While our thread on electoral reform for California continues to grow (up to an F&V record 69 comments at last check), now is the time to start one on the idea of a constitutional convention. There is a place to enter “Your ideas for Reform,” with the following topical areas prompt:
Governance, including the structure of the legislative and executive branches of government, with the latter to include State agencies and commissions.
Elections, including the initiative and referenda processes, campaign finance, and term limits.
The Budget, including the budget process and related requirements, such as the 2/3ds legislative vote required to pass a budget, the term and balancing of a budget, and mandated spending.
Revenue distribution, including the revenue relationship between local and state government
Note that while the Elections topic does not even hint at electoral-system reform, the Governance topic does open up the idea of executive-legislative structural reform. Parliamentarism, anyone?
Thanks to Dave Shelton, one of our students, for the tip.
The governor should be elected by AV/STV. (I and other STV fanboiz look forward to proposals for the election of the governor by MMP or ListPR with peculiar joy)
Gubernatorial elections would change significantly because candidates would be seeking a majority rather than a plurality. Demonising opponents is not a spectacularly good strategy under those circumstances as has been shown with the San Francisco experiment. Candidates would need to consult minor parties as, for example, the ALP in Australia must make preference deals with the Greens and independents before a federal election in Australia. The recall provisions should be changed that a successful recall generates an executive and legislative election without the exclusion of incumbents.
Other executive positions should not be filled by election. Short ballot reform should create a governor who is seriously accountable instead of one who can evade responsibility. Gubernatorial vacancies, except very short-term ones, should be filled by by-election.
There should be a number of superintendence institutions that are independent of both the executive and legislature. They should be appointed in the same manner as judges, but to a limited term of say 7 years. The minimum list would be ombudsman, electoral commission, auditor-general integrity commissioner, information commissioner and possibly an environment commissioner. The South African list is ombudsman, human rights commission, commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities, commission for gender equality, auditor-general, electoral commission, fiscal and financial commission. (The gender commission and the communities commission would not be on my shopping list)
Apart from better governance the function of these bodies would to be to better inform the electorate. The auditor-general and the fiscal and finance commission for example, would analyse the budget and perhaps establish authoritatively that the sums just do not add up.
An upper house elected and structured in the same way as the lower house is pointless and just adds an extra veto point to an already road-blocked system. A unicameral legislature should be elected from regionalised super-districts by some form of proportional representation. Preferably one that is the same as that by which the governor is elected to avoid the Scotland problem. The size of the legislature should be fixed by some objective standard like population rather than being a fixed arbitrary number. The Shugart number would be fine. Redistricting would be as frequent as needed, not at fixed arbitrary intervals, and would be done by the electoral commission subject to judicial review.
The budget super-majority (and super-majorities generally) should be abolished except for constitutional amendments, some procedural votes, and perhaps the confirmation of supreme court judges. There may be a case for allowing a significant minority to call a referendum on a bill, but not to block bills at will. The governor should present an executive budget and legislative amendments (including tax expenditures) should be self-funded. Tax expenditures should have a fixed term that is identical to other outlays. The governor should have a pre-emptive veto on new outlays. The budget should be balanced unless the legislature and governor agree that a deficit is necessary. There may be a case for a super-majority on deficit resolutions. There may be a case to authorise the fiscal and financial commission to adjust taxes upwards where the budget is in deficit.
The multi-layered local governments, including special purpose local governments, should be consolidated into at most 2 levels. Local governments should have a single elected executive and a proportional representation council. Local government boundaries should be fixed independently according to objective standards in a manner similar to Alaska.
There should be a general system of administrative review on the merits on the Australian/South African model.
Constitutional amendments should have to meet a higher threshold such as a majority of the state and a majority of the upper level local governments. Constitutional initiatives should continue, but be subject to the same fiscal rules as legislative initiatives. Legislative initiatives should expire after a fixed term. Initiatives should be excluded from dedicating or appropriating revenue and from authorising tax expenditures. Fiscal initiatives should be subject to independent analysis by the fiscal and financial commission.
Seed planted by Alan — 22 May 2009 @ 05:01
Are we talking about what would the ideal form of government will be, or the minimum reforms needed that will actually pass?
There is a strong status quo bias among American voters and the political class. I’m a big fan of parliamentary systems, and they work on the state/ provincial level in Canada, but don’t expect to see any constitutional convention implement a parliamentary system.
The minimum reforms would be:
1. Legislature passes budgets and taxes by majority vote. This will also be the hardest one to get voter approval. If you don’t get this, you might as well declare bankruptcy and ask the Feds for a bailout.
2. I/R still exists, but you can’t make budgetary appropriations through I/R. Again, I’m not sure how you get the voters to buy this. One creative solution is to remove all legislative powers from the legislature, you pass laws through I/R, the legislature exists to raise taxes, pass the budget, and monitor the executive.
