In a recent comment to the earlier thread on Canada’s dysfunctional electoral system, Wilf Day notes that Prime Minister Stephen Harper has promised that reforms to the Senate will be in place before the next general election. Included in Harper’s plans is a move to an elected Senate.
In many comparative politics texts, Canada is listed among the countries with a weak upper house, but as Wilf notes, technically the Senate is almost as powerful as the lower house. The Senate has not frequently challenged the authority of the lower house and the government that emenates from it, in part because it is an unelected body. I would add that simply being appointed is not enough to render an upper house weak, as the British House of Lords is actually far more influential than is often assumed in many of those same standard comparative politics texts. However, the Lords have a special function in that many have been appointed for their special expertise in various policies, which gives them a basis for assertion of authority that Canada’s essentially patronage appointments do not afford.* (The hereditary members have been sharply reduced in their voting priveleges in recent years.)
Then there is the partisan factor. Canada’s lower house, and hence its executive, has been controlled by the Liberal party for about three quarters of the past forty-plus years. Hence most Canadian senators have been both appointed by Liberal prime ministers and faced co-partisan governments through most of their tenure. And, I do recall that the Conservative governments of the 1980s indeed had some difficulties getting budgets and other bills through an upper house dominated by the other party.** In the U.K., on the other hand, alternation of the lower house and government has been more regular, though that has not prevented a built-in conservative bias to the House of Lords (stemming from the till-recently dominant life peers). Many of the British upper-house members, however, sit on the “cross benches,” and the body may simply be less partisan than the Canadian Senate. (There may be comparative studies of the two upper chambers, but I am not aware of them if there are.) And, of course, one bill that the British upper house clearly can not veto or delay is the budget, which must pass only the Commons.
If Canada moves to an elected upper house, it will become more like Australia, which also has a powerful upper house. In addition to strong powers, the Australian senate is fully “federalist” in the American sense, in that it has an equal number of members per state, regardless of population. In this sense, the two houses of Australia’s parliament are highly incongruent in their composition. The incongruence is made even greater by the different electoral systems: Both are single transferable vote, but in single-seat districts in the lower house (i.e. the “alternative vote,” “instant runoff,” or “majority preferential” system, as you will), while the upper house is multi-seat STV and hence a proportional system. The PR-STV system for the upper house in Australia exacerbates the incongruence by making it more likely that the lower house majority (and hence the government) will lack a majority in the senate; on the other hand, the use of PR reduces the potential partisan bias of the chamber’s malapportionment in that it effectively ensures that the chamber’s majority will be represented across the states, and not concentrated in some over-represented states where one party is stronger than in the nation as a whole. (Contrast, for example, the Republican bias of the US Senate: that party has had occasional seat majorities over the past quarter century without ever having that majority rest on even a plurality of the vote.)
Strong bicameral parliamentarism is actually rather rare. That is, most parliamentary systems are either: (1) unicameral or, if bicameral, have an upper house that is either (2) easily overridden by the lower house, or (3) highly congruent due to similar districting arrangements and electoral systems. Presidential systems, on the other hand, are far more likely to have incongruent and co-equal upper houses.
As far as I know, the only parliamentary system in which the government can be ousted by a no-confidence vote in either chamber, acting alone, is Italy. But in Italy, through all three major electoral systems of the postwar era (open list PR, mixed-member majoritarian, and the new majoritarian-bloc, closed list system), the upper house has always been highly congruent to the lower house, thanks to nearly identical electoral rules.*** However, while Italy may be the only parliamentary system with a formal bicameral-confidence requirement, in the parliamentary (especially British parliamentary) tradition, a cabinet must resign if it can’t obtain “supply,” meaning that the upper house can effectively force a government to step if it has budget power.
So, how common is it for governments in parliamentary systems to need the upper house for supply? The only cases I know of are Australia and Canada. Some other parliamentary federations–Austria and Belgium, for example–have very weak (as well as quite congruent) upper houses. And while Germany has an upper house with real powers (unelected, but arguably even more powerful as a federal chamber than it would be if it were elected, given that its members are direct delegates who must vote as a bloc on behalf of their state cabinet), the budget must clear only the lower house.
Upper houses in parliamentary systems usually can’t be dissolved before the expiry of their terms, as typically the lower houses can be. Australia and Italy are exceptions, and unsurprisingly so: If the upper house can either oust the government (as in Italy) or block its budget (as in Australia as well as Italy), it makes good constitutional sense for the dependence to be mutual, so that a deadlock can be referred back to the people in the form of a “double dissolution.”
Thus, while Wilf asks about the uniqueness of Australia’s incongruent and nearly co-equal but incongruent chambers with the double dissolution possibility, I would say that it is Canada that is the unique one: A parliamentary systems with a (formally) co-equal upper house that is not subject to dissolution. The inability to dissolve the senate has not been a serious problem because the appointment of senators by cabinets, mostly of one party for the past forty years, has tempered the incongruence of the chambers. But if the Canadian senate were elected, it would become at once more inconrguent and more assertive. Then Canada would become a very odd case of a federal parliamentary system with the very real possibility of genuine deadlock.
Will Harper’s reforms include the introduction of a provision for double dissolution? It seems unlikely, because he also recently announced an intention to institute fixed general election dates, thereby eliminating the possibility of early dissolution of the lower house. (Surprising, I might add, as he became prime minister on account of an early dissolution, and he seems to be itching for an early election on his own terms in search of a majority; presumably he wants the fixed dates to kick in after he wins a larger “mandate” from that dysfunctional electoral system!)
* Recent allegations in the U.K. of the selling of peerages to campaign contributors are all the more scandalous given that the rather limited “legitimacy” of the upper house depends on its being a chamber of chosen “experts” and the “wise old men” (and some women) of the hereditary peerage.
** The 1984-93 period in Canada marks the only time since 1962 that the Conservatives have had a majority in the lower house. In other instances, like Harper’s government, Conservatives have been a mere plurality. Because a minority government is generally less likely to clear any controversial partisan legislation through the lower house, it is less likely to have bills rejected in an upper house dominated by the other party: Bills that reach the senate will have been watered down already.
