Propagation: Seeds & scions (25)

25 ideas sprouting »

1. > “Stéphane Dion, notwithstanding that he anounced shortly after his party’s poor performance in the election that he would stand down as party leader once the party chose a successor.”

   Interesting. Will the NDP sign up for a coalition headed by a “TBA” Liberal leader whom they have no direct role in electing? or might the Liberals be swayed by the need to elect a leader who can work with the NDP?

   Australian experience with capital-C coalitions indicates that the National/Country Party’s willingness to ally in Parliament with the Liberals can depend on whom the Lib leader is. Famously, in 1968 the Libs elected John Gorton after Harold Holt drowned, passing over Billy McMahon (father of actor Julian) largely because the NCP leader, “Black Jack” McEwan, vetoed McMahon personally. Because McMahon had supported tariff reductions, McEwan announced that the NCP would leave the Coalition if the Libs elected him. The Libs blinked, and elected Gorton instead (he was a sitting Senator at the time, so constitutional propriety demanded that he win a House of Reps seat – that vacated by Holt, in fact – to become PM). As veteran Canberra journalist Mungo MacCallum wrote:

   “McMahon [...] had been the subject of a thunderous veto by McEwen on the behalf of the Country Party. Although the veto was almost entirely bluff – the Country Party relied on its position in government to deliver goodies to its supporters, and, even if it had moved to the cross-benches, was hardly likely to vote to replace a Liberal government with a Labor one – the Libs caved in with surprising alacrity.” (The Man Who Laughs, 2001, p 139).

   “I have said before that I always regarded McEwen’s threats to leave the Coalition as largely bluff; under almost any circumstances, the Government seats were more comfortable than the cross-benches, and actual Opposition was unthinkable.” (p 213).

   And in Queensland – where the major and minor Coalition party roles were reversed – Joh Bjelke Petersen ended the Coalition in 1983 when the Liberals insisted on having as their leader Terry White, who had committed the effrontery (in the Premier’s eyes) of supporting the establishment of a Public Accounts Committee.

   (The coalition was eventually restored – in 1995, from memory – and recently the two Qld conservative parties have officially merged. The stated reason is that optional-preferential voting makes it too risky to run separate candidates because Labor then wins on a split vote. I don’t, myself, see the logic of reasoning that a “small-L” Liberal who won’t give a conservative National candidate a second preference when there is a Liberal candidate will nonetheless give that conservative candidate a first preference if if there is no Liberal candidate… but then I haven’t lived in Qld for nearly 5 years so maybe I’m missing something.)

   Back to Canada… The evidence is strong that coalitions don’t work for long under plurality voting. (Pure single-ballot plurality, that is – France and Minnesota Democrat-Farmer-Labor get two chances to vote). They might succeed in the short term goal of ousting a disliked common enemy (UK 1920s, India 1977, Queensland 1957), but within a single term or so, either the coalition falls apart or the voting system is changed to enable parties to co-compete without splitting their vote.

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 01 December 2008 @ 18:50

2. Dion (Liberal), Layton (New Democrat), and Duceppe (Bloc Quebecois) held a news conference a little while ago where they publicly signed a coalition agreement (video link). The NDP agreed to Liberal leadership for 30 months, the Bloc to 18. So it’s on. Now there will be at least a week until there is an opportunity to move non-confidence. The Tories may prorogue to stave this off until after Christmas. The longer the better for the coalition, I think, as it gives them time to get their economic package together.

   Seed planted by CCBC — 01 December 2008 @ 18:58

3. I’d think a prorogation is prolly in the class of things to which the governor-general should ‘not react terribly well’. Its main effect would be to enable Harper to retain office without retaining the confidence of the parliament. Unlike Tom, I am still not mentioning the Bkelke-Petersen resignation.

   Seed planted by Alan — 01 December 2008 @ 20:30

4. Wow. As a politics watcher, this is fun. I already had guessed that this minority government wouldn’t last long, but I was putting that at another year or two – not a matter of months.

   My guess is that there is nothing the Tories can do to stop it. There was some things I liked about the Tories, but I’m willing to see what this new coalition will do, if anything. I would think that this won’t last too long for the reasons Tom cited above – in this system, they can’t be too stable, and the addition of the Bloc, which can be quite unpredictable, may at some point decide to blow the whole thing up anyway.