In other words, direct democracy for laws, delegated democracy for taxes and spending and watchdog functions, administration by a civil service supervised by an elected executive.
3. Unicameral legislature. No reason for two houses both elected by FTFP single member district. This could be sold to the voters if the total size of the new legislature was smaller than the combined current Senate and Assembly. Also short ballot, only the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are directly elected, every other executive branch official is appointed by the Governor with legislative confirmation.
4. District lines set by non-partisan body, proportional representation would be nice if you could convince the convention to go for it.
You might be able to sneak through a South African style system where there is someone called the “Governor” who is elected by the legislature and recallable by the legislature, in other words a disguised parliamentary system. Note that making the legislature unicameral should strengthen the power of the one chamber in bargaining with the governor. You also might be able to get through that the governor’s signature is not needed to pass the budget. If you combine this with legislation passed only through I/R and close monitoring of the executive branch by the legislature and ombudsmen, that leave a figurehead governor. Note that the figurehead governor has not worked well in Texas, but the the Texas state government has problems in other areas.
In New York, its very easy for the governor to get rolled by the legislature if the Democratic and Republican party machines cooperate, but this is more of a function of NY machine politics than the state constitution.
I’d like to see some movement towards creating metropolitan area wide governments which would be strong enough to eventually take over the functions of the state governments. In fact, the metro councils could be made up of the state assemblymen elected from that particular metropolitan area, which would both keep the number of politicians down and make it less likely that the state legislature takes back power from the metroplitan areas. Local governments in rural areas would still be run mainly from the towns, coordinated by a state legislative committee made up of the rural assemblymen. I think California geographically and in terms of population is simply too large for a provincial tier government. For someone living in San Diego, having decisions made in Sacamento isn’t much better than having decisions made in Washington.
Local government consolidation is another common sense idea that always seems impossible to implement in non-parliamentary systems.
I think most of these proposals will be too radical for the actual state convention, I just hope they don’t make the problem worse by putting in even more restrictions on taxation and creating even more minor offices.
Seed planted by Ed — 22 May 2009 @ 13:09
The reason why we are in this budget deficit is mainly because of public employees generous pension plans that are unsustainable without huge tax increases and huge cuts in services. The worse of both worlds. These pension plans are defined pension plans, and the private sector has abandon them for 401k’s.
The poor should not bear the brunt of these budget cuts nor should they be encouraged to gamble more when services and programs should be helping them become less poor and self sufficient.
Local Government should go bankrupt for indulging in these types of benefits, and the same with the same state for allowing this to happen.
Neither the Republican Party and the Democrat Party is going after this and making this an election issue.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 22 May 2009 @ 17:48
Global deficits rarely result from particular expenditures.
If defined benefits pensions are the problem you would need to show that the deficit would disappear if and only if those pensions were removed. If abolishing those pensions would not solve the structural deficit then that explanation would fail. The tax expenditure on Prop 13 is a massive subsidy to landowners and created a huge gap on the revenue side. I’d suspect the tax expenditure there is considerably more likely then defined benefit pensions to be the main underlying cause of the structural deficit but I would not die in a ditch for it.
If you take the particular expenditure approach then you need to show what the budget would look like without the Prop 13 tax expenditure.
The ‘deficit is caused by your fiscal programs but not mine’ argument precisely encapsulates what has happened to California. All that really happens under that argument is that the advocates or opponents of particular programs insist that it is Program X and not Program Y that causes the deficit. It would be surprising if the average deficit were really bright enough to recognise the kind of dollars that make it expand or contract.
Local governments cannot go bankrupt in any serious sense. We’ve learnt recently that large private banks cannot go bankrupt in any sense. Fires still need to be put out and the functions of government still need to continue. Forcing the appearance of bankruptcy on local government will not kill their ability to raise revenue and ultimately recover. Apparent bankruptcy would not be a significant punishment to those responsible for the debacle. They will have moved onto other offices higher in the state long before they are ever called to account for their local records.
I suggest the real problem is a political class whose sums do not add up and a budget/initiative process that together encourage private raids on the treasury.
Seed planted by Alan — 22 May 2009 @ 18:22
Ed’s comment on making things worse through pseudo-populist restrictions on taxes and spending, etc., points this discussion in a direction I think it needs to go. How can the debate best be focused on real solutions instead of the phony ones that clog the airwaves (and the ballot)?
I hope that PR can, at least occasionally, be introduced into the proceedings by repeating over and over that the 2/3 rule for budgets and taxes is the wrong solution to the right problem. Challenge those who want to repeal it to say how they would protect minority interests in a two-party legislature with no representatives of the political center.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 22 May 2009 @ 21:51
Could a U.S state embrace some sort of parliamentarianism? or would that be declared unconstitutional because of the U.S constitution requires a Republican government and that means separation of powers possibly?
