I see Jack Grant over at Random Fate was struck much as I was by a story in the Christian Science Monitor a few days ago comparing gas prices and fuel economy in Europe and the USA.
I recommend reading both the original piece and Jack’s commentary, but the punchline is here:
Europeans feel they have a “right†to government-provided social services such as “free†health care.
Americans feel they have a “right†to cheap gasoline.
Yes, it is about political choices, but I think a case can be made that it is more fundamental even than that. European political systems generate more public goods, of which I would include their generally fantastic urban and inter-urban public transit systems and lower fuel consumption itself, along with universal health care and others that Jack alludes to.
What political science has not really figured out is the extent to which these outcomes—more government-provided public goods in Europe, lower consumer prices in the USA—are a result of preferences (what people “feel” they have a “right” to), as Jack suggests, or of the institutional structure of government.
A good case can be made that some significant portion of the difference rests with the institutions. European political institutions (always fundamentally parliamentary, and usually proportional representaion) tend to delegate citizens’ electoral choices to strong national parties. Our institutions (presidential with single-member districts), on the other hand, tend to delegate more authority to individuals (president and congress members alike). Individuals have to finance their own campaigns, are less bound by party platforms, and have both shorter time horizons and narrower constituencies than disciplined party organizations and the coalitions they form in most European systems. These characteristics render individual politicians realtively more vulnerable to pressures from “special” interest groups like oil companies, auto manufacturers and organized workers in the latter industry—all of whom have a vested interest in low gas prices and the consumption habits they foster. (Note to those who have their “conspiracy theory” meters set at too sensitive a level: I am not saying there is anything conspiratorial about this! I am saying there is a political logic within variations in the structure of democracy itself, and how those structures frame choices for voters.)
Cheap gas and other consumer products have their upside, to be sure, but they have their environmental and national-security downsides and other broadly imposed costs that are not factored into the prices. Cheap gas prices are not very helpful if you are one of those without any health care, for lack of insurance. And cheap gas prices are not so necessary in the first place if you have publicly funded alternatives like comprehensive and low-fare urban and suburban transport that runs frequently more or less around the clock.
The relationship between between political institutions and policy (which, note: might be seen as the “fruits” of people’s votes!) is one theme I intend to develop over time here at Fruits and Votes, so please stay tuned.
(And as a footnote, I will add that my criticism of US institutions indeed can be reconciled with my admiration for James Madison’s original insights at the founding. Another theme I will be developing.)
I find most of your discussion compelling, save for the part about “special” interest being more powerful in a fractured polity, as created by individual members rather than organized parties. It is certainly true that the Federalist disagrees with you on this issue. And I would point to the centralization and regulation by a national government being one of the chief causes for the abuses of the Railroad in the 19th century. I would credit much of the difusion of special interests in Europe (if such a phenomenon exist at all) to the lack of centrality of power. A test of my hypothesis would be that as the EU gains power the power of special interests should increase. Though that may also be attributed to your thesis as well as the EU will be more individualistic in its representatives than current European institutions.
One point about “special” interests. When the party is strong, or parties are strong, they still have to raise money and special interests need only appeal to a central power rather than many individual entitities. So I would hypothesize that “large” special interests (the AARP, Enron, Halliburton) have more power in such an arrangement. Where more localized special interests like the Film Industry, Coal Mining, etc. have greater power.
I would also point to Louis Hartz’s book on the nature of American Liberalism. We aren’t as caught up in being “subjects” as Europeans are having had no “feudal system”, or since I am more Hegelian…we don’t value the State as fulfilling entity as much as Europeans. We are individuals first, Los Angelinos second, Californians third, and Americans last.
To add to your analysis though. The “pork” of the European nations is of a “national scale”. So they provide national services, where the pork of America is localized and by necessity less efficient from a regulatory position. In America the funds are spread “competatively” with no real limit tied to a re-election incentive and the ability to “bring home the bacon” as individuals. Where the parties in Europe take credit. This is where I think your analysis is strongest, but it is a different thesis than “special” interests. After all, one could imagine the same special interests (drug companies) getting broader and more sweeping support with a more centralized system while passing savings on to constituents. Merely due to the fact they have to spend less money to get legislation passed.
