THE CORE

Fruits & Votes is the Web-log of Matthew S. Shugart ("MSS"), Professor of Political Science, University of California, Davis.

Perspectives on electoral systems, constitutional design, and policy around the world, based primarily on my research interests.

Also experiences with growing many varieties of fruit (always organic) and other personal interests. Please see the Mission Statement for more. (There is also an explanation of the banner.)

Other "planters" have been invited to contribute. Please check the "Planted by" line to see the author of the post you are reading.

Join the conversation. Comments are always open. Except, that is, when Word Press mysteriously shuts them down, which happens with distressing frequency.

Core principles:

Henry Droop on the "moderate non-partisan section"

Madison on "dangers from abroad" and "the fetters... on liberty"

The Head Orchardist's other sites:

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  • 28 March 2013

    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Asia: East & Oceania

    The military regime has published a draft constitution. The regime constitution is radically different from the Ghai constitution released some months ago and most of the changes are for the worse. The regime has managed to establish possibly the worst constitution-making process possible. The draft will be enacted by decree after 2 weeks for public submissions which the regime can accept or disregard at pleasure.

    In most ways this is almost as theoretical a constitution as the one just adopted in Zimbabwe and had been prepared in a much, much less transparent and accountable way. Less transparent and accountable than Zimbabwe is not a good look.

    I found a version of the Ghai constitution without the watermark. The Fiji police seized all paper copies and burnt them which is why the PDF is hard to find. The Lowy Institute, to say the least, damns the process and its product with faint praise.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (1)


    25 March 2013

    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Africa; Authoritarianism

    I realise this is a purely theoretical document, but it’s an interesting constitution nevertheless. It follows pretty much the standard South Africa/Kenya model.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (4)


    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Australia

    The backwash from the Gillard frolic continues. The opposition has put a motion of no confidence on notice for the budget meeting of the parliament in May. This motion will not require a suspension of standing orders and therefore will not need an absolute majority.

    I’d be astounded, (but as we all know I’ve been astounded before) if the government tried to prevent a debate on this motion. They are unlikely to have the numbers in the house to vote against debating the motion, which means if they really do not want to have the motion debated there is always the possibility of seeking a prorogation. Prorogation would be dangerous because it would terminate the budget debate and the government needs to pass the budget before 30 July.

    I hope the governor-general would reject that advice, but at least it would be a test case for whether the governor-general is a benign mentor or a mechanical idiot so at least the cause of political science will advance.

    In the wake of Thursday’s chaos a number of senior ministers have resigned. They have been replaced by relative unknowns whoa re thought to be deeply loyal to Julia Gillard. The government’s electoral standings continue to decline. In today’s Newspoll the 2PP is 58/42 to the Coalition.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (15)


    20 March 2013

    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Australia

    While there is no truth at all to DC’s dastardly assertion that all Australian MPs are golpistas, Simon Crean, senior minister and a former opposition leader, has called on Julia Gillard to resign the prime leadership. I’d be astounded if there is not a change, and then presumably there will be a caretaker government while the new leader tries to form a government.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (7)


    17 March 2013

    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: Blogging

    Blogging–by me, anyway–will be almost non-existant till the very end of March or early April. The move to the Davis area is upon us at last!

    Those who have the keys to the virtual orchard are invited to plant (as Alan did earlier today). I will be checking comment threads now and then; if your comment lands in the moderation queue, it may take longer than usual for me to spot it and clear it.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (2)


    The following items have been published in the past several weeks. Please note that the links are to publisher’s websites, and are not open-access.

    Abstracts are viewable at the links without a subscription, but I will also put them in (long) footnotes here.