   Seed planted by B. Minich — 01 December 2008 @ 22:49

5. I’m curious about the public opinion implications of any Liberal/NDP coalition. The spin battle over this will be tremendous. The Tories risk losing their “strong leadership” mantle; the Liberals could be seen as usurpers led by a rejected Dion; and the NDP may be associated with an economic downturn, which has cursed some of their provincial wings. Does anybody know of any polling?

   It’s clear that once Harper started introducing so many confidence measures, the opposition had to do something to defang the threat. (Why didn’t this happen last Parliament?) But I’m interested in other options they had. What do folks think of the following ideas?

   1. The opposition could allow the Tories to govern for now, but sign a standing coalition agreement to take effect should Harper lose a confidence vote. This could force Harper to be more conciliatory without some of the downsides of the current agreement. But it risks that after a few months, upon a loss of confidence the G.G. might allow an election call instead of turning over the government.

   2. The opposition could advocate a national-unity government. Vote no confidence, propose a C/L/N coalition “in the spirit of cooperation”, but say that they’re willing to go forward without the Tories if they won’t join. Either the Liberals and NDP get a seat at the table; or we have a L/N coalition just like now, but IMHO more of a public opinion win.

   Canada has had two attempts at national unity governments, both by the Tories and both during wartime. The first one worked, the second didn’t—but in neither case did they involve a minority government. I’m not aware of any instance of a coalition-in-waiting, but given how rare minority governments are worldwide this is unsurprising.

   Seed planted by Vasi — 02 December 2008 @ 08:58

6. Vasi’s strategic suggestions (#5) are interesting. I’ll refrain from further comment on them (for now).

   Thanks to Tom (#1) for referencing cases where the PM was a matter of bargaining between the parties. I am ‘collecting’ such cases (for purposes I promise to address in their own planting some day soon).

   Regarding coalitions in FPTP systems, that is another issue I intend to address head-on in its own planting. (Sorry, but it is both exam and book-finishing time, so lots to be deferred.) India suggests that pre-electoral coalitions under FPTP can be stable. I refer here not to 1977 (which was really nothing beyond a “stop Indira” coalition, although that was quite an achievement in itself). Rather I refer to the NDA (elected 1999) and UPA (2004), both pre-election coalitions that served a full term (or are about to serve effectively a full term in the latter case) and survived to contest the next election in approximately the same form (or so it appears in the current case). But post-electoral coalitions are indeed rare (and probably not usually happy experiences) in FPTP systems.

   An interesting question for this Canadian case–assuming it indeed comes about and survives on its own terms–is what happens at the next election? That, too, deserves its own planting. (Really, I will get to it.)

   Seed planted by MSS — 02 December 2008 @ 14:25

7. There is an on-line petition: Canadians for a Progressive Coalition.

   I shall refrain from adding my name. It would be presumptuous of me to declare what is good for Canada. However, I can declare that the coalition would be great for my research and teaching. And, really, isn’t that what politics is all about?

   Seed planted by MSS — 02 December 2008 @ 15:44

8. The video linked at #2 above is fascinating and highly recommended!

   It contains a series of segments on the coalition prospects. One interesting twist: rumors that the Green leader could get an appointment to the Senate, and possibly a cabinet post.

   I will say that the introduction to the news items and some of the commentary are rather annoying–words like “secret deals” (seems pretty public to me!), “overthrow,” “banana republic”(even though most parliamentary democracies have post-electoral bargaining as a matter of course), etc. But the bottom line on the slant is accepting the notion that voters re-elected a “strengthened” (evidently not!) Conservative minority. Of course, all they did was reelect a parliament, in which indeed no party has a majority.

   If one wants to address the subjective theme of democratic “legitimacy” here, I think one should at least start from the fact that Harper chose to call an election, with one intent: to get a majority. The voters did not grant that.

   Seed planted by MSS — 02 December 2008 @ 16:03

9. > “But post-electoral coalitions are indeed rare (and probably not usually happy experiences) in FPTP systems”

   Amendment accepted. Also, ISTM that India, like Canada, has the advantage (from an FPTP point of view) that sheer regional diversity in voting patterns can make a pre-electoral pact easier to agree on. Easier for the Bloc Quebecois to generously concede the Liberals every riding in Alberta than for (say) the Democrats to allow a resurgent Progressive Party (!) a straight fight against the GOP in all states and districts west of the Mississippi, or for the UK Liberals and Social Democrats to work out who “gets” which seats in England.