*** In fact, in 1992, Italy’s reform away from PR was instigated by a popular initiative that struck a few key words from the senate electoral law. (That is all an initiative in Italy can do: overturn or strike provisions from an existing law). The old Italian senate electoral system had single-seat districts in addition to PR, but only a candidate obtaining 65% of the votes could win a district seat. If a district had no such candidate (and hardly ever did any), then the seat would simply be added to the regional PR district. By striking the cluase referring to the 65% requirement, the senate electoral system was efectively transformed into a parallel MMM system because the single-seat districts now would be won by a plurality. This threw the chambers into a potential future of unmanageable incongruence (given that the cabinet must maintain the confidence of both houses), and forced the parties to work on a new and more majoritarian electoral system for both houses–just as the promoters of the initiative intended!
Early dissolution will still happen if a minority government loses the confidence of the House.
Over at pithandsubstance, I argue that this is a recipie for a regionalist food fight, which Canada does not really need.
Seed planted by Pithlord — 29 May 2006 @ 11:09
Here’s the most comprehensive study of Senates I’ve seen.
It concludes: “few Senates can dismiss a government.”
Seed planted by Wilf Day — 29 May 2006 @ 13:35
Can the Australian Senate dismiss the government? I thought that Kerr’s dismissal of Whitlam was controversial in part because the Senate wasn’t supposed to have that power.
[MSS here: As I mentioned in the post, the Australian senate can't vote no confidence, but it can deny supply, which is what prompted the Governor General to take his action.]
Seed planted by Pithlord — 29 May 2006 @ 14:02
All Australian states began with legislative councils (upper houses) appointed for life by the executive in the same way as Canada. There were several cases in the nineteenth century where legislative councils refused supply and forced an election, although none where the governor dismissed the government, as the governor-general did in 1975.
All states now elect their legislative councils (4 by STV in multimember districts), except Queensland which abolished the council in the 1930s. New South Wales and Victoria have abolished the legislative council’s power to refuse supply. Strong upper houses with incongruent electoral systems seem to be an Australian peculiarity.
The actions of the governor-general in 1975 remain highly controversial, but any new supply crisis would see the Senate with the same powers over supply and probably the same outcome.
There’s been no change to the constitution to alter the 1975 situation, except that a Senate vacancy must now be filled by a senator from the same party. The Senate which denied supply in 1975 included 2 anti-Labor senators appointed by state governments to replace Labor senators.
[Alan, I was really hoping you would weigh in. Thanks!--MSS]
Seed planted by Alan — 29 May 2006 @ 15:44
The (Liberal-dominated) Canadian Senate did force an election on the Conservative-negotiated Free Trade Agreeement with the U.S. in 1988. In that case, they were able to overcome their inherent lack of democratic legitimacy by pointing to the importance of the issue.
Given the direction Harper seems determined to drive us in, I’m curious why something like 1975 doesn’t happen more often in Australia, since I understand that it is rare that the same party controls both Houses.
Seed planted by Pithlord — 29 May 2006 @ 16:59
While it’s rare for the government parties to control the Australian Senate (as they do now with a majority of 1) that is not the same as the main opposition party controlling the Senate. The opposition Australian Labor Pary and the (minor) Australian Democrats are opposed in principle to rejecting supply and regularly give promises in campaigns tht they will not do so. The only possible situation for rejecting supply is therefore for the Liberal-National Coalition to possess a majority in its own right.
The Australian Labor Party has not controlled a Senate majority in its own right since the 1960s and has required the votes of minor parties and independents to control the Senate since then. The current Senate is the only case of a Coalition majority since 1980 and is unlikely, on current polls, to be repeated in the near future.
The more likely future is to be found in states like New South Wales where the legislative council (42 MLCs, 21 elected by the whole state as a single electorate every 4 years with half retiring at every election) is roughly 1/3 Labor, 1/3 Coalition and 1/3 independents and minor parties. The recent South Australian eleciton produced a similar pattern.
Seed planted by Alan — 29 May 2006 @ 19:01
Alan, do I understand correctly: The NSW upper chamber is elected in a single 21-seat district by STV? If so, would that be the largest district ever to use STV? Does NSW have an “above the line” vote such that few voters actually bother to use the preference-ranking procedure (making the system akin to closed lists)?
I appreciate the point on the difference between “government not controlling” and “main opposition controlling.” I have tried to push this conceptual distinction for years in the study of presidential systems. Most scholars want to use the term, “divided government,” for any situation in which the president’s party is not in the majority in congress. I want to preserve the concept of “divided government” only for situations in which a single opposition party controls the congress.
I thus make the distinction between “opposition control” and “no majority” situations.
Seed planted by MSS — 30 May 2006 @ 08:57
[...] The issue of the Senate (though not the term length, per se) has already been the topic of a lively thread here at F&V. As for fixed dates for the lower house, I weighed at the already-lively thread over at We Move to Canada. [...]
Scion grafted by Fruits and Votes » Blog Archive » Bills to set election dates and reform senate introduced — 30 May 2006 @ 15:58
In case anyone is interested, here’s the text of bill C-16 for fixed election dates. (You’d expect that by now online newspaper articles would link to the text of a bill, wouldn’t you? Or at least give the bill’s number, so it can be easily looked up? *sigh*)
I’m still not too happy with the idea of fixed election dates. I fear it will lead to the never-ending election campaigns that we see in the US, where the parties can arrange their fundraising and muck-raking far in advance. The advantage the incumbent party has in choosing the dates of elections is unfortunate of course, but I’ve been pretty happy with the management of our elections recently (if not the electoral system or the results!). So I’d be hesitant to change what’s working. What do the rest of you think?
Also, apparently Harper’s first dose of Senate reform will be a maximum term of eight years for Senators. Again, I’m not so sure this is a good idea, without further Senate reform it just multiplies the number of patronage appointments each prime minister can make. Maybe the idea is just getting Canada used to the idea that Senate reform can actually happen, rather than being only in the realm of theory?
Seed planted by Vasi — 30 May 2006 @ 16:09
The legislative council of New South Wales indeed has 42 MLCs with half of them elected every 4 years by the whole state voting as a single electorate.
The ballot paper does use above-the-line voting, but it’s still generally about the size of a table cloth. The state electoral commission has details here.
It’s certainly the largest PR-STV district by area at 800,642 km². The population was 6,764,600 at March 2005. South Australia is smaller in area and population and has a similar upper house.
Seed planted by Alan — 30 May 2006 @ 22:19
Just a footnote in history: There once was an elected upper house in Canada, that is, in the Province of Canada, the predecessor entity to both Ontario and Quebec. Its Legislative Council, while originally appointed, in 1856 became an elected body, with one member representing each of the 48 electoral divisions for four year terms. Half were up for renewal every other year.