    David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, “Party ‘capacity’ in new democracies: How executive format affects the recruitment of presidents and prime ministers“, Democratization (2013). 1

    Matthew E. Bergman, Matthew S. Shugart, and Kevin A. Watt, “Electoral Studies (2013).2

    Kuniaki Nemoto and Matthew S. Shugart, “Localism and Coordination under Three Different Electoral Systems: The National District of the Japanese House of Councillors,” Electoral Studies (2013).3

    1. Abstract: Scholars and practitioners express concern that parties in “third wave” democracies are poorly developed, compared to parties in older democracies. We suggest that parties vary in their organizational “capacity”, focusing on parties’ ability to select trustworthy executive agents. Capacity is higher where parties can vet potential executive talent by observing future leaders over time in the legislature – an increasingly available option as democracy matures. The key distinction in parties’ use of this option lies in the delegation structure between a party and the executive. Parliamentary systems offer a clear line of delegation, which parties control. In presidential systems, parties must recruit executive candidates who can win a popular election, requiring characteristics that may not be well correlated with those that make them good party agents. As parliamentary democracy matures, we find a steady increase in prime ministers’ average length of prior legislative service. For presidents, there is significantly weaker growth in prior legislative service. We also theorize about and investigate patterns in semi-presidential democracies. Our findings suggest that the institutional format of the executive is more important for party capacity in new democracies than the era in which a democracy was born. []
    2. Two electoral systems that use “nontransferable preference votes” are commonly used: single nontransferable vote (SNTV) and open-list proportional representation (OLPR). Both systems promote intraparty competition by vote-seeking candidates, but differ on the extent to which the incentives of individual candidates and collective seat-maximizing parties are aligned, or not. We develop “logical models” of expected vote shares of parties’ first and last winners, and test (and confirm) these models using “symmetric regression” on an original data set drawn from over 2000 party-district observations in nine countries. The analysis helps bring us closer to an understanding of the relatively neglected “intraparty dimension” of representation, and allows us to offer some modest suggestions for improving systems of nontransferable preference votes. []
    3. Democratic representation involves tradeoffs between collective actors – political parties seeking to maximize seats – and individual actors – candidates seeking to use their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) to maximize their own chance of election and reelection. We analyze these tradeoffs across three different electoral systems used at different times for the large-magnitude nationwide tier of Japan’s House of Councillors. These electoral systems – closed and open-list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote – differ in the extent to which they entail candidates seeking individual preference votes and in whether collective vote shares affect overall party performance. We use local resources as a proxy for PVEA and seek to determine the extent to which parties nominate “locals” and how much the presence of such locals affects party performance at the level of Japan’s prefectures. []

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (0)


    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: ACADEMIC WORK; USA

    The draft chapters for a co-authored book project in which I am involved are posted on my academic pages for anyone who might be interested.

    A DIFFERENT DEMOCRACY?

    A Systematic Comparison of the American System with 30 Other Democracies

    By Steven L. Taylor, Matthew S. Shugart, Arend Lijphart, and Bernard Grofman

    It is often said that the United States has an exceptional democracy. To what degree is this claim empirically true? If it is true, in what ways is US democracy different and do those differences matter? What explanations exist for these differences?

    The study examines the choices made by the designers of the US government at the Philadelphia convention of 1787 and the institutional structures that evolved from those choices and compares them to 30 other democracies. The basic topics for comparison are as follows: constitutions, federalism, political parties, elections, interest groups, legislative power, executive power, judicial power, bureaucracies, and public policy.

    Each chapter starts with a discussion of the feasible option set available on each type of institutional choice and the choices made by the US founders as a means of introducing the concepts, as well as discussing how specific choices made in the US led to particular outcomes. This is done by looking at the discussions on these topics from the Federalist Papers and the debates from the Philadelphia Convention. This approach allows a means of explaining the concepts in a comparative fashion (e.g., federal v. unitary government, unicameralism v. bicameralism, etc.) before moving into the comparisons of the US system to our other 30 democracies, which make up the second half of each chapter. Each chapter contains an explicit list of specific differences between the US and the other democracies as well as comparative data in tabular and graphical formats. The current draft of our book has 64 tables, 16 figures, and 10 text boxes. All of the figures and tables contain comprehensive comparative data featuring all 31 cases (save in a handful of instances) or specific thematic subsets of the 31 cases (e.g., presidential systems or bicameral legislatures).