I would all be more a move in the direction of parliamentarianism perhaps semi-governorism. The speaker of the state Assembly is already a de facto prime minister whether we like it or not. So we should introduce a premier but most likely this is not going to happen.
At the very least, all the governor and lieutenant governor should be elected on a joint ticket, the secretary of state should be abolish and the functions of that position transfer to the lieutenant governor. All the other positions including executive positions besides the jointly elected governor and and his vice should be appointed. California should look at the Hawaii and the Alaskan state constitutions for reference.
The term of the Assembly should be increase from 2 to 4 years the legislative recall should be abolished in exchange for recalling the whole legislature.
It might be awful to say this, but the initiative process needs to be reformed, requiring that any revenue increasing initiatives must first go to the state legislature so that it can be amended and debated and then put on the ballot. Could that work?
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 23 May 2009 @ 00:10
If the legislative term increased to 4 years what would you do with the gubernatorial term? Presumably you are not advocating an 8 year governorship. Perhaps 3/6 would work better than 4/4 or 4/8.
Seed planted by Alan — 23 May 2009 @ 03:00
Many – even the majority of? – US States had a Governor (or “President”) appointed by the Legislature in 1787-89. Direct elections were not universal until the mid-19th century. Even then, many States retained a Chilean-style model (runoff in the Legislature if no candidate polled 50%) until the 1960s.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 23 May 2009 @ 04:02
If I’m not mistaken, Vermont still has gubernatorial elections decided by the legislature when no candidate gets 50%. But this is not really evidence for the constitutionality of a parliamentary form of government in a state. On the other hand, Tom’s reference to the early 19th century clearly is such evidence.
Judges don’t like the Guarantee Clause and might well treat challenges to such a state constitution as nonjusticiable. If they did not, they almost certainly should decide that a “republic” (whatever that is) can be parliamentary as well as presidential.
But this kind of court decision is inherently political, and that means that the answer to Suaprazzodi’s question (#6) depends partly on something I know nothing about. Who wins and who loses politically when the form of government is changed from presidential to parliamentary, or back again? I have some sense of who wins and who loses when election methods are changed between majoritarian and proportional, but not in this case.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 23 May 2009 @ 14:39
Yes, it would be odd for the US Supremes to have to hold that, say, the Federal Republic of Germany is not a “republican form of government”, even given certain Justices’ disdain for “foreign law”.
On the other hand, if we give too much weight to historical precedent, then you could have a US State governed by a hereditary Doge…
Seed planted by Tom Round — 23 May 2009 @ 19:37
There is nothing “parliamentary” about the sequence of popular first round–>top-two (or three) runoff by the legislature–>fixed term. However, in the presence of a multiparty system it might generate portfolio-based coalitions, as was briefly the case in Bolivia.
I am not aware of any precedent for confidence votes in US states, which is what it would take to establish that parliamentary government has been permitted.
I wonder if any states have (now or in the past) low thresholds for impeachment. If it is low enough, it could be the next best thing, though even requiring the political majority to make a political finding of a “crime” is hardly the same as a policy-based or partisan majority “no confidence.”
Seed planted by MSS — 24 May 2009 @ 14:25
“The speaker of the state Assembly is already a de facto prime minister whether we like it or not.” (#6)
No! The Speaker of the Assembly not only does not have any political or management leadership over the administration, and also shares legislative leadership with the leader of the Senate. Each of these legislative leaders is accountable only to the majority of one house, and has leadership role only over that house.
As much as I might like a semi-presidential arrangement as an alternative to what we have now, let’s not fail to recognize that it would be quite a radical change.
Seed planted by MSS — 24 May 2009 @ 14:31
#11 reminds us that selection of the governor by the legislature for a fixed term — with no provision for votes of confidence — would not be a parliamentary system. But would it be a step in the direction of parliamentary government, or just a step sideways? In other words, would such an executive — not accountable to the voters but not accountable to the legislature either until the end of a term — accomplish anything at all?
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 24 May 2009 @ 15:22
Bob, the point I was not making very clearly with my reference to Bolivia is that it likely depends on the nature of the alliances that form between the indecisive popular vote and the ‘runoff’ in the legislative chamber(s).
If the popular vote produces a majority, then it’s obviously no different from direct election. If it produces close to a majority, especially with a wide lead, then it probably is still no different. But if you wind up with no candidate even close to a majority, you might–but only might–get parties bargaining over the shape of the government, forming a coalition that controls both the legislature and the executive. But even the latter is not parliamentary, because there are few consequences to the president (governor) if the coalition later breaks down. The term is fixed, and the chief executive might expect that he or she can win a majority (or close enough) in the next election in spite of (or because of) the breakage of the coalition. Or the chief executive might not be eligible in the next election (depending on term-limit provisions) and hence certainly not any more accountable than would be the case currently.
