuia horta, eius regulae.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 24 May 2008 @ 02:58
I suspect one of the highest degrees of blockness can be found in Monaco.
Not sure whether the matter was discussed here, the Principality has quite unique electoral system for the Conseil National (24 members): unlimited vote (voter has 24 votes) in the nominal tier in one district (M=16). 16 candidates with the most votes are elected.
For the list tier (8 seats), the party labels of the candidates from the nominal tier come into play. These seats are distributed proportionally to the best losers (of each party) from the nominal tier, based on the sum of votes all the candidates of the parties got in the nominal tier.
In the 2008 election, the winner UPM got all the 16 seats in the nominal tier, its candidates got overall 52,5%. The candidates of the REM (the rival party), who obtained about 40% of votes in the nominal tier, were unable to get a single seat here. In the list tier, the UPM got 5, while the REM 3.
The results suggest MMM. On the other hand, there is some sort of “correction” and “dependence” between the two tiers which make the case quite puzzling.
As for the blockness in the 2008 elections: the last winner (placed 18th!)- first winner ratio was 0.92, the FL-LW ratio 0.98 and SL-FL ratio 0.99!
Seed planted by Roman Chytilek — 07 June 2008 @ 18:30
0.92 ratio of 18th candidate’s votes to those of the first! Yes, Monaco is clearly the Blockness Monster.
What is the “correction” employed in Monaco’s party-based upper tier? (It’s clearly a “list tier” but without actual lists, given allocation to best losers; that aspect is like the former Italian senate rules.)
It sure does not look from this one result as if there is any correction (or partial compensation), given that the party that won all the nominal-tier seats also won more than half the “list” seats.
Seed planted by MSS — 08 June 2008 @ 12:28
It is clearly not the “correction” of the results from the nominal tier (its superiority in the mechanics of electoral system is a striking feature of the electoral system) in the MMP sense but rather an “extension/ translation” of the results achieved by the blocs of candidates in the nominal tier into the list tier (where Hare+LA is used for the distribution of the eight seats).
It seems to me that all this was intended as the “correction” of the perceived state of one party capturing all the seats in the nominal tier. As far as I know, the post 2003 system has been agreed upon following the recommendation of Council of Europe who criticised the (nearly) one party parliaments achieved under the pre 2003 TRS in one multimember (M=18) district. The goal of the MMS was thus to assure at least some representation to the opposition (who surprisingly took the control of the parliament already in 2003) and encourage political pluralism. This goal has been achieved fully in the 2008 election: there were candidates with three party labels in the nominal tier, however these party labels were more of less electoral alliances of 7 parties and/or movements (3+2+2). Not bad for a polity with 7-8 thousands of those eligible to vote…
Seed planted by Roman Chytilek — 08 June 2008 @ 19:47