    The book is now under contract with Yale University Press.

    Comments are welcome (but act fast!).

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (5)


    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Australia

    The Northern Territory has a new chief minister. That is perhaps not notable enough for fructovotantes except that Giles is Austraia’s first indigenous head of government and for the manner in which he deposed his predecessor. Terry Mills was replaced as leader of the Country Liberal Party, and therefore as chief minister, while attending a trade mission in Japan. Presumably he phoned in his resignation to the Administrator of the Territory.

    That makes two head of government removals on the Coalition side in a fortnight.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (3)


    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: Electoral Thresholds; Israel

    As discussed in a previous thread, the new Israeli government is based on an agreement that includes a commitment to raise the electoral threshold from 2% to 4%. What impact might this have?

    In a working paper (of which I will become co-author), Taagepera has developed a logical model that suggests the number of parties (of any size) should be about the inverse square root of the threshold (expressed in fractional terms, not percent). The models fits a range of established countries quite well.

    At 4%, that means five parties.

    The problem is that Israel already has far “too many” parties for its existing threshold. At 2%, the country “should have” seven parties. In the most recent election, twelve parties (or, rather, lists) won seats. That’s about one and two thirds more than expected. So maybe raising the threshold to 4% would reduce the number of parties in the Knesset to about eight. Coincidentally (or maybe not), that would be a reduction by precisely the number of parties that won more than 2%, but less than 4%, of the vote in the most recent election.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (0)


    15 March 2013

    One of the provisions in the Israeli coalition agreement refers to political reform plans:

      1. The threshold is to be doubled from 2% to 4%.

      2. The number of Knesset members needed to dismiss a government will be increased from 61 to 70 (of 120).

    I would not count a system of government under that second provision as “parliamentary”; I am not sure what it is,1 or if there is anything comparable anywhere else.

    (As for thresholds, we have discussed the theme extensively before.)

    1. It has some features of Assembly-Independent, though it is a less drastic “de-parliamentarization” than that agreed in Papua New Guinea. []

    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: Coalition governance; Israel

    Just as the clock was about to run out on PM-designate Benjamin Netanyahu’s period for forming a government, he struck deals with Yesh Atid (Yair Lapid) and Bayit Yehudi (Naftali Bennet), to go along with one struck weeks earlier with Tnuah (Tzipi Livni).

    That this would most likely be the make-up of the ultimate coalition was clear almost as soon as the election results were in–or at least that is what I told our synagogue congregation in a “sermon” (yes, a political-science sermon!) shortly after the election. So I want to thank the Israeli party leaders for making me look good. Nonetheless, as is often the case with such bargaining, it went down to the wire and endured many twists and turns and seeming crises along the way. Of course, one can never be sure how many “crises” and threats are real chances for the process to break down, and how many are posturing for a better deal. I suspect most of them were the latter.

    Yesh Atid leader Lapid struck quite a good deal, in insisting on several of his campaign promises or post-election declarations: a smaller cabinet–including legislation to mandate that future cabinets be smaller still–a reduction in the number of deputy ministers, no ministers without portfolio, and–the big one–a commitment for legislation to “equalize the burden” by bringing more Haredi men (ultra-orthodox) into military service. In the last weeks, he made some direct threats to let the process lead to new elections–which some polls suggested would lead to a big increase in seats for his party–if his party did not get the Education ministry for Yesh Atid MK Shay Piron. Likud was insisting that the post stay with its own incumbent, Gideon Saar. Lapid won this showdown, too.

    Bayit Yehudi also struck a good deal, with the party claiming some key economic portfolios including the Ministry of Industry and Trade for Bennet and Housing and Construction for Uri Ariel (a leader of the ultra-nationalist National Union, which merged with Bayit Yehudi during the last Knesset term).