When the Dominion of Canada was set up in 1867, this arrangement was abandoned as a method of selecting senators. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, their own LCs still being appointed, did not want it. Many also found the electoral divisions too large, too strange and the campaigns too expensive for prospective candidates. Some feared an elected Senate might overshadow the House of Commons, others thought it superfluous to have two houses recruited in largely similar ways (however, many of the initial appointees to the Canadian Senate had previously served as elected legislative councillors). One might wonder if Canadian bicameralism would resemble more that of Australia if an elected upper house had been established in the BNA Act.
In a footnote to this footnote, the 24 electoral divisions carved up a 150 years ago actually survive in Quebec, where each is “represented” by an appointed senator, who must fulfill either the residency or property requirement in his or her division. In 1867, the divisions in that province were kept to safeguard, somehow, the representation of the English-speaking minority. The same setup applied to the provincial Legislative Council until it was abolished in 1968. In an anomaly, the 24 electoral divisions in Ontario were completely scrapped.
Interesting blog, first time reader, first time “seed-planter” (longer comment than planned though – late too, sorry)!
Seed planted by Espen — 04 July 2006 @ 20:04
After seeing a primary source (click my signature), a small correction: There were eight year terms for legislative councillors, a quarter being elected every two years. These seats were only gradually introduced from 1856 to 1862. Also, those appointed for life before 1856 kept their seats.
So in a way, not entirely dissimilar to the Harper proposals now, a century and a half later.
Not a big deal, but better to correct it.
Seed planted by Espen — 07 August 2006 @ 05:23
The 24 electoral divisions in Quebec were kept for the provincial Legislative Council and the federal Senate “to safeguard, somehow, the representation of the English-speaking minority.”
How many of the 24 divisions were/are to be considered as english-speaking?
Seed planted by Bancki — 08 August 2006 @ 03:46
A little tricky, Bancki. I do not have access to very detailed population statistics from the relevant census of 1851-52, but the short answer is probably four or five (today, that number is likely zero). Not that it really matters much in an appointed system. And now the long answer:
When created, the “divisions” for the reformed legislative council were (for the time) surprisingly equal in population size, something which was accomplished by splitting a number of counties. This of course created more opportunities for gerrymandering, but the legislature appears not to have engaged in much of it, at least not in terms of linguistics (The legislative assembly, which itself had a slight gerrymander of Quebec constituencies in favour of English-speakers, had a powerful French-Canadian minority due to this group being more unified than the English-speaking majority).
True, most of the rural areas with English-speaking majorities were grouped together in three divisions (Wellington and Bedford in the Eastern Townships, Inkerman along the Ottawa River), but English-speakers had a significant presence in a number of other divisions as well. Montreal Island was divided between three: Alma to the north (with Laval), Victoria (most of the city itself), and Rigaud to the south (with the Vaudreuil-Soulanges area). The latter two probably had English-speaking majorities. Other divisions with large minorities included Stadacona (basically Quebec City), Kennebec in the Eastern Townships, and others. A decline in the proportion of English-speakers started by the 1860s and has not stopped since, during that time falling from about 25 to 8 percent. Likely none of the divisions have English-speaking majorities today, although Rigaud probably comes closest.
In practice, other issues being in the foreground, some French-speaking divisions elected English-speaking candidates (more than vice versa). When the divisions were kept for the appointive system as a compromise acceptable to both groups, the linguistic characteristics of a division only came to matter as far as the federal prime minister or the Quebec premier cared. In the initial appointments by the crown in 1867, by my count, nine English-speakers were called to both the federal Senate and the Quebec legislative council. These numbers then generally fell over time.
Seed planted by Espen — 14 August 2006 @ 02:41
I just want to say thanks to Espen for his detailed answer (but only now I could post it)
Seed planted by Bancki — 10 September 2006 @ 23:48
An official paper on the reform of the House of Lords has leaked. It’s written by Jack Straw (Leader of the House of Commons), to be used for cross-party negotiations on the issue.
The proposed new House of Lords would have 450 members, half of it elected, the others appointed.
The elections would be using open list-PR in the EP-constituencies at the same time as the elections to the House of Commons.
Besides some Anglican bishops and PM-appointed members, most of the appointments would be made by an independent nine-member Appointments Commission.
All members would sit for three Parliament terms. Most of the existing members (the co-opted hereditary peers and the life peers) would loose their seat.
In the paper, the advantages and disadvantages of various methods and timings of elections are discussed (thos that were not chosen in an appendix).
It puzzles me to read that regional lists “produce proportionate result” (catalogued as an advantage) and STV “allows proportional result” (advantage) but “can produce visibly disproportional outcomes” (disadvantage). This is only true if under STV one considers only the first preferences aggregated by party to calculate “the” proportional result, while voters can cross party-lines with their lower preferences. But if everyone votes completely loyal to only one party, STV gives the same result (on the party-level) as list-PR.
Seed planted by Bancki — 31 October 2006 @ 03:01
House of Lords proposal
… a leaked proposal for reform of an even older unelected upper house, the House of Lords.
Scion grafted by Fruits and Votes — 31 October 2006 @ 09:41
Canadian PM Stephen Harper introduced a bill (C-43) for “the consultation of the electors … in relation to the appointment of senators.”
“Pending the pursuit of a constitutional amendment … to provide for a means of direct election” (preamble of the bill) the elected candidates are not automatically senators, they will be presented to the PM and he retains the choice who to appoint senator: it is the task of the Governor-general to “summon” senators. (s. 24 Constitution Act 1867)
If I’ve read the bill well:
* these “consultations” should be held together with federal or provincial legislative elections. (ss. 12-13) This should be read together with bill S-4 amending s. 29 Constitution Act 1867: new senators are appointed for eight years and not until their 75th birthday.
* the electoral system chosen in the bill is province-wide STV (or AV if there is only one vacancy) (ss.47(3) en 51-55)
The bill makes no changes in the distribution of seats between the provinces.
Seed planted by Bancki — 19 December 2006 @ 05:58
At present there are 10 vacancies in the Senate: one each for Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island; two each for Ontario and Quebec and three for Nova Scotia.
But maybe these vacancies opened a window of opportunities for a redistribution of seats between the provinces?
Seed planted by Bancki — 20 December 2006 @ 06:08
Harper’s Senate reform is surprisingly good, if you like elected upper houses with almost co-equal powers.