   Re Billy McMahon – he eventually got his chance to be PM in 1972, when (a) McEwen retired and his successor lacked both the personal vendetta and the ability to bluff the Liberals; and (b) a combination of Gorton’s “erratic” personal behaviour and McMahon’s manouvering led to a bizarre party-room coup, in which the Liberal MPs votes tied, and Gorton voluntarily quit. There was a persistent media meme that he, as chair of caucus, had used his own casting vote against himself, but in fact it wasn’t discretionary. Rather, Gorton took the view that, since the motion he called was of confidence in him as leader, a tie meant it was defeated and he lacked confidence. McMahon duly took over for a brief time until Labor under Gough Whitlam won the 1972 election.

   (As it happens, Gorton was a former fighter pilot who had been shot down in wartime and suffered lifelong injuries as a result. He was disliked by many conservatives for his constitutional heresies [eg, on "States' Rights"]; he became notorious for off-the-cuff public statements; and his choice of female appointees raised eyebrows…)

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 02 December 2008 @ 16:07

10. An op-ed in the Montreal Gazette suggests another option: That the GG could refuse to accept the government’s resignation, essentially instructing all parties to cooperate like adults. This is similar to various musings during the past two parliaments.

    I’m not sure that this idea is very practical. For most bills there is a status quo that can be preserved, so perhaps the GG could decide never to treat them as confidence motions. But for some, like the budget, some bill has to pass within a reasonable time frame. Therefore, if the parties prefer brinkmanship over cooperation, they just have to wait for the budget—we can’t force them to be sensible.

    Then again, part of me would love to see parliament pass a very progressive agenda and then charge Harper with implementing it, just for giggles.

    Seed planted by Vasi — 02 December 2008 @ 20:58

11. @Vasi

    I’ve been through a viceregal constitutional crisis where a governor-general gave the appearance of favouring one side of politics over the other. They are not, I assure you, much fun or very good for the heath of the political system.

    The Crown is not there to assure adult behaviour, especially where the definition of adult behaviour favours one side of politics over the other. The Crown is there to find advisers who can command the confidence of the parliament. At the moment Harper does not meet that definition.

    While the article asserts that the crown can refuse ministerial resignations, and that therefore the Crown can refuse prime ministerial resignations, I have not been able to find any historical example of this that goes beyond a request to remain in office in a caretaker capacity for a very brief period.

    The editorial actually calls for the governor-general to sustain Harper in office against the will of parliament, and then compound her constitutional error by ordering the House of Commons to repose it confidence in Harper. There are no historical examples of the Crown ordering or requesting Parliament to reconsider a vote of no confidence. I can only assume the editorial writer is a closet republican who wants the monarchy abolished in Canada as quickly as possible.

    Seed planted by Alan — 02 December 2008 @ 21:13

12. Some news reports suggest Dion has agreed to appoint NDP and Bloc nominees, as well as Greens leader Elizabeth May, to the Senate as a quid pro quo for their support.

    Seed planted by Tom Round — 02 December 2008 @ 23:57

13. Thanks for the props, MSS.

    There was a missing link in my last comment: By the time the Tories backed down on public subsidies, it was too late. Why? Because once the Liberals were forced to consider a coalition with their sworn enemy for the sake of survival, it’s only a small step to consider a coalition for the sake of power.

    Harper must know this, he is anything but stupid. So he knows that the coalition really of his own making. Delicious.

    The other thing I forgot to mention is the Bloc’s calculus for dissolution. Dion’s pre-May dissolution only works if the Bloc prefers to face Dion rather than Ignatieff, and/or if they think they would gain seats.

    I don’t know which the Bloc would prefer, but if I were them, better the devil you know. Besides, who wouldn’t want to run an election against a lame-duck leader?

    Consider then, that the coalition may simply dissolve because the Bloc and Tories want to run against Dion rather than Ignatieff. Crass politics, but Canada has been delivering a master class on it since at least the summer.

    Not to be outdone in the crass department, the Liberals will want an election immediately after May, to benefit from the honeymoon. Surely the Bloc and Tories will figure this out. So they should probably prefer to dissolve before May.