    As had been previously agreed, Tzipi Livni will be Justice Minister as well as lead negotiator with the Palestinian Authority. Her list’s #3, Amir Peretz, will have the Environmental Protection portfolio. (Livni struck a deal with the Green Movement before the election, and even though Peretz does not represent the Greens, getting the portfolio confirms the support Green voters brought to Livni’s list overall.) The prior agreement for two ministers from Tnuah (6 seats) was another potential source of bargaining breakdown, as when combined with the agreed smaller cabinet, it meant Tnuah would be over-represented. Livni threatened to withdraw her earlier agreement if she were her list’s only minister. Her seats are superfluous for the coalition’s having a majority, but Netanyahu apparently really wanted her (presumably for her international standing), and she got the deal adhered to. The cabinet size was increased from 21 to 22 as part of the agreement to keep Livni’s list at two. (Lapid had campaigned for 18; recent cabinets have had a number of full ministers in the high 20s, with numerous deputies.)1

    The biggest deal of all, however, is that the two Haredi parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, are going to the opposition. Their combined strength of 18 seats made them almost equivalent to Yesh Atid, and Netanyahu tried to play the card of an alternative coalition in the bargaining. There is little doubt that he would have preferred the continuation of a coalition with the Haredi parties over the one he is about to present to the Knesset. However, as long as Yesh Atid continued to be backed by a de-facto post-electoral, but pre-coalition, alliance with Bayit Yehudi, the alternative was not credible.2 The lack of a credible alternative shows up in the significant concessions Netanyahu had to give to his partners.

    Based on the likely composition of the government, we can calculate the degree of over/under-representation of each party. Under “Gamson’s Law” we expect the shares of ministers for each party in the agreement to be proportional to the shares each party contributes to the coalition’s parliamentary basis (i.e. its number of seats).


    Israel Cab 2013
    Click to open a larger image in a new window

    The table shows the shares calculated both with Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu as separate parties, and with them treated as one. The latter is done because they ran on a joint list. It is clear that the various concessions Netanyahu was forced to concede on policy and specific portfolios to his two main partners were traded for a significant over-representation to the joint list he led in the election. Likud-Beiteinu will have an absolute majority of the cabinet, despite representing less than half the Knesset seats of the coalition (and exactly half if the technically superfluous Tnuah is removed from the calculation).

    We can also see that Yisrael Beiteinu was rewarded for being in pre-election coalition with Likud, as it is over-represented if considered as a separate party, especially relative to Bayit Yehudi, which is actually a slightly larger party.

    The deal to preserve the second seat for Livni’s Tnuah results in this list being the one that is represented almost perfectly proportional to its seats. Not bad for a superfluous party!

    Ultimately, this coalition reflects quite closely the way Israelis voted: an overall right and pro-settler tilt, but decisively away from Haredi dominance of key posts and policies.
    _____________

    Pardon the lack of links. If time permits, I may add some more at a later time. This is based on numerous Haaretz articles, as well as others in Ynet and Times of Israel, and almost daily news reports heard/see on Kol Yisrael radio and IBA-TV.

    1. During the bargaining, there had been statements that Kadima (2 seats) also had joined the Bayit Yehudi-Yesh Atid alliance and that its leader Shaul Mofaz would get one of Yesh Atid’s ministerial posts. But this did not happen. []
    2. Interestingly, Bennet campaigned as if his list had a formal agreement with Likud and then bargained as if he had a formal agreement with Yesh Atid! []

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (1)


    09 March 2013

    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Australia

    The great state of Western Australia had a general election today. The results were the customary Coalition landslide.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (0)


    06 March 2013

    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: Japan

    Professor Kuniaki Nemoto of Waseda University sends along this note, which he kindly agreed to let me post:

    The Tokyo High Courts ruled the House of Representatives elections in 2012 as unconstitutional, though the results as non-unconstitutional.