With the new eight year terms, the plan is that half will be elected every four years. (He has made it clear he wants to appoint those “elected.”)With 24 Senators from Ontario and another 24 from Quebec, that means a quotient of 7.7% on the final count to win a seat. Almost fair! Unfortunately BC still has only six, so three at each election means you need 25% on the final count to win a seat.
Well, in a three party system that’s one for each party. Better than First-Past-The-Post, I suppose. (Well, almost anything is better than First-Past-The-Post, except the Instant Runoff Vote which, with a three-party spectrum in which the centre party is everyone’s second choice, would actually be worse than First-Past-The-Post. In the last Ontario election that would have given us a legislature in which the two opposition parties would both have elected too few MPPs for official party status.)
Harper is not proposing to give BC more Senators, as 99.9% of those British Columbians who care about the Senate (less than half, I expect) will tell you they deserve. This would take a constitutional amendment, but it’s Quebec’s turn first, unless it’s the First Nations’ turn first, unless … hey, why don’t we do a whole package for everyone, and then everyone will be unhappy with some part of it. Oh, yes, we tried that, didn’t we.
Seed planted by Wilf Day — 29 December 2006 @ 20:14
Wilf, I agree that IRV is even worse than FPTP in a three-party context. Worse for legislative elections, that is–which is the only kind you have at national or provincial level.
I don’t like co-equal upper houses, and it is certainly the case that–against much conventional wisdom–Canada’s Senate is close to co-equal. Watch it act as such once the Senators are elected and Canada’s unique bicameral division of labor surely fades away.
The representation ratios for provinces really should be dealt with before any move towards elections goes forward. But that issue has killed past efforts at Senate reforms, has it not?
Seed planted by MSS — 31 December 2006 @ 10:47
There is more than one method of breaking deadlock. You haven’t mentioned joint sessions, as in India, which is what I’d propose for Canada.
I do like co-equal upper houses, as long as they have a meaningfully different partisan composition from the lower house, they don’t normally have a 1-party majority and there exists a good deadlock-breaking mechanism. That way you can have a plurality rule, with a lower house majority, while needing to negotiate with other parties in an upper house, where no party has a majority, in order to get legislation through.
I think the problem with the Australian constitution is that despite its brilliant double-dissolution mechanism, it lacks an effective deadlock-breaking mechanism for supply, which it seems cannot wait three months like other legislation. In order to prevent a repetition of 1975, I would advocate a provision allowing for swift double dissolution for supply bills, as well as a temporary budget for such cases. Alternatively, you could have the houses going straight to joint sitting (without dissolution) as the mechanism for supply bills. Or you could, of course, strip the Senate of any supply-blocking powers, but that would mean virtually permanent 1-party control of the budget.
Seed planted by JD — 06 January 2013 @ 09:44
In NSW if the council rejects supply the government can ultimately obtain supply from the assembly alone. If a bill that is not a money bill is rejected by the council,or amended in a way that the assembly rejects, the assembly can force a referendum on the assembly version of the bill.
I seem to remember that Harry Clarke, the former clerk of the senate, once suggested that the NSW model be adopted federally.
Seed planted by Alan — 06 January 2013 @ 11:36
The model I would prefer is that the lower house can bypass a balky upper house by appealing straight to whatever part of the polity the upper house is supposed to represent or be drawn on.
So if the upper house is supposed to represent the states in a federal system, there should be a way for the lower house to directly appeal to the separate state governments to get its measures through. If the upper house is popularly elected, then the alternative mechanism would be a nationwide referendum.
This obviously wouldn’t have worked well with the British House of Lords, or with an upper house such as the Bundesrat that is already essentially a conference of the state governments. Though with an appointed upper house such as the current version of the Lords or the Canadian Senate, maybe a nationwide referendum would be appropriate.
I don’t think bicamerlism works well at all with pure budgetary legislation.
Seed planted by Ed — 06 January 2013 @ 22:48
Alan @23: You mean Harry Evans? Either that or a brilliant satirical name to rival Barry Humphries’ fictitious ABC manager “Senator Doug Manton” (ABC manager Talbot Duckmanton x Senator Doug McClelland). One of my students once referred to Tasmania’s “Hah-ray Clark electoral system”, ie pronounced as in Hare Krishna.
(At one point when Harry Evans was Clerk of the Senate, the Clerk of the House was Ian Harris – a nicely symmetry of Celtic names).
MSS, in light of the 2011 Canadian federal election you need to update footnote **.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 06 January 2013 @ 22:59
The problem with an appeal to the states is who are the states? In the US would it be the governors? The legislatures? Would California and Wyoming have the voting power they exercise in the Senate or the House?
And why, when it is a state that is is to be appealed to, lay the matter before officials who were not elected for that purpose over the heads of senators who were?
There would be 2 second chambers, a second chamber at first instance and an ad hoc second chamber at second instance.
Seed planted by Alan — 06 January 2013 @ 23:05
Maybe one could have a sort of “alarm-bell” procedure. One third of senators across say half of the provinces or states could ask for a vote on whether to suspend consideration of a bill be done by unit rather than by head-if both senators vote a certain way, the state or provincial unit counts as a vote, if the vote splits, it is counted as not voting. In the Canadian context, if a majority of senators vote in favour or against in each unit, the unit counts as a vote, if they split equally, which might be possible, then they count as not voting.)
If a bill is suspended in this way it could either be stopped for a fixed amount of time (like the HoL suspensive veto) or until the next general election. At that point, if the Lower House takes it up again and passes it in exactly the same form, the bill is voted on in the Senate by head, under a special rule where any procedural obstacles can be over-run with a majority vote.
This tests whether a) the vital interests of lots of small or thinly populated states aren’t over-ridden without there being an opportunity to think again on the part of the majority, b) that it really is the vital interests of these states in question, and not just a question of ideology (if a state or provinces’s senate delegation splits its vote, or where there a re more than two senators, actually deadlocks, public opinion on the question is obviously more complicated), and c) doesn’t allow determined minorities to frustrate the clear popular will for years if not decades through procedural obstructionism.
Seed planted by DC — 07 January 2013 @ 10:38
I would have thought, with the greatest possible respect, that the problem in the US federal legislature is getting bills started, not stopped.
The extraordinary super minority procedures in the US Senate were not envisaged by the Philadelphia convention which rather clearly provided for the default to be a simple majority except where the constitution specifies otherwise.