Just some thoughts… Sorry for all the tangential babbling, but this is a comment and not a research paper.
PS. If you are going to APSA maybe I’ll see you there.
Seed planted by Christian Johnson — 30 August 2005 @ 20:26
I appreciate Christian’s thoughtful reply on this topic. Actually, I don’t think what I am saying is contradictory to the Federalist (which is not to say that I am unwilling to contradict those documents from time to time). I assume Christian is talking about the “faction” argument, which I take to be saying it is better to have a plurality of interests than to allow the government to be captured by a single interest. As far as that goes, I agree. But in the late 17th century, the concept of mass political parties was still unkown. The Federalists make no distinction between interest groups and what contemprary comparative political scientists recognize as political parties.
My thesis can be boiled down to one simple claim: Politicians and citizens need organization help to advance their goals. There are two main types of organization that provide this function: parties and interest groups. Both exist in all liberal democracies, but the balance among them varies across polities. Parties, by their nature, are broader than interest groups. Interest groups, by definition, are concerned with one issue, or a narrow range of issues.
Only the very smallest parties can be said to be as narrow as a single interest. And I mean really small parties, not those like the FDP and Greens of Germany in the 5-10% range, but more like some of the 1 and 2% Israeli parties. But even where very small parties are present and are narrow, they never have access to power except in coalition with bigger and broader parties. Individual politicians who lack strong party organizations, on the other hand, make “coalitions” primarily with others who likewise are dependent on their own electoral coalition of narrow interest groups. The result is “porky” logrolls and policy steered towards interest groups (whether big railroads in the 19th century or oil companies more recently, or whatever).
Sure, parties need finaning, too (though some party-centric systems have public financing). But parties are organizations that develop their electoral strategies and receive their votes based on a basket of policies that is almost always more encompassing than what any single individual politician develops. It is a question of aggregation.
I do not get Christian’s comment on the “prok” of European nations being of “national scale.” If it is national scale, it is not pork, unless all public policy is considered pork, in which case the term loses any analytical value. All public policy involves benefits to some groups and costs to others. That’s the nature of government. But pork, elusive though it may be to define precisely, needs to be kept to goods and service provision that benefit one interest group or region, or a narrow range of groups and regions, and not to policy provision that generates national goods and services that are available to the general public.
Please note that my argument is not about federalism or unitary states (as Christian’s comments on US railroad regulation and the EU suggest). It is about the relative role of broad parties and narrow interest groups. This would be independent of federalism or its absence. The EU probably is generating more special-interest regulation, but not because it is centralizing power. Quite the contrary. The European Parliament remains too weak relative to the Council, and the latter body tends to aggregate only with in policy areas, and not across them. Much European-level policy making is thus made in ways more analagous to “strong committee” theories of the US Congress than by national (or in this case supra-national) partisan coalitions. I think this is why Europeans have shown their anger at the EU in referenda: The EU, as presently constructed, does not appear responsive to public interest. Voters have a right to be skeptical of the way the EU is being built.
Anyway, thanks again to Christian for his comments. His caveat applies here, too:”…this is a comment and not a research paper.”
Seed planted by Matthew — 31 August 2005 @ 09:40
“The European Parliament remains too weak relative to the Council.” Is that why you have no thread on the European Parliament?
Yet it makes the news on occasion, such as when “Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty”, the far-right faction in the European Parliament, collapsed recently to the applause of the rest of the parliamentarians. Surely it’s an institution worthy of study?
Is it the world’s largest parliament, with 785 members? Followed by the UK with 646, Italy with 630, and Germany with 598 plus temporary seats (613 today)? Or did I miss any?
Is 785 too big to be functional? Or on the contrary, is the UK’s ample 646 just what we need to ensure bankbench legislative control of the executive?
Seed planted by Wilfred Day — 17 November 2007 @ 08:00