    …meaning that the HoR needs to fix the malapportionment, but the MPs elected in 2012 can maintain seats.

    If the group appeals to the Supreme Court and the SC would rule both the elections and the results unconstitutional, then I don’t know what will happen, but here are some options:

    1. The HoR will be dissolved. It could be argued the entire chamber is unconstitutional.

    2. The HoR will have by-elections but only in under- and over-represented districts. Or probably only in SMDs. At least MPs elected on PR should be constitutionally OK.

    3. The HoR will fix the rule but won’t have the by-elections, because it could be argued overturning voters’ decisions, however malapportioned they were, should be undemocratic and unconstitutional.

    The link to the story Kuni is referring to (in Japanese): Asahi.com.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (4)


    Planted by MSS
    Planted in: WBC

    Thanks to Chris in a WBC ’09 thread for reminding me that we need a place to talk about this year’s World Baseball Classic!

    The Taiwan-Korea game on 6 March featured the most boring 8th inning comeback you could ever see.

    It seems the WBC could use some good institutional engineers to correct such situations.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (5)


    Planted by Alan
    Planted in: Australia

    A Victorian Coalition MP (who is under investigation for misuse of parliamentary resources) has resigned from the Liberal parliamentary party. The numbers in the legislative assembly are now Coalition 44, Labor 43, Independent 1. There is a by-election for the seat of Lyndhurst on 27 April.

    Victoria has a fixed term parliament and it is absolutely unclear which way the new independent will vote should Labor win the by-election. It is also absolutely unclear if the resigned MP will be able to remain in parliament after the investigation is concluded.

    It really seems to me that if the assembly is where the government is formed, there need to be an odd number of members.

    Propagation: Seeds & scions (28)


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    Recent comments.

  • Do UK elections now allow fusion candidacies? (11)
    • MSS: UKIP did admit during the recent local election campaign that it did not fully vet its candidates, due to (it was claimed) resource...
    • Chris: UKIP’s candidates for Parliament and MEP do indeed seem to need National Executive Committee Approval before being placed on the...
    • Chris: I think the key thing in being a Conservative-UK IP candidate might not be in having both of their emblems, but in not having an UKIP...
    • MSS: Here is the text (see Jaffr’s link): After paragraph (2A) insert— “(2AA)If a candidate who is the subject of an authorisation by...
    • MSS: Let me call attention here to Jaffr. at comment #1, who notes the amendment to the ballot law was passed earlier in 2013. (This comment was...
    • Tom Round: > “would officially be Conservative-Li beral on the ballot” The UK only adopted ballot labels in the early 1970s, and...
  • Is MMP in Ireland’s future? (7)
    • Wilf Day: Ireland’s Constitutional Convention is a very interesting model of an electoral reform process. It includes 66 randomly selected...
    • MSS: Yes, electoral-syste m change would require a constitutional amendment, which is why it is a topic of the Constitutional Convention. The...
    • Alan: I expect the sixth and last senate place to be decided by very small margins in a number of states. Voting below the line will have more than...
    • Tom Round: Sorry, I should clarify: A legal change to an explicit party list system would indeed require a referendum to amend the Constituti...
    • JD: Tom: I think the Irish probably DO like getting a choice among different candidates of the same party. Whether their leaders like offering that...
  • Distortions of the US House: It’s not how the districts are drawn, but that there are (single-seat) districts (30)
    • Ed: This is another article where the writer attempted to draw non-partisan districts, using a set of criteria an independent commission could...
  • Does STV have anything to do with absence of “free votes” in Ireland? (16)
    • MSS: I was sort of hoping this thread would be about free votes and STV’s possible role in them, but whatever… Uruguay has primary...
    • JD: Tom: There is far more variety than that. You have for example the compulsory primaries in Argentina, parties having primaries closed to party...
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