I’m afraid I’m with JS Mill. A majority is a majority.
That being said, the Danish Folketing has a a minority veto where 1/6 of deputies can require a referendum on legislation. I do not know if it has ever been invoked. In the South African National Council of Provinces some classes of bill are voted by individual delegates and others are voted by province. There is no procedure for counting both by delegate and by province.
And @Tom who has been taking my extensive bagging of his ideas with peculiar grace, yeah I was in a hurry and messed up the name.
Seed planted by Alan — 07 January 2013 @ 14:29
I was thinking along the lines that if a certain percentage of the lower houses of state/ provincial legislatures sign off on a bill passed by the federal lower house, but not the federal upper house, within a certain time frame it becomes federal law and no further action by the federal upper house is necessary. This assumes a situation where the federal upper house in theory represents the state/ provinces but its members are really not tied to the state/ provincial governments, as in the U.S. where the Senate became a really inefficient legislature chosen from malapportioned electoral districts.
This would not add another veto point, it would be an alternative passage method in cases where the upper chamber was badly in need of reform, but for some reason couldn’t be reformed or abolished. I really don’t see why you wouldn’t just reform or abolish the upper chamber instead.
The entire premise of U.S. federalism is that all states are equal entities, regardless of population. So something like this would have to be 26 of the state legislature lower houses. This despite the fact of the Civil War and gerrymandered states admitted in the nineteenth century to keep the post-Civil War Republican Party in power.
Seed planted by Ed — 08 January 2013 @ 03:30
I’m increasingly drawn to South Africa where the provincial premiers are delegates to the NCOP and when the vote is by states it is the premiers who exercise the vote.
Seed planted by Alan — 08 January 2013 @ 04:27
@Alan: I don’t think its illegitimate in a federal system to have some sort of break on the majority-what I had in mind was the decades long attempt to introduce civil rights legislation over the opposition of the Southern senators. The House passed numerous bills (well before the 1960s) that the permanent blocking minority in the Senate killed. I’m all for delay to reconsider an issue if opposition is that virulent, but at a certain point one has to make a decision, and that’s what my suggestion was about.
Seed planted by DC — 08 January 2013 @ 08:28
DC: What do you mean ‘there has to be a decision’? Surely, a decision can be negative…
Seed planted by JD — 08 January 2013 @ 10:18
@JD-well yes, but I return to my example, civil rights in the US. For decades the will of the majority was stifled by a minority in the Senate-a lot of the time the legislation simply never came to a vote, either way.
By institutionalising an “alarm bell”, you give a minority a chance to put their case to the majority, by temporarily postponing the decision. It could be that a substantial minority are unfairly (from their perspective) victimised by a measure with majority support across the nation, but which may not have broad geographic or regional support. (Doesn’t mean they are right-but it doesn’t change that they feel that way).
In the meantime, the political support for the proposal could evaporate, or flaws in the original proposal could come to light. That’s my thinking anyway-its better than perpetually postponing decisions because a blocking minority won’t even let the matter come to a vote, which is the most pernicious aspect of the present Senate procedure.
Seed planted by DC — 08 January 2013 @ 11:24
If Canada is going to have an elected Senate, hopefully by Proportional Representaton, then wouldn’t it be wise, if elections are called for the lower house, then elections for the upper house are held at the same time. A government that can’t get it’s bill passed through the Senate, can call an snap election to resolve the deadlock.
Seed planted by Suaprazzodi — 08 January 2013 @ 22:33
JD, while legally a negative decision has the same force as a positive one, politically the first type can lack democratic legitimacy.
Eg, if a bill has overwhelming support in the lower house, but is blocked by 40% +1 of the upper house, this can’t really be interpreted as a resounding vote of confidence in the status quo.
Peter Russell and other Canadian political scientists have warned pessimistically that the repeated defeat of Constitutional reform provinces in the past four decades has led to a situation where the status quo continues only by default and shows more the mutual distrust of competing powerbrokers (Quebec, the west, etc) than assent to the status quo.
The Australian republic debate showed signs of falling into this spiral (one reason why I’m personally happy to keep the issue off the agenda for another generation). A combination of (my estimate) 10% who are actually monarchist (ie, would campaign for a royal restoration if Australia ever became a republic) plus 30% who support the status quo on procedurally conservative grounds (‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”) plus another 15% who want a republic but not the particular model on offer, can repeatedly vote down the 45% who either like the republic model on the ballot or are prepared to live with it.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 09 January 2013 @ 01:12
The presumption behind discussion of the role of the Senate in Australia is that the House of Representatives represents the majority. In fact, almost every government we have ever had received a minority of the vote. The Senate is the more representative house as it is elected by proportional representation. Even the fact of each state having the same number of senators does not override this representative character. The majority of seats in the House of Representatives rarely the result of a majority of first preference votes.
Labor has to get over the Senate’s blocking of Supply in 1975, as history tells us that the Australian people understand that the Senate is the more representative House and that they will always defeat referenda undermining the Senate.
We need four-year fixed terms for the House of Representatives, fixed eight-year terms for the Senate, acceptance of the Senate’s right to block Supply, the replacement of the double dissolution provision with a referendum of the people on any legislation passed by one House and not by the other and the constitutional entrenchment of proportional representation for Senate elections. If the Senate blocked Supply, the people would vote on the issue on a referendum. If they agreed with the Senate, the House would face an immediate election. If they agreed with the House, the Senate would face an immediate election for al senators. In both cases, the newly elected MPs and senators would serve only for what remained of the four-year or eight-year term.
The chances of this package in the current political environment are zero.
The fact that each state has the same number of senators despite differences in population does not affect the representative nature of the Senate because the people in each state vote in a similar fashion.
The following gives the voting percentage, the number of seats won and the percentage of seats won in various House and Senate elections since 1970. The figures for votes and seats are from http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/a/australia/. I have calculated the percentage of seats. Rounding means that the total percentage does not always equal 100. The first column is the percentage of the votes; the second is the number of seats won; the third is the percentage of seats won. (I am crossing my fingers that the formatting will survive.)
