Propagation: Seeds & scions (16)

16 ideas sprouting »

1. Perhaps Capt Yglesias should look further afield, to other federations, and ask whether anything terrible has happened in Queensland after (and therefore arguably because) it abolished its upper house in 1922…

   On the other hand, if one looks at Canada, it’s arguable that the other Q-region takes the prize for being most repressive (I mean… being fined for leaving out an accent mark in an English loan-word from the French?) despite being bicameral for longest.

   But then, bicameral Bavaria in Germany, although probably the most socially conservative Land, is not unusually repressive and indeed had a better-than-average record resisting the Nazis.

   I’m only a contingent bicameralist: what matters more is whether adding or abolishing chambers increases the number of MPs elected by PR. So I’d strongly oppose the abolition (on its own) of the NSW Legislative Council, but tepidly support the abolition of the Tasmanian, and give a big meh to the abolition of the (pre-2005) Victorian.

   Besides, functionally, many (all?) US States aren’t really bi- but tri-”cameral” at present, if the (elected , executive) Governor has a strong veto power (ie, line-item and/or 60% plus to override). A single chamber for Maine is a different proposition than a single chamber for Manitoba, in terms of effective checks and balances.

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 10 June 2009 @ 18:18

2. One might as well throw in Minas Gerais or Western Cape. The Bavarian Landrat was abolished in 2000. Outside the US and Australia, subnational second chambers are remarkably rare.

   Seed planted by Alan — 10 June 2009 @ 22:04

3. My statement about Bavaria was past tense. Can’t find any data about Minas G or W Cape upper houses.

   Interesting that Yglesias’ rationale (“Most people in the United States suffer from being represented by more elected officials than they can actually keep track of. Only a small minority of the population can actually name their two state representatives. Cut that down to one, and you make it somewhat easier for people to inform themselves about what’s going on. At a minimum if you hear that “the state legislature” has done something bad, you can go look up who represents you in the state legislature and complain”) is as much an argument for single-member electorates as for a single-house legislature. After all, several States (Utah and Hawai, I think) use multi-seat constituencies for their lower house. On the other hand, NSW has always been bicameral but before 1978, a NSW voter had only one representative to “keep track of” (whereas this jumped to 46 in 1978 and then 43 in 1991)…

   Likewise, Canada is bicameral at federal level but voters there have only one representative they can hold accountable.

   Given that legislative action (or inaction) is a function of the legislature and its houses corporately, rather than of legislators individually, I think Yglesias’ argument would make more sense if he focused on voters monitoring only one house rather than only one representative.

   I suspect most sub-nations decided that an upper house wasn’t worth the cost and delay since the lower house no longer had unrestricted power. Once the colony/ province/ State concerned entered a federation or union, its legislature was subject to the national or federal Constitution and laws on a wide range of important matters. I do note though that a number of populous Indian states are bicameral.

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 11 June 2009 @ 00:41

4. Via word of mouth: the state Senate has killed the bill.

   Seed planted by Jack — 11 June 2009 @ 10:52

5. Of course the state Senate would kill the bill, why would they want to abolish themselves?

   Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 11 June 2009 @ 18:24

6. Can be done, even from inside (eg, Queensland’s “suicide squad” of 1922). Much would depend on whether the lower house were expanded to add extra seats the Senators could run for. Someone at Yglesias suggested expanding the Lower as a temporary transitional measure. Something like this was also proposed in the mid-1980s when the Victorian Labor Govt of John Cain (son of John Cain Senior, but not Scots enough to be called John McCain) talked about abolishing the 44-seat Legislative Council. One suggestion was to add 40 seats to the 88-member Assembly (making 128), then gradually reduce this by four or five seats at each subsequent redistribution until the unicameral legislature reached 100 or so. Of course this got nowhere as Labor never had a working Council majority.

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 11 June 2009 @ 18:47

7. … Of course, this won’t fly if unicameralism is being sold as a cost-cutting “small govt” measure (often equated, rather lazily, as Alan noted, with “fewer elected representatives”). So a lot would depend on whether the push for one chamber is driven from the top down (by a centralising executive that wants fewer checks and balances, as in Qld) or from the bottom up (by an annoyed electorate that wants “fewer politicians”, as in Nebraska). Does Maine have a workable initiative and referendum process?

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 11 June 2009 @ 19:05

8. Until 1978 the legislative council of New South Wales was arguably the best club in the world. The term was 12 years. A quarter retired every 3 years. Election was by a joint session of the legislative assembly and non-retiring MLCs using STV. Nevertheless, the appointed council did eventually vote itself to be replaced by a popularly elected chamber.