    Caveat: arguably, the Bloc’s main opponents are now the Tories, not the Liberals, and the calculus could hinge on Tory popularity in Quebec. This is partially true, but the Tories turned out to be little threat in 2008, by winning the exact same seats as in 2006, after much wooing.

    More election calculus: What do the people think of the coalition?

    Partisans will mostly fall in line with their parties. Remember, Liberals are the quintessential brokerage party of power, not principle, so don’t expect much complaint about working with separatists from within the party.

    The general public, on the other hand, has two outcomes:
    1) Apathy and indifference.
    2) Outrage. Remember, the Liberals had their worse showing, ever. The government (which excludes the Bloc) will have less seats than the Tories.

    #1 and #2 may vary by region. The West in particular could react very, very negatively. Rejection of the Tories could be read as rejection, once again, of the West by Central Canada (where the Liberal and Bloc seats are).

    Note that in neither case, does the general public shower the coalition with kisses.

    So the coalition is likely to have a very short honeymoon. Once they appoint some unelected Senators, deliver a stimulus package, and the deficit starts to grow as the economy tanks, it could get extremely rocky.

    Did I mention that Dion has trouble leading his own office, much less his party? It may not bode well for good government, but the prospects for Canadian political junkies has never been better.

    Seed planted by Ross Trusler — 03 December 2008 @ 02:20

14. MSS, I’d love your comment on this:

    The Bloc is at the root of the current crisis. This is really only the end of the beginning of a major change in federal Canadian politics.

    Background: Only the Tories and Grits have ever formed government. But with the Bloc consistently winning about 50 seats, majority governments will be extremely rare, and in any event, unlikely until after the next redistribution in 2014.

    Therefore, barring unlikely Tory/NDP coalition, forming government either requires Conservative and Liberal cooperation (as in the last parliament), or government cooperation with the Bloc.

    But cooperation with the Bloc is likely to only further legitimize the function of a separatist party.

    MSS: What is your take on the effect of separatist parties in federal parliaments? My own feeling is that they destabilizing federations, and increasingly so, given time.

    The obvious solution for the Tories and Liberals is to abandon FPTP. It would greatly reduce the influence of the Bloc, even if it bore several new parties, ensuring that the original parties never govern alone again.

    Seed planted by Ross Trusler — 03 December 2008 @ 02:30

15. In the calculus on who will jump and when, can I suggest that party seen as responsible for causing an early election at this stage, and for some time to come, is going to be treated harshly by the electorate? Electorates generally do not like early elections very much. Harper should bear this in mind if he ever recovers from his current tantrum.

    Seed planted by Alan — 03 December 2008 @ 03:33

16. The greedy coalition members just dont want to tighten their belt, so they are throwing a tantrum. Rather wast more tax money and let the people suffer and tighten their belts.
    It is now obvious that it does not matter what Canadians vote for as politicians can do what they want anyway.
    It looks like Canada is going the dictatorial way. Who cares what the people vote for. We might as well join the third world countries run by dictators.
    Why should anyone waste their time going to vote when the politicians we do not vote for and still get paid with our taxes waste millions and do whatever they want.
    This is a full on coup by three greedy dictators.

    Seed planted by John — 03 December 2008 @ 03:51

17. Alan:

    Re the “GG calls a time-out” solution, I agree that it’s silly and unlikely, I’m glad you fleshed out just how crazy it is. (And I suppose the GG becoming enmeshed in controversy does have a certain appeal to republicans such as myself, closeted or not.)

    Re the populace blaming parties for causing an early election, I hope you’re right, but I’m not too confident of this. A party is unlikely to say “We want an election now, so we’re bringing down the government”. Instead they’ll bring up an existing disagreement, portray some other party/ies as intransigent, and blame them for an election. Even in the most recent election, after Harper won all his confidence motions and then asked the GG to dissolve parliament anyhow, the public didn’t seem particularly inclined to blame or punish him.

    Ross:

    Re public attitudes towards the coalition, you’re right that the public is unlikely to start singing the praises of a coalition. But remember that it doesn’t exist in isolation. The important calculus after a turnover, I think, is whether opinion on the coalition sours more than opinion on the Tories.

    Re the Bloc, I’m not sure that cooperating with them will legitimize them so much as it will co-opt them. So far the Bloc has mostly stayed out of government, and so has been able to avoid the “pur et dur” vs. gradualist conflict that has so riven the Parti Québecois.