1970 Senate
ALP 42.2 13 41
DLP 11.1 3 9
Coalition 38.9 14 44
Other 8.5 2 6
1972 House of Representatives
ALP 49.6 67 54
DLP 5.2 0 0
Coalition 41.4 58 46
Other 3.8 0
1974 Senate
ALP 47.3 29 48
DLP 3.6 0 0
Coalition 43.6 29 48
Other 5.5 2 4
1974 House of Representatives
ALP 49.3 66 52
DLP 1.4 0 0
Coalition 45.8 61 48
Other 3.5 0 0
1975 Senate
ALP 40.9 27 42
DLP 2.7 0 0
Coalition 51.7 35 55
Other 4.7 2 3
1975 House of Representatives
ALP 42.8 36 28
DLP 1.3 0 0
Coalition 53.1 91 72
Other 2.8 0 0
1977 Senate
ALP 36.8 14 41
Democrats 11.1 2 6
Coalition 45.6 18 53
Other 6.5 0
1977 House of Representatives
ALP 39.6 38 31
Democrats 9.4 0 0
Coalition 48.1 86 69
Other 2.9 0 0
1980 Senate
ALP 42.3 15 44
Democrats 9.3 3 9
Coalition 43.6 15 44
Other 4.9 1 3
1980 House of Representatives
ALP 45.2 51 41
Democrats 6.6 0
Coalition 46.4 64 59
Other 1.9 0
1983 Senate
ALP 45.5 30 47
Democrats 9.6 5 8
Coalition 40.0 28 44
Other 5.0 1 2
1983 House of Representatives
ALP 49.5 75 60
Democrats 5.0 0 0
Coalition 43.7 50 40
Other 1.9 0 0
1996 Senate
ALP 36.2 14 35
Democrats 10.8 5 13
Coalition 44.0 20 50
Other 9.1 1 3
1996 House of Representatives
ALP 38.8 49 33
Democrats 6.8 0 0
Coalition 47.3 94 64
Other 7.2 5 3
1998 Senate
ALP 37.3 17 43
Democrats 8.4 4 10
Coalition 37.7 17 43
Other 13.9 2 5
1998 House of Representatives
ALP 40.1 67 45
Democrats 5.1 0 0
Coalition 39.5 80 54
Other 15.0 1 1
2004 Senate
Greens 7.7 2 5
ALP 35.0 16 40
Coalition 45.0 21 53
Other 12.3 1 3
2004 House of Representatives
Greens 7.2 0 0
ALP 37.6 60 40
Coalition 46.7 87 58
Other 9.5 3 2
2007 Senate
Greens 9.0 3 8
ALP 40.3 18 45
Coalition 39.9 18 45
Other 10.6 1 3
2007 House of Representatives
Greens 7.8 0 0
ALP 43.4 83 55
Coalition 42.1 64 43
Other 6.7 2 1
The pattern is crystal clear. Major parties are over-represented in the House of Representatives: in 1975, the Coalition won 72 per cent of the seats with only 53 per cent of the vote: in 1996, the Coalition won 64 per cent of the seats with only 47 per cent of the vote; in 1998, the Coalition won 54 per cent of the seats with only 40 per cent of the vote: in 1983, the ALP won 60 per cent of the seats with only 40 per cent of the vote; in 2007, the ALP won 55 per cent of the seats with only 43 per cent of the vote. The DLP, with 5.2 per cent of the vote, got no seats in 1970. The Democrats, with 9.4 per cent of the vote, got no seats in 1977. The Greens, with 7.8 per cent of the vote, got no seats in 2007.
By contrast, the percentage of seats won is close to the percentage of votes won for major parties in every Senate election, and third parties are typically represented there.
Even though states of different sizes have the same number of senators, the voting pattern in each state is typically sufficient to elect two Coalition and two ALP senators, with a contest between the third major party candidates and a third party candidate for the last two spots, with a major party usually winning one of them. Thus, the 2007 results were: NSW – 3 ALP, 3 Coalition; Victoria – 3 ALP, 3 Coalition; Queensland – 3 ALP, 3 Coalition; WA – 2 ALP, 3 Coalition, 1 Green; SA -2 ALP, 2 Coalition, 1 Green, 1 independent; Tasmania – 3 ALP, 2 Coalition, 1 Green.
The figures show that the Senate is more representative of how people vote than the House of Representatives. This justifies the Senate’s right to refuse to pass any legislation at all from the House of Representatives. Governments are forever complaining about the Senate, but they almost never take the option of the double dissolution to prove that the people really do support them. The fact that the Senate better represents public opinion is the reason.
Seed planted by Chris Curtis — 09 January 2013 @ 01:42
I agree with 90% of Chris @36 apart from:
“If the Senate blocked Supply, the people would vote on the issue on a referendum. If they agreed with the Senate, the House would face an immediate election. If they agreed with the House, the Senate would face an immediate election for all senators.”
One thing both sides agree on, regarding the 1975 crisis, is that there isn’t time to wait while supply is running out. (The Whitlam faction say this warrants a UK/ NSW style lower house override: the Kerr faction say this justifies an immediate double dissolution, or at least an election for the lower house alone).
Interposing a referendum on the budget (have I understood this proposal right?), followed by an election, sounds like more delay (4-8 weeks for each poll) and enormous cost ($50 million for each federal election or referendum, on average). Given the budget hasn’t been passed, the Constitution would have to, eg, authorise the Electoral Commission or the G-G to appropriate the necessary funds by decree, perhaps with High Court pre-clearance.
My own preferred model is a Lower House override on the budget (but only defined as “ordinary annual services of govt” – ie, not over creating new taxes or increasing the maximum rate of any tax), no double dissolutions, completely fixed term for the Senate, a dissolved House only serves out the remainder of the previous term (Swedish model), and House can override Senate on non-budget bills either by (a) two-thirds at a joint sitting, or (b) re-passing after an intervening House-only election, or (c) a referendum.
We should also get rid of the 2:1 nexus ratio, fix the Senate at 11 seats per State (if rotation is abolished) or 5 per State per election (if rotation is retained), and retain 2:1 voting weight at joint sittings simply by laying down that every MHR casts [twice number of Senators] votes while every Senator casts [number of MHRs votes]. So, with 70 Senators (66 for the States, 4 for ACT and NT) and 200 MHRs, each Senator would cast 200 votes each (total 14,000 “Senate” votes) and each MHR would cast 140 votes (making a total of 28,000 “House” votes). Journalists would, of course, describe this as “complicated”, but at least the House could grow with population, and we wouldn’t have to put up with 150,000 people per MHR.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 09 January 2013 @ 07:18
@Tom and Chris with whom I mostly concur but partly dissent.