   Seed planted by Alan — 11 June 2009 @ 21:49

9. Yes, but the 1978 Act (which went to referendum) included a schedule grandfathering nominatim two 15-member groups of the existing MLCs, who kept their seats until 1981 and 1984 respectively. I remember Johnno Johnson was one of those named. No idea how they chose individual names but there appeared to be some attempt to maintain proportionate party representation.

   Seed planted by Tom Round — 11 June 2009 @ 23:06

10. Until 1910, Cape Colony had a second chamber (Legislative Council) elected by cumulative vote, to help the English minority against the Boer majority. (source: good old Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote)

    Seed planted by Bancki — 13 June 2009 @ 16:54

11. New Zealand had a legislative council until 1951. MLCs were originally appointed for life by the governor-in-council, but the term was reduced to 7 years in 1891. The Bolger government proposed a senate in 1990 as an alternative to PR for the house of representatives.

    Seed planted by Alan — 14 June 2009 @ 10:47

12. ‘What is more, while politicians everywhere have a natural human reluctance to abolish themselves, the Nebraska move to unicameralism reduced the number of State legislators in 1937 from 133 to forty-three.

    ‘What is especially significant in terms of the Nebraska experiment as a model for other legislative bodies is that the move to unicameralism involved the election of an entirely new chamber, not simply the re-election of one of those involved the election of an entirely new chamber, not simply the re-election of those existing in the old bicameral system. Within a week of its first meeting, however, the new legislature resolved that its members would be known as ‘State Senators,’ and they later adopted an electoral regime of staggered four-year terms, more characteristic of an Upper House than of a Lower House. In effect, unicameralism in Nebraska was achieved by abolishing the State’s Lower House. This may not be a sound basis for a proposal to generate momentum for reform among Lower House members in other jurisdictions.” (p 170).

    - Graeme Starr, “Bicameralism in the United States,” in Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser, and JR Nethercote, Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The Upper House Solution? (UWA Press, 2008), p 170.

    Starr also mentions (p 168) that it was US Senator George W Norris (ie, not a State legislator) who promoted the 1934 (initiative/ petition) referendum that saw 60% of votes supporting a (non-partisan) one-chamber legislature.

    Now… what about Minas Gerais?

    Seed planted by Tom Round — 14 June 2009 @ 18:44

13. Speaking of US State Senates, this 31-31 standoff in New York is interesting – not only politically, but legally, in that it appears that the opposing sides are asking a judge to adjudicate the matter.

    The relevant text – it seems: I could be wrong – is the State Senate’s own rules of order, not the NY State Constitution, which makes it puzzling that this would get as far as the Albany County Supreme Court without being struck out as a non-judiciable political question.

    Courts in the common-law world will certainly review the validity of actions done within the legislature where necessary to determine if the resulting Bill/ Act conforms to constituional requirements, true – but issuing orders affirmatively directing a legislative chamber how to organise its internal procedures seems to contravene tradition and separation of powers principles.

    Does NY State have an unusually relaxed doctrine of judiciability? Or has NY reset the Scalian clock even earlier, to 1687 instead of 1775?

    Seed planted by Tom Round — 15 June 2009 @ 23:55

14. Thanks, Tom, for bringing up the NY Senate. I have not followed it closely, but it is quite a story in conflict between aggregate partisan election results and individual ambition.

    An added twist (mentioned rather in passing in the item that Tom linked to) is that normally senate tie votes would be broken by the lieutenant governor. However, NY’s constitution is like Argentina’s: no provision to replace a vacancy in the vice/lieutenant executive position. Of course, the person who was elected lt. gov. is now the governor, due to Elliot Spitzer’s misdirected ambitions.

    Seed planted by MSS — 16 June 2009 @ 13:50

15. Is this the place to mention the somewhat embarrassing attempt in the 1840s to impose a colonial aristocracy on New South Wales (which then included most of Australia and all of New Zealand) with a hereditary upper house. It was derided as a bunyip aristocracy and went down to ignominious defeat. Weirdly enough, the main promoter, William Charles Wentworth, was appointed to the legislative council and founded a dynasty anyway. At least one Wentworth, and sometimes more, sat in the colonial, state or federal parliaments continuously until 1977.

    Seed planted by Alan — 16 June 2009 @ 15:21

16. Exactly four years ago, voters in Puerto Rico overwhelmingly supported the establishment of an unicameral legislature in a non-binding referendum; however, the referendum had the lowest-ever voter turnout rate in Puerto Rican history – 22.6% of registered voters (19.2% of the voting age population) – and opponents of unicameralism in Puerto Rico’s House of Representatives seized upon the low turnout to kill a binding referendum that was to be held two years ago.

    For a detailed account of these events, see No Unicameralism Referendum on July 9, 2007 on my Elections in Puerto Rico website.

    Seed planted by Manuel Alvarez-Rivera — 10 July 2009 @ 19:54

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