In other words, there are situations in which this form of executive authority (partially fused origin, but fully separate survival) might make a difference. But probably far more in which it would not.
I base the above on both deductive logic of how the provisions should affect behavior and the actual experience of Chile (before 1973) and Bolivia (since around 1982).
Seed planted by MSS — 24 May 2009 @ 15:35
It would be highly ironic if a US court were to argue that “Legislative origin doesn’t make a State’s executive non-’republican’, but legislative survival does” (to borrow the useful distinction from Samuels & Shugart 2010) – if provision for a no-confidence vote (eg, removal by as little as 50%+1, and/or for grounds other than “high crimes”) caused a State to contravene the (otherwise pretty much non-judiciable) Republican Guarant[y] Clause.
In 1991, when a hung Parliament forced the NSW Liberal Govt to agree to amendments to the State’s Const Act – including legal restrictions on the Governor’s reserve powers to dissolve the Assembly – monarchist critics attacked this as “a step towards republicanism”.
Likewise, after the ACT’s first self-govt election in 1989, The Bulletin (now, alas, defunct) commented tongue-in-cheek that, “because the ACT is a republic”, a Chief Minister could not legally be formed until all the votes were counted and the Assembly had met to elect her or him.
In other words, in this hemisphere “republican” implies, inter alia, that the legislature (rather than the Crown) hires and fires the Executive.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 24 May 2009 @ 18:46
Just call it a “legislative recall election” instead of a “vote of non-confidence”. Tada, it’s now thoroughly American!
Seed planted by Vasi — 24 May 2009 @ 21:49
“Just call it a “legislative recall election” instead of a “vote of non-confidence”. Tada, it’s now thoroughly American!”
That’s a great idea, just dress up the proposal in different terms. Could a state manager position be introduced functions as a Prime Minister? It is elected by the state assembly and can be recalled by the assembly at any time, and be replaced by another person.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 25 May 2009 @ 18:12
In a world where ‘empathy’ has acquired the denotation ‘dangerous radicalism’, I think we can safely assume that calling a state premier a manager or even a grand high poobah is not necessarily going to pass muster. Moreover, there are good and sound reasons to do with democracy. transparency and legitimacy why constitution-making should never involve sleight of hand.
Seed planted by Alan — 25 May 2009 @ 22:47
I dunno, Alan, there’s something to be said for giving low-key titles. Calling the Head of Govt “Prime Minister” (ie, “chief servant”) instead of “Chief Executive Officer” or “Supreme Commissioner” may serve the same function as the slave whispering in the Roman general’s victorious ear.
C/f how our American cousins originally considered “His Elective Majesty” but rejected it in favour of “Mr President”.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 25 May 2009 @ 23:29
Low-key titles to restrain the tendency of the good and great to think themselves best and greatest are an excellent idea. I could not agree more with your argument and I think I have commented to that effect, especially in relation to the unfortunate title ‘commander-in-chief of the army and navy’ which is so often and so evilly abbreviated to ‘commander-in-chief’. That is not what is here proposed.
Rather we are told the courts will avert their eyes from parliamentary issues and perhaps that the people will also if only the head of government is styled manager instead of premier. I think the judicial strategy unlikely and the electoral strategy appalling.
Seed planted by Alan — 26 May 2009 @ 03:44
The analogy is to the City Manager in smaller California cities, who serves at the pleasure of the elected Council. Of course, it is not an especially good analogy, because the City Manager really is a professional “technocrat” and not a political figure, and often serves longer than any given council majority. So how you ‘import’ this municipal model to the state (or national) level is not clear to me. I guess that means I come down on Alan’s side, mostly.
On the other hand, I have always found it interesting that the Spanish do not call their head of government a premer ministro, but rather presidente del gobierno. I think the title in the brief Brazilian parliamentary phase ( early 1960s, but never fully implemented) was similar, even though there was still a ‘president’ (intended to be chosen by congress) as head of state.
Seed planted by MSS — 26 May 2009 @ 13:17
Why not call the prime minister a Chancellor like what we call the Prime Minister in German speaking countries?
The chancellor would be elected by the assembly and can be recalled by it at any time, and he or she would have a cabinet responsible to the assembly as well.
We have Chancellors for head of running the University of California. That would be a good way to move toward parliamentarianism.
Calling it a state manager is perhaps a bad idea because people might think it is similar to a city manager. What ever we call it, moving in the direction of parliamentarian is a good idea.
The question is would we have early or snap elections? or just fixed terms like Norway does or extra elections like Sweden?
The governor and his vice would be elected on a joint ticket for 4 years along with the state assembly eliminating mid term elections. It would be better if we reduce all the layers of government because it is costly and few people bother voting for school boards and water boards and other special districts.
Consolidating services is a good idea.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 26 May 2009 @ 15:18
@21 Italy and Poland still use ‘president of the council of ministers’, as did France during the Fourth Republic. That may have been a precedent for president of the government.