I voted against the republic model in 1999 much against my first impulse. It was an absurd proposal that entrenched and expanded prime ministerial power at the cost of parliament. A alrge majority of people who declare themselves as republicans in polls also say they want a populary elected president. A small minority of them insist that an elected president would suspend the constitution and declare martial law the instant they were sworn in.
There was an ironic moment during the constitutional convention when Mary Delahunty addressed the convention.
‘Convince me that celebrity would not control the election’.
Delahunty was seated with the rest of the Australian Republican Movement leadership group. (1) Malcolm Turnbull, (merchant banker, prominent figure in Sydney society, later a Liberal MP), (2) Australia’s richest woman, (3) a well known Australian Rules footballer and game show host, (4) Delahunty herself, a prominent ABC radio personality, (5) a young cosmetics entrepreneur. Evidently Delegate Delahunty had not looked over shoulder.
Weirdly enough the ARM prefigured the current mess in the ALP where the party caucus have appointed a leader who is not the choice of either the party membership or electorate. Many of the same voices that insisted an elected president was an invitation to an Australian Napoleon can now be heard insisting that caucus got it right and you cannot trust either the membership or the electorate to judge these issues.
But to return to the proposal, we have a simple model in NSW that does not need referendums or complex calculations.
A government with the confidence of the legislative assembly can get supply from the assembly alone. All other bills can be resolved by referendum. There may be a case for adding the not uncommon rule that if the parliament does not pass the budget by the due date the previous budget continues in force.
I would be deeply uncomfortable with letting a bill pass over senate opposition after an intervening election.
Seed planted by Alan — 09 January 2013 @ 08:14
How about “60% of a joint sitting after an intervening election, OR a referendum”?
Seed planted by Tom Round — 09 January 2013 @ 19:02
Tom, why a supermajority of a joint sitting? The current provisions for joint sitting (after double dissolution) require only a regular majority.
Seed planted by JD — 09 January 2013 @ 23:42
Hi DC @40, true, the current Aust Const s 57 requires only an absolute majority of the combined joint sitting and in fact a 60% requirement in the first draft was one reason that version didn’t get majority support in the more populous States.
However, the current s 57 also requires the House to submit itself to a special general election. It cannot be used less than six months before the normal term is due to expire. (It also cannot be used too early in the House’s term as the High Court has ruled that the Senate has not “failed to pass” a HR Bill merely by subjecting it to ordinary legislative deliberations – consideration by committee, for example. The ban on a DD an unspecified time after the previous HR election and a specified time before the next has the internal logic that it requires the PrM to make a good faith attempt to negotiate the disputed bill(s) with the Senate. IOW, at one end the PrM can’t simply re-spin the electoral roulette wheel if the Senate doesn’t fall into line ASAP, and at the other end, the PrM can’t convert his or her normal scheduled date with electoral destiny into a DD with the chance of making all Senators fight for re-election).
By contrast, I would (if asked to re-write the Constitution: Ms Gillard, you may contact me c/o the email address above, thanks…) replace the complicated and somewhat vague s 57 flow-chart with a simpler requirement only that the disputed Bill have been passed (or re-passed) by a joint sitting within the 60 days before a HR election (expiry or dissolution), and again within the 60 days after. A HR dissolution (without the Senate, which should have a wholly fixed term) would be sufficient but not necessary. An ordinary regular election would also do the trick.
To compensate for this – since the PrM would no longer be sacrificing up to one-sixth of her normal maximum parliamentary term (6 months or more out of 3 years) as the price of a “double or nothing” electoral re-gamble – I think the joint sitting threshold should be raised from 50% to 60%.
(With the 2:1 ratio between Houses, as noted, ensured by weighting members’ votes rather than by capping the size of either chamber. On reflection, if we are going to constitutionally entrench the number of Senators permanently, “13 per State if rotation is abolished, 7 per State per election (ie, 14 per State total) if rotation is retained” might be more politically palatable. The minor parties and independent candidates would be trading away their – admittedly remote – hope that the major parties might, just might, one day increase the number of Senators per State, by ordinary Act, to 16 or 22 or 30. So they would want a plumper bird in the hand, quota-wise, to make up for signing away the two in the bush. Having said that, I would bet that if population pressure ever forced Labor and Liberal?National to collude on a Senate of 184 and a House of 367, they would also legislate for the States to be divided into three five-seat Senate districts for each election – there would not be 15 Senators State-wide at each periodic election and 30 at each DD.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 10 January 2013 @ 04:53
@Julia
Don’t hire Tomad legibus scribundun , hire me.
@Tom
We have a PR Senate which, as Chris has shown, more accurately mirror’s the nation’s mind than the House of representatives. The size of the house and its election by MPV make the 60% barrier almost irrelevant. As Harry Evans noted, it would give the prime minister absolute control of legislation and reduce both houses to an electoral college.
I still say give the house exclusive control of supply, abolish joint sittings, and allow either house to initiate a referendum on bills rejected or amended unacceptably by the other house.
Seed planted by Alan — 10 January 2013 @ 11:58
Alan@42:
Several Australian governments (eg Hawke/Keating 1990-93) had 50%+ in the HR but a minority in the joint sitting. 60% would be even less common. Or we could re-weight the two Houses’ voting weight as 50-50 instead of 66-33, now that (unlike 1900) it doesn’t mean a minuscule 36 MHRs.
Uruguay, I think it was, had a similar rule – counting the percentage vote in each chamber then adding the percentages to maintain parity irrespective of the actual numbers of Senadores y Diputados.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 10 January 2013 @ 19:23
It is not deeply reassuring knowing that occasionally the prime minister will not be able to legislate at pleasure. As Harry Evans wrote:
Seed planted by Alan — 11 January 2013 @ 01:17
@Julia
I should never have posted #44 because you are now sure to hire Tom.
Seed planted by Alan — 11 January 2013 @ 03:18
Tom (37),
I am imposing a referendum on supply bills. If the Senate refused to pass supply, it would do so knowing that a subsequent referendum might do so and force the Senate to an election. That is meant to discourage the Senate form refusing to pass supply in most circumstances. If the senate got it wrong, it would face an election with supply already passed (at the referendum). If the Senate got it right, the House would face an election with supply having been defeated, so there would need to be funding for an interim period. I don’t think it need to be anywhere near 4-8 weeks for each poll. I’d say three weeks for the referendum and two for the subsequent election. (I’ll let the lawyers do the drafting.)