    It certainly sounds plausible that a large, persistent secessionist party would destabilize Parliament, but I’m not sure what other examples there are. The Lega Nord has been mostly coopted by now, and Italy’s not exactly known for stability anyhow. Sinn Fein started a revolution before they had time to destabilize the British House, and the modern Northern Ireland parties are too small to do so. The Basque PNV is too small as well. One could imagine obstructionist national Catalan or Scottish independence parties, but those haven’t really arisen. I suppose we could also look at non-separatist parties that cause coalition difficulties, such as those restricted by a cordon sanitaire?

    I was wondering whether Canada’s convention of minority governments (rather than coalitions) makes the Bloc more destabilizing than otherwise. But if coalitions were required, we could easily end up with year after year of grand Lib/Cons coalitions; so you’re probably right that the electoral system is what needs to change.

    Seed planted by Vasi — 03 December 2008 @ 13:04

18. A friend of mine is claiming that whatever the GG does, it will likely be challenged in court. Could somebody who knows than do I tell me if this makes any sense? I have no idea whether anybody has standing to take this to court, or whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Parliamentary convention.

    Seed planted by Vasi — 03 December 2008 @ 13:09

19. The courts refused to review Kerr’s actions in 1975. It’s not immediately obvious why Canadian courts would take a different view from Australian courts. The Crown is generally immune from suit and in any case the constitutional conventions are not judicable or enforceable law.

    The Westminster system (term used loosely) is remarkably opaque once it moves into crisis. In 1975 the department of government at the University of Queensland held a famous seminar on what the governor-general was likely to do. With one exception, every professor, lecturer or tutor agreed the governor-general would not dismiss the government. The exception, a former colonial treasurer of Nigeria, argued strongly that the governor-general had no choice but dismissing the government.

    The seminar is famous because the laughter with which the former colonial treasurer’s views were greeted was interrupted by news that the governor-general had dismissed the government.

    Seed planted by Alan — 03 December 2008 @ 15:20

20. > “It’s not immediately obvious why Canadian courts would take a different view from Australian courts”

    Except that Canada has a recent (post-1980) tradition of asking the courts to rule on matters that in Australia would be considered purely non-justiciable “convention”, or “political”. Hard to imagine the High Court of Australia touching a question like “How many Provinces must agree to an amendment before, by convention, Westminster ratifies it?” or “If one State wants to secede, what’s the appropriate procedure?” In the Quebec Secession Reference, the SCC required both sides to negotiate in good faith. The HCA would never (even at the height of the Mason/ Brennan Chief Justiceships) have ordered anything so fuzzy and non-black-letter. Having said that, the German Const Court does order the Bund and the Laender to “negotiate in federal good faith” with each other so maybe it’s Australia that’s the outlier.

    I suspect the Aust/ Canada difference derives from two factors, one recent (the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and indeed the whole 1980-81 repatriation package, which includes fuzzy non-judiciable stuff like “The PM must convene a conference to discuss federal funding”) and one much older (advisory opinions on reference by the executive – constitutionally mandated in Canada, but unconstitutional in Aust, like in the USA).

    Seed planted by Tom Round — 03 December 2008 @ 16:14

21. Except that the Crown immunity doctrine is common to the UK, New Zealand, etc etc, not just Australia and even survives under a different name in the US. I’d agree with you that the supreme court of Canada takes a different approach in relation to patriated matters, but I’d ask you to show me where in the patriation legislation the long-standing doctrine of Crown immunity for its own acts is disturbed or even mentioned.

    Even in Ireland, probably the most codified of any of the Westminster countries, the ‘prerogative’ acts of the president, appointment removal, prorogation and dissolution, cannot be reviewed in the courts. There are actually good public policy reasons for the doctrine, beyond the common law silliness of claiming things like mandamus cannot run against the Crown because the Queen cannot command herself.

    Lets imagine, arguendo, that the supreme court of Canada is prepared to review a decision to dismiss Harper, to prorogue parliament, or to dissolve parliament. Can any of those things be remedied? Can a parliament be undissolved and the new parliament elected in place of the old parliament be told it was all a dreadful mistake and they should go home? What happens to a prorogued parliament while the courts decide whether it can be prorogued or not and how would you distinguish a ‘judicial prorogation’ while the court considers the issue from the ‘royal prorogation’ that is allegedly being reviewed?