@22 Why retain the lieutenant-governor and the weird system of succession to office? France allows 35 days to replace a president in a special election.
California plainly also needs a rule that reducing the civil rights of a targeted group of citizens requires a super-majority or (ideally) cannot be done.
Seed planted by Alan — 26 May 2009 @ 15:52
1. Some of the original New England Colonies/ States had a “Chancellor” (eg, James Kent of NY) who was modelled on the UK office (in its judicial aspect) – a single super-judge who sat as a court of Equity, as distinct from the ordinary courts who administered statute and common law. Originally, in NY (1701-77), the Governor constituted the Court of Chancery! After that, the Chancellor was a separate judicial officer but he sat ex officio on the Council of Revision (an idea discarded by Americans but later taken up by the French, Lebanese, et al with their Conseil constitutionelle) and the special impeachments tribunal.
Switzerland has a Chancellor who is not wholly unlike the US city manager model – elected by the same joint sitting that (formally) elects the Cabinet, and for the same term.
In Australia, Universities traditionally had a Chancellor as ceremonial head and a Vice-Chancellor as active CEO – a sort of Westminster model. The VC does not succeed a vacating Chancellor; in fact, UQ has a separate Deputy Chancellor and Pro-Vice-Chancellors. Griffith Univ recently re-titled its CEO “Vice-Chancellor and President of the University” – it sees this is becoming common in Oz so that overseas academics dealing with a mere “Vice-Chancellor” wouldn’t mistakenly think they were “only” dealing with Gore instead of Clinton, or Cheney instead of… Anyway.
One VC commented that since “Chancellor” is cognate with the Latin root of “cancel”, his role should be to cancel vice.
2. I once counted the number of officials entitled “President” in Italy’s system; apart from the President (of the Republic), the PM is “President of the Council of Ministers”, the Speaker is is “President of the Chamber of Deputies”, the Chief Justice is is “President of the Constitutional Court”, a Region’s premier is is “President of the Giunta” (cognate with “junta”, albeit with different overtones).
Australia has a Senate President, like the USA’s except not pro tem when the Vice-President is away. The Canadian and now UK system of having a Speaker for both Houses seems more consistent, but consistently confusing – the Speaker is the only Member who doesn’t normally speak, and Rules of Order manuals like Robert or Renton use small-S “speaker” to mean “the member who has the floor”. I would personally vote for “Chair”, “Convenor” or ideally “Moderator”, partly I’m a bit of a Whig on these issues but mainly in the (perhaps forlorn) hope it would encourage the Presiding Officer to moderate, rather than leading the troops Newt/ Pelosi style.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 26 May 2009 @ 18:27
The admirable Cordwainer Smith set many of his science fiction stories on Norstrilia, a fabulously wealthy planet settled from Australia. It looks suspiciously like Frank Herbert’s Arrakis except that giant mutated sheep were the source of the immortality drug instead of sandworms. The sensible Norstrilians were governed by a deputy premier because they thought having a full premier would be pretentious. They were a monarchy but sadly the British royal house had been extinct for millennia so they made do with an entirely fictitious monarch.
Ahem. More seriously, ‘chancellor’ is also used by a number of countries, particularly in Latin America, for the foreign minister. That is prolly why an embassy residence is a chancery.
Sweden, Finland and Estonia each have a justice chancellor who is a sort of super-ombudsman.
Seed planted by Alan — 26 May 2009 @ 20:20
If science fiction works are admissible here, I ought to note that the original 1977 novelisation of Star Wars (ghosted by Alan Dean Foster but given assent by His Lucas himself) referred to the corrupt Senator Palpatine getting himself elected “President” of the Galactic Republic. By the time The Phantom Menace screened in 1999, “President” had been replaced with “Chancellor”.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 26 May 2009 @ 22:09
One way to avoid the chancellor or state manager from turning into a grandiose version of a city manager would be to require this person to be an elected official. He or she could be any elected official, including the incumbent governor.
Perhaps the custom would arise where the “state manager” is always the incumbent governor, but the lower house of the legislature could of course dismiss the state manager at any time and appoint a new one. So the governor would always be threated with having his actual power over the state government removed by the legislature, though he would keep the title of “governor”. This would be a step towards a parliamentary system.
Seed planted by Ed — 27 May 2009 @ 13:07
One problem with doing the parliamentary system by disguise is that we may already have two states that work that way. Texas has a weak, almost figurehead, governor. In New York, the Democratic machine hacks and the Republican machine hacks in the legislature have not been shy about cooperating to stop any whiff of a reform agenda by the governor. This went to the length of impeaching and removing from office one reformer, William Sulzer, within months of his taking office in 1913. More recently both the Democratic controlled Assembly and Republican controlled Senate passed a budget over the veto of the then governor, George Pataki. One of the reasons Elliot Spitzer may have been so quick to resign was the realization just how little effective power the governor has in Albany.