I am totally opposed to any provision for the House to override the Senate for the reasons that the Senate is in fact more democratic and any dispute can be settled by the ultimate authority – the people.
I accept hat the nexus provision is less important if there is to be no double dissolution, but I would keep it any way to allow the Senate to grow in size as population grows.
I would keep rotation as it smooths out temporary enthusiasms.
Seed planted by Chris Curtis — 11 January 2013 @ 20:46
Alan (38),
Your reason for voting against the republic model in 1999 is the same as mine. No one would design a system with an inherited monarch at the top of it now, but the absurdity of the system does not justify just any old replacement.
I am opposed to taking away the Senate’s power to block supply because the Senate is more democratic and representative than the House. The principle is separate from the issue of the use of this power on any particular occasion. I did not support the blocking of supply on 1974 or 1975. In fact, I spoke against it at the Victorian DLP Central Executive meeting in 1974 when the DLP senators were considering what to do. Unfortunately, Frank McManus was conned by Billy Snedden into thinking the DLP senators would be on a joint ticket with the Coalition. I said this would not happen, but who was going to listen to a 21-year old in preference to the federal leader of the party? The DLP was wiped out – not the last example of the consequences of my advice not being taken.
Seed planted by Chris Curtis — 11 January 2013 @ 20:54
Chris, that’s a great story!
It is great to see this old planting revived. It’s the sort of re-propagation that makes F&V valuable!
Seed planted by MSS — 11 January 2013 @ 21:54
@Chris
I would not have the Senate able to reject supply, also because it is more democratic that the House of Representatives.
The minimum, as I think Tom says, is that you need a constitutional provision for a continuing budget. That comes close to only a limited capacity to block supply anyway, the sting in blocking supply is not its constitutional or legal status, but the fact that the money runs out and you are likely to be dismissed by the governor-gneral. A situation where supply can expire before a referendum is finalised is an invitation to chaos. I know we have stolen a thread devoted to North America, but let’s not acquire fiscal cliffs as well.
It is true that the Senate has a more democratic character than the House. It does not necessarily follow that a referendum on supply, with a chance the government would have to cease operations before or until the referendum, has a more democratic character than the alternatives.
Seed planted by Alan — 11 January 2013 @ 23:49
One could reverse the Australian formula (which I quite like), and have the lower house be the proportional house and the upper house be the non-proportional house.
However, assuming that the lower house is still larger than the upper house, that leaves the problem. I think there is considerable value in having constituency representatives elected by districts. In the Australian case, a non-proportionally elected Senate would be either elected on a statewide basis or appointed by the state governments. If the Senate is to be elected on a statewide basis the current proportional system is obviously much better and anyway you don’t get constituency representation.
MMP would allow for the placing of constituency representatives in a lower house that was proportional overall. I happen to dislike MMP because of the presence of representatives who don’t actually represent anyway (since they are appointed by the parties to bring their representative up to quota), but this can be seen by some as an aesthetic consideration.
However, with a larger, constituency or SMD elected lower house and a proportional upper house, you get the paradox that the upper house is more democratic.
In the Australian case, if Australia reversed the formula in favor of a proportionally elected House of Representatives and a non-proportionally elected Senate, I would prefer to use statewide open party lists for the House, and an unelected Senate made up of recallable state government appointees, or the senior state cabinet members themselves. State delegations in the House would still be proportional to the state populations, and Senate delegations would still be equal. The House delegations would represent the people of the states and the Senate delegations would represent the state governments. Come to think of it, something like this would be appropriate for a federal Europe. Note there is a serious argument in the Australian context for doing away with the states altogether.
There is also an argument that the continuation of the government and national finances should not necessarily be in the hands of the more democratic chamber, its better to entrust it to a stable chamber that is merely sufficiently democratic.
Seed planted by Ed — 12 January 2013 @ 01:22
There is certainly a case for redrawing state boundaries so that the states are more natural regions, but that argument applies equally to the other ‘square federations’ like the US and Canada. The combination of vast distance and cultural diversity makes multilevel governance more, not less, relevant here than in the US. In any case, multilevel governance, whether formally designated as federalism or not, is actually the global standard.
Some idiot wrote a recent article that Australia cannot be taken seriously as a diplomatic middle power unless we abolish the states. He apparently had not noticed that the US, India, Russia, Brazil and Germany are all federations and seem nevertheless to get their diplomats taken seriously.
Seed planted by Alan — 12 January 2013 @ 01:41
Ed @50:
Victoria’s introduction of PR for its Legislative Council a decade ago was, I estimate, a first in the democratic world since there is no longer any reason to hold the Victorian Legislative Assembly the “lower” or “popular” house, as opposed to the Legislative Council, other than (a) custom and (b) larger size.
In other words, the Victorian Legislative Council is fully elected by popular vote; there is no vote-weighting, unlike the federal Senate and the WA and Tasmanian Councils (eight regions of roughly equal size each elect 5 MLCs by PR-STV and 11 MLAs from SMDs); and unlike the Senate, NSW, SA and Tasmania, there is no rotation – both houses serve four-year terms.
In other words, there is no particular reason other than force of habit to regard the Assembly as “more democratic” than the Council. None of the usual reasons why the upper houses should “sit down and shut up” apply to Victoria.
Even the larger size of the Assembly is not conclusive – compare the UK Lords which was traditionally larger than the Commons, and the USSR’s Soviet of Nationalities which had the same number of deputies (750) as the Soviet of the Union.
As far as I can tell this is unique to Victoria (although there may be US States I have missed where Senate and Assembly both serve either 2- or 4-year terms and it’s only size that matters).
One minor point is that Assembly vacancies are filled though by-election whereas the Council has adopted the post-1977 Senate method of appointment by party machines. Yet even so, former Premier Jeff Kennett in 1993 wanted to abolish Assembly by-elections (substituting party appointment) whenever the Govt had a majority of at least 5 seats. And if countback had been adopted instead of the “Olsen Parachute” method, I would argue vigorously that would have made the Council no less democratic than the larger chamber.
Seed planted by Tom Round — 12 January 2013 @ 08:56
Ed @50: What is your argument in favour of such a reversal?
Seed planted by JD — 14 January 2013 @ 09:12
An update: The Canadian government is referring a collection of Senate-reform-related questions to the Supreme Court. There are quite a number of questions, I don’t think I’ve ever seen a reference quite this long.
Seed planted by Vasi — 04 February 2013 @ 10:26