The final vote for the referendum that would allow a second reelection for Álvaro Uribe in Colombia was 62-5 in the Colombia Senate (it has 102 members). The caucuses of the Liberal Party (PL) and the Democratic Alternative Pole (PDA) both abstained from the vote. The official results from the 2006 elections put the PL at 18 votes and the PDA at 10, for 28 total. As such, there were seven others that did not vote yesterday (62+5+18+10=95).
Further details and links are included in his post.
As someone who has followed Colombian politics now for 20 years (including several trips to the country), and who was quite involved as an outsider assisting the very important legislative electoral-system reform passed in 2003, I am quite alarmed by this development. It has been expected for some time, but there was always the chance Uribe might have called it off by announcing he would not seek a third term. When he was elected in 2002, the constitution permitted only a single term; he then obtained an amendment to permit a second term, which he won easily in 2006. He should win easily again. (This amendment must be submitted to a referendum, but it is sure to pass.)
Both reelection amendments have been passed through legal processes, unlike some others in the region in the past that have come through institutional rupture (e.g. in Peru and Venezuela) or threats of rupture (e.g. Argentina when Carlos Menem was president). In some ways, that is what is so disturbing. The legislative electoral reforms were supposed to have empowered more meaningful parties, and there were indications in the first post-reform election, 2006, that they had done so. Furthering party development has had the predicted and desirable effect of making the congress more relevant in lawmaking. It also “should have” led to competition over national leadership, the ultimate prize for which is the presidency. Uribe does not have a single party, but rather is backed by several. One might have expected that these parties would have produced contending leaders, rather than have subordinated themselves to a single “above parties” jefe.* Alas, one would have been wrong to assume that, and now one must wonder whether the hard-won independence of the parties, the congress, and other institutions can survive.
This is a sad turn of events for Colombian democracy.
* Update: Steven has some further valuable information about the possibility of mergers of the smaller uribista parties, as well as potential presidential challengers. (I tend to agree with Steven that no challenger would be likely to defeat Uribe.)