Since Texas and New York are arguably the two worst governerned American states, this indicates there is something about US politics that requires an independent strong chief executive.
Seed planted by Ed — 27 May 2009 @ 13:52
While those two states may be poorly governed, questions of the powers of their separately elected, separately surviving governors is not very helpful in thinking about how parliamentary-responsible executives would function.
Seed planted by MSS — 27 May 2009 @ 14:19
@26
There is high intellectual authority for using examples from science fiction. The Nobel laureate in question once published a paper on the economics of interstellar trade.
Seed planted by Alan — 27 May 2009 @ 17:54
I have often thought that local councils should have one member elected by at-large majority vote, alongside the other members elected by a “quota” (whether of the votes cast, by PR, or of the population, by districts).
The member-at-large is entitled to serve as chief executive unless an absolute majority appoint someone else. IOW, in any election for CX, the MAL is deemed to receive exactly [total members/2] votes, and so can only be beaten by someone with an actual absolute majority.
As a result, if the council is “hung” – not just that no party or coalition wins a majority on election night, but that shifting majorities combine to regularly vote down the executive – the MAL serves as a presidential executive by default. OTOH, if s/he faces a determined opposition majority of councillors, they elect one of their own to be CX and you don’t get a Brisbane City Council (2004-08) style deadlock.
From what I gather, a number of British local govts operate a roughly similar system except that the ceremonial “mayor” is chosen by council for a fixed term, and the council appoints the mayor or another councillor to serve as “council leader” during council’s pleasure. (Someone correct this if wrong, please!)
The (cross fingers) Weimar constitution sought to attain a similar goal – quasi-Westminster if the legislature could agree on which cabinet to support, quasi-Presidential if it couldn’t – but made the mistake of allowing the executive to bypass Parliament entirely (among other problems).
Seed planted by Tom Round — 27 May 2009 @ 18:39
Many California cities have something similar to Tom’s proposal (#31). A “mayor” (note the quote marks) is elected city-wide and is a voting member of the council, the rest of which is elected from single-member districts. In these cases, the mayoralty is not an executive office; no department heads report to the mayor. Instead, s/he presides at council meetings and has some agenda-setting power, and functions as a head of state for ceremonial purposes, but is otherwise just an at-large council member.
Seed planted by Bob Richard — 27 May 2009 @ 20:40
> “Just call it a “legislative recall election” instead of a “vote of non-confidence”. Tada, it’s now thoroughly American!”
It may soon be thoroughly British too, old chum. Cameron is calling for introduction of recall in the UK:
‘Conservative leader David Cameron is urging other party leaders to back a plan to allow voters to sack their MPs. “If we cannot have an election now we should start looking at recall powers,” he told BBC One’s Politics Show. [...]
‘He said the public wanted a chance to “sit in judgement on MPs” and called on Gordon Brown to hold a general election in late July or early September rather than next year.
‘This would be “better for the country” than a “rash of by-elections which I think would actually kind of deflect from the need that everyone feels for a general election,” he added.
‘But, in the absence of an elections, voters should be allowed to “recall” MPs who have behaved badly.
‘Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg has led moves for a “recall” mechanism that would be triggered if 5% of constituents signed a petition demanding a by-election.
‘Prime Minister Gordon Brown has said the idea will be considered as part of wider reforms aimed at cleaning up Parliament but cautioned against acting without the “full facts”…’
- “Cameron backs MP ‘sacking’ powers,”
BBC News (31 May 2009).
There’s a stronge(r) case for a system of recall of an officer who has a long term (and 5 years, outside Sri Lanka and South Korea, is the high extreme for a policy-maker).
I have sometimes wondered if the threshold for a recall petition should reduced later in term: eg, starting at 60% (of all enrolled voters) in the officer’s first year in office and then dropping 10% at each anniversary, so that by the fifth year it would have reduced to 20%. (It should have a floor of, say, 10% or else NSW MLCs, with 8-year terms, would be recallable by minus-10%…)
So an early-term recall would be achievable only for gross incompetence or corruption (as the proponents of the California 2003 recall – or the 1975 Whitlam dismissal – viewed the matter), whereas a late-term recall would be more like UK PMs dissolving the Commons after 4 years rather than waiting the full 5.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 02 June 2009 @ 18:50
@ 30
“There is high intellectual authority for using examples from science fiction.”
From John Campbell to John Campbell in a single blog post…
Seed planted by Tom Round — 04 June 2009 @ 01:23
While a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation is obviously the best solution, it may also be the most difficult to achieve. Alaska vests most legislative responses to executive action (confirmations, vetoes, etc etc) in a joint session of both houses. That may be a much more saleable idea and there could be (I do not necessarily accept the view) an argument that California’s constitution is so busted that anything would be an improvement.
