UPDATE, 6 August: I corrected an error below. Thanks to Alex for pointing it out. (The value of peer review on blogs!) Chris has raised an interesting question, also at the propagation bench, to which I responded quickly on Friday afternoon. I have now revised and extended my remarks in that comment.
In some respects, the Haaretz headline and story are unremarkable. Israel has a democratic form of government, after all–and the most democratic subtype, a multiparty-majority coalition; moreover, the prime minister and defense minister are the leaders of different political parties. The policy disagreements that are inevitable in such a set-up lead to a more effective and democratic form of checks and balances than the kind that goes by that term in the USAmerican presidential system.
Still, it is interesting that Defense Minister Amir Peretz (Labor) is reported to favor “expanding the incursion”* all the way to the Litani River. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (Kadima), on the other hand, believes that holding ground in southern Lebanon is beside the point, in that it will not achieve their shared aim of solving the problem of Hezbollah’s rocket-firing capabilities. Indeed it is beside the point, but it is not as if Olmert’s shock and awe is–or could be–any more effective at stopping the firing of rockets that can be stored and launched from virtually anywhere in southern Lebanon. If the goal was preventing rockets being fired, then the government had to refrain from such massive retaliation for the captpuring of two soldiers.
Also interesting on internal (mainly internal to the Defense Ministry and IDF) discussions on strategy is a piece by Amir Owen. Key passage:
Two forces of nature influenced all of Israel’s wars: time and America. The two are really one.
Too long to excerpt or summarize adequately, but a very interesting article.
*a sort-of-nice-speak phrase for invasion and occupation.



Then again, there are frequently policy divisions within the executive in the US as well. Of course, here we have a “decider” who doesn’t have to worry about the (immediate) collapse of his government if he pushes another policymaker too far.
Then again, given Israeli political arrangements, Olmert would remain in office as PM for some time after a coalition collapse and have a freer hand to pursue his policy, absent a Knesset majority to replace him. Hence it is in Labor’s interest to remain in the government and nudge policy in its favor rather than leave and have no influence at all while Kadima pursues a more aggresive strategy (and possibly leaves them with a mess when/if they gain the upper hand, which could be months away).
Seed planted by Chris Lawrence — 04 August 2006 @ 16:01
[Revised] On “policy divisions [occurring also ] within the executive in the US,” –indeed, but the question is whether the ministers in question are accountable to an electoral constituency for the divergent positions they take. In multiparty cabinets in parliamentary systems, ministers from different parties taking different stands do have such a connection.
(The logic would be somewhat different for presidential systems, though not completely vitiated: Presidents who face multiparty legislatures without a majority for their own party often build formal cabinet coalitions, and if they do not, obviously that have to build legislative coalitions.)
I agree with Chris’s analysis of Labor’s calculations, up to a point. But Kadima depends on Labor as much as vice versa. They are thus in a transactional relationship with one another and so the calculations of costs and benefits of dissent (and potential breaking of the coalition) are not as one-sidedin favor of the PM’s party as Chris implies.
Thus I do not necessarily agree with Chris that Olmert would have freer reign during an interim in which a major coalition partner left.
The question ultimately is whether one dissenting party would expect to be better off after breaking the coalition. Would it find a more attractive new coalition, or would a new election give it greater bargaining power? (In the present case, the answer for Labor is almost certainly no, but that is because of the political situation, not because of any inherent advantage enjoyed by the party having the prime ministership.)
Seed planted by MSS — 04 August 2006 @ 16:10
It seems as though this article says that Peretz is the one who wants to go to the Litani, not Olmert. Interestingly, Ze’ev Schiff states that only one minister favored extensive ground operations: “National Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, who once held the defense portfolio. Justice Minister Haim Ramon backed him to an extent….” One Labor hawk and another ex-Labor…
But why would Peretz and not Olmert favor this strategy?
Seed planted by Alex — 05 August 2006 @ 11:07
But why would Peretz and not Olmert favor this strategy?
Peretz has expressed strong reservations about the air campaign, on the ground that it has killed too many civilians without achieving significant military objectives. He believes that a ground campaign would be more likely to clear Hizbullah out of southern Lebanon while causing many fewer civilian casualties. Olmert, in contrast, has favored an American-style “shock and awe” approach.
I’ll reserve judgment on the merits of Peretz’ strategic thinking until the end of the war – among other things, his strategy runs the risk of turning into a long-term occupation if an international force can’t be organized – but sometimes a ground campaign can be the less damaging alternative.
Seed planted by Jonathan Edelstein — 09 August 2006 @ 14:06
Crossing the Litani? Israeli domestic politics, Olmert’s failings, and the war. On 9 August, as an expanded ground operation seemed to be drawing close, the Jerusalem Post noted: So the IDF appears to be finally getting what officers admit they should have asked for from early in this operation – when it became clear that Hizbullah could not be defeated by non-stop airstrikes. The man to thank for the shift, it is said, is Defense Minister Amir Peretz who, for the first time since this war began, seems to be setting the national agenda.
Scion grafted by Fruits and Votes — 11 August 2006 @ 12:54