    I think Westminster is pretty silly and I think the conventions can actually be codified with some minimal changes. That’s a different argument from the nightmare of having two parliaments or two governments at the same time while the courts attempt to apply law which is not really law to a set of facts that it is impossible to establish with any certainty and then to apply remedies that would not work to this vagary o law and fact.

    .

    Seed planted by Alan — 03 December 2008 @ 16:46

22. In Canada, it is much easier for a government to ask the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, a fuzzy question, then for an aggrieved individual to do so. Governments have access to the “reference procedure” which lets them posit questions to the SCC for “advisory opinions.” The Secession Reference was one such.

    As a matter of doctrinaire law, there is just no doubt that the Governor General’s actions are beyond judicial review. Now courts have sometimes done weird things, but someone would have to go to a trial judge in the federal court, persuade them to hear it on an expedited basis, persuade them of an extremely unorthodox use of the judicial review power, and not get hammered by the Federal Court of Appeal right away. I just can’t see it happening.

    Seed planted by Pithlord — 04 December 2008 @ 12:29

23. There’s nothing to co-opt with the Bloc, unlike the Pq. The PQ can form governments, and has had to govern. Things brings discipline.

    No discipline is ever required of the Bloc. They are free to continue to make one-sided demands, without any responsibilities, and without having to answer to the electorate for them.

    However, the Bloc has now been fully legitimized and vindicated by the formal creation of the coalition, even if it does not form government. Forever more, the Bloc leadership will be able to claim that it has a role in government, is a player, etc. Until now, other parties could substantively deny that claim.

    It’s a very, very powerful claim. It cements the Bloc in parliament, seemingly permanently. For this reason alone, Dion should be excoriated. Liberals should also question giving the NDP the chance to form government: the Liberals can now kiss their usual ballot box bonus from a lot of NDP supporters.

    Long-term, the Liberals are bigger losers than the Tories, which is perhaps why Harper didn’t anticipate Dion’s move. The NDP is a winner, but the Bloc is the biggest winner by far.

    Seed planted by Ross Trusler — 05 December 2008 @ 00:02

24. Who is the biggest looser in this political drama? Will no party ever win a majority in Canada ever again? Will the Liberals and NDP along with Bloc Quebecois change the electoral system to Australian Preferential voting and swamp preferences?

    Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 05 December 2008 @ 01:50

25. The argument “no one voted for a coalition” is thoughtless if not ignorant: that’s why it’s a coalition. For people to vote for it, it would have had to be a Coalition Party.

    The bigger problem is not the coalition, but its reliance on the Bloc Quebecois. This would not have been necessary with proportional representation: the Liberals, NDP and Greens would have had a majority without the Bloc.

    This reliance on the Bloc is a surprise to those who did not follow developments in Quebec in the past year.

    Duceppe will not be in the cabinet room. Remarkably, he has given the Coalition a blank cheque for 18 months. He gets only three things out of it, if you look at the actual documents: the Coalition Agreement and the three-party policy agenda.

    1. “A permanent consultation mechanism.”

    2. A re-opener after 18 months, although the Coalition agreement runs for 30 months. This is when the Bloc will finally be able to seek something they can point to for Quebec, which they will need politically in Quebec, and haven’t gotten yet.

    3. The same policy goals for Canada as the Coalition government has, but which they have to trust the Coalition to implement. The remarkable thing here is, until this September the Bloc has always said it is not in Ottawa to improve Canada, but to pursue Quebec’s interests. (By the way, they have never said they were in Ottawa to get Quebec independence, because it is a basic principle in Quebec that only Quebec will decide its future, not Ottawa.) But in the past election campaign they got a mandate from Quebec voters to “Stop Harper” and his “very right-wing agenda” as Duceppe said about 15 times a day. Their platform was, in fact, the platform of the Quebec Federation of Labour. So now the Bloc have found themselves committed to improve Canada, something very new for them. They would not have done this except they decided to trust the NDP to share the labour agenda.

    Former Quebec PQ premier Jacques Parizeau recently said something like “if the Coalition is good for Quebec, it’s good for a sovereign Quebec.” What a new concept: the Coalition is good for Canada, therefore good for Quebec as a part of Canada, and therefore good for a sovereign Quebec. Sovereignty becomes less relevant than ever.

    Seed planted by Wilf Day — 13 December 2008 @ 16:30

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