Seed planted by Alan — 08 June 2009 @ 21:37
Nicholas Gruen, an Australian economist, has proposed (pdf) that some tax increases should be approved by an independent authority without reference to the legislature on the model of the way central banks handle monetary policy. Gruen’s proposals were directed at counter-cyclical fiscal policy, but his ideas may be worth examining in California. The deal would be that initiatives could authorise what expenditures (including tax expenditures like Proposition 13 where the state reduces its revenue in favour of particular groups) seemed good to the people, but an independent fiscal authority would then adjust tax rates appropriately to cover the gap between expenditure and revenue.
Seed planted by Alan — 08 June 2009 @ 23:32
FairVote has an interesting article on compulsory voting. California should consider compulsory turnout (compulsory voting is actually a misnomer) in order to reduce the extent to which private interests can capture the state through carefully crafted initiatives. California should also consider whether promoting initiatives is a legitimate area for profit-making business activity (which also runs close to vote-farming) and whether the promotion of initiatives should be limited to voluntary citizen groups.
Seed planted by Alan — 09 June 2009 @ 00:06
Does California require an initiative to get a minimum number of votes (not simply 50% of those voting) in order to pass?
Seed planted by Ed — 09 June 2009 @ 12:48
California has no quorum requirements on referenda or initiatives.
Seed planted by MSS — 09 June 2009 @ 13:46
Should there be a quorum requirement on California initiatives and referendums? Hawai’i requires a minimum of 30% of registered voters for a Legislatively-referred constitutional amendment to be approved, and Earn a majority of all the votes tallied upon the question.
The summary doesn’t say simple majority or an absolute majority.
Why in some states especially in young states like Hawai’i is that there is no initiative process? Is that partly because of Hawai’i's history and the ratification of the Bayonet Constitution.
The Republicans dominate Hawai’i a century ago, and were oppose to the I&R process, and then the Democrats were for it, and then they became oppose to it. Funny because in it was Progressive Republicans that introduce I&R in California. It’s nice to know that each state has such wide variety and diversity in governing arrangements.
What should the registered voter threshold be? Most U.S states do not have the initiative for Constitutional Amendments. There is a chart below showing the different states that allow which type of initiatives and referendums.
What would have happen if California never had that? Prop 13 would have never have happen. How much (for Californians) would we be paying for property tax if there was no Prop 13?
It’s funny considering that Sarah Palin’s Alaska doesn’t have Constitutional Amendment initiatives.
Alaska’s initiative law specifically prohibits initiatives on certain subjects, in the Alaska Constitution, Article XI, Section 7. Initiatives cannot:
* Dedicate revenues;
* Make or repeal appropriations;
* Create courts;
* Define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules;
* Enact local or special legislation.
And even stranger, no initiatives can dedicate revenues. I think that provision should be put into a new constitution for California. Taxes should be raised if voters want to approve constitutional amendments and statues for special projects.
Maybe California should have something similar to this.
Hawaii is even more restricted, it only allows referred amendments. Almost all U.S states except Delaware use this method that voter ratify amendments to state constitutions.
What is the international outlook on voter ratifying constitutional amendments?
Isn’t Ireland the only country in Europe to require the consent of a majority of the people in a referendum to amend it’s constitution?
In Switzerland, isn’t there such a thing as voting petition for a referendum, and then the Swiss parliament can propose a counter proposal and tell voters to ratify that? That could be use for California.
Also, does anyone know about any U.S states that use or allow non-binding referendums to determine what the people’s position is on an issue?
It would be kind of cool if all the U.S states had non-binding referendums. Then they all could get together and have a national-wide non-binding referendum to pressure Congress on Federal issues. Then that would require a compact between all the states and the Congress approval.
[long URLs suppressed, per posted comment policy]
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 10 June 2009 @ 00:23
Australia has no quorum as such, but quorums become irrelevant when turnout is 95%. What we do have is a rule that every amendment goes to referendum and requires a majority of all electors who vote and a majority of the electors who vote in a majority of the states. Slightly oddly, territory voters are counted for the national majority but not the states majority. This is one of the rare principles we did not pirate from the UK or US. We pirated it from the Swiss instead.
Proposition 13 operates to shift the burden of property taxes almost entirely from corporations to individuals and severely penalises new home buyers because the tax is frozen until a property changes hands. If Proposition 13 had not been enacted the overall tax would be higher but the incidence would be far fairer and state and local governments might be able to balance their budgets. Proposition 13 encapsulates the magical thinking about revenue that led directly to the GFC.
Revenue restrictions that serve only to create a permanent fiscal gap are not providence but fantasy. California, no more than anywhere else, cannot run on hot air.
Seed planted by Alan — 10 June 2009 @ 17:05
Isn’t the property tax once of the worst taxes ever invented?
The reason why Prop 13 was passed so that people can say in their homes.
Suggestions to institute a two-tier system of property have failed. Voters don’t want any changes to it.
I understand all the cuts in services that people complain about it, if there is a public perception that services are getting worse, then they want taxes to be cut even more. It’s a downward spiral that is impossible to change.
Some people don’t want to pay for services that they don’t use. Should people be force to pay taxes on services and programs that they don’t use? That is the million dollar question.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 10 June 2009 @ 18:08
Many worse taxes than property taxes have been invented at one time another. Saying la la la and borrowing like drunken sailors imposes a giant tax on the future and that is arguably the worst tax of all.
Proposition 13 is about the confusion between the market and government. Public goods are not something you buy off a supermarket shelf and treating them as such is a short road to chaos. I do not need to point very far beyond the epic fiscal gaps in the United States, in California and elsewhere to show its folly.
The decline in the quality of services is a direct result of programs like Prop 13 which are a giant tax outlay in favour of particular groups and against other groups. We have heard the do more with less mantra for 40 years now, and the revenue rises when you cut taxes mantra, and the end result is that all those allegedly marginal cuts ended by collapsing services and ripping open an unsustainable fiscal gap.
The cure to a disease cannot, in simple logic, be more of the disease, any more than smoking can cure cancer or over-eating cure obesity.
Seed planted by Alan — 10 June 2009 @ 19:48
@42
Prop 13 may have been marketed as helping people stay in their homes, but how can you argue that the introduction of the super-majority requirement for tax increases is at all part of that? Furthermore a look at the effects of Prop 13, which strongly favour big corporations, could lead one to argue that a two-tier property system is indeed in place in CA.
The service/tax cut spiral you refer to has a lot to do with a belief in the inherent superiority of anything which is private, which unfortunately is quite widespread in the US despite the lack of supporting evidence.
I also think the idea of “not wanting to pay for services that you don’t use” overlooks the fact that failure to provide a public service is unbelievably limiting. For example, I don’t want to have to purchase a private car to get from point A to point B, but a lack of public services (public transport, etc) is a strong limiting factor. Why should I be forced to meet some relatively basic needs (e.g. transport) in the private market because others feel like they don’t want public transport to be available? Isn’t this in essence a personal tax? Naturally, of course, such personal taxes fall disproportionately on the least wealthy.
Seed planted by Jessica — 10 June 2009 @ 23:40
Well, prop 13 ain’t going to be repealed anytime soon, so the only reform would be a mini-max reform. What do you all think should be changed on prop 13?
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 11 June 2009 @ 18:34
California has a $35 000 000 000 budget deficit. Ignoring Proposition 13 is la la la politics.
When the Howard government introduced a tax on all goods and services, not just a sales tax, I was energetically opposed. Nevertheless, Howard succeeded in actually balancing the budget, to his credit. While Australia, like everyone else has gone into deficit to deal with the GFC, it is notable that we are the only OECD economy that has not actually gone into recession. Going into deficit from a position of zero government debt is quite different from doing it when you are already in a giant hole.
35 billion is a really really big number and Californians are going to have to dig deep. Whether they dig themselves into or out of a hole depends largely on their willingness to address spectacular examples of corporate welfare like Proposition 13.
On second thoughts, MSS, may want us to talk more about political science issues and less about public finance.
Seed planted by Alan — 11 June 2009 @ 21:02
> “more about political science issues and less about public finance”
They’re all interconnected. “Weimar! Nya-nya!” “No! Lijphart! Get up to date!”
Are Calif voters still adamantly opposed to repealing Prop 13 even as their State heads towards receivership?
I once read (likely a Butler/ Ranney AEI book on referenda, but don’t have a copy) a late-1970s symposium where various UK, US and other politicians and academics discussed the topic. One or two Labour or Democrat representatives surprised me by expressing (tepid) support for Prop 13 – along the lines that it was understandable since property taxes in 1978 were exorbitant and Sacramento was sitting on a (then) huge surplus without making any moves to alleviate homeowners’ pain.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 11 June 2009 @ 21:33
I guess the state is going to go bankrupt. I hate to imagine if prop 13 were repealed, but then I doubt that repealing it with do any good considering that most people foreclose on homes because of the subprime crisis.
Hopefully some sort of compromise can be worked out if there is any change.
Perhaps a V.A.T should be introduced in California. That would raise significant revenue and make illegal immigrants pay for use of services.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 12 June 2009 @ 03:13
The GST in Australia is a federal tax but the proceeds are distributed to the states. I would explain more but the last person who mastered the intricacies of federal/state financing in Australia went mad and had to be committed to the care of Her Majesty. A state-based GST would face significant difficulties, but then most federations do not have separate federal and state income tax systems either.
Seed planted by Alan — 12 June 2009